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S U M M A R Y
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WEST GERMANY : THE OPERATION OF A
PREDOMINANTLY WHITE COLLAR SMALL ORGANISATION IN WEST GERMANY
This thesis describes the operation of a Works Council after initially 
reviewing the concept of co-determination and existing literature. It details 
the Company in which the study took place over a thirty month period and is 
written by a former Works Councillor employed by that Company. It is not, 
therefore, a pure academic study of a controlled experiment written by an 
academic; the great expansion of research into West German industrial 
relations particularly after the 1972 Labour Management Relations Act and 1976 
Co-determination Act appears to have missed out the operation of Works 
Councils and concentrated on worker directors and the subsequent effect on 
them caused by the legislation. This study aims to fill the gap.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively concentrate on problems encountered by 
the Works Council and employer in the areas of unequal treatment, grievances 
and job evaluation/performance appraisal. Each area encompasses the relevant 
articles of the legislation and their interrelated difficulties; emphasis is 
placed not only on the facts and the problems but on eventual solutions - if 
any - and how the system was, or was not, able to cope with them. In addition 
to describing issues and how they were handled by both Works Council and 
Management, I have tried to emphasise how Management tries to keep all 
activity within a largely inflexible legislative framework.
Few, if any, studies exist that have been carried out or written by 
participants in the Works Council system (see Chapter 2). In particular there 
is a distinct lack of material written by Works Councillors in the white 
collar sector of smaller organisations with a multi-national background.
Using for reference the International Labour Organisation translation of the 
1972 L.M.R.A. under which the Works Council operation was governed, this 
thesis is the unique experience of an Englishman elected to two successive 
terms of office as a Works Councillor the second as Deputy Chairman of the 
Works Council.
The results of the study may lead to a revision of the general 
conclusions about the Works Council system, particularly as a system of 
management accountability, a basis of employee involvement and participation as 
well as a major influence on co-operation and low levels of conflict; it may 
also provide realistic guidance as to whether the system is initiating or 
simply reactive, and whether a Works Council can be a stand alone body rather 
than simply part of a complex system.
The reader is, therefore, invited to approach this study as the author 
has done - a new product.
(1)
Foreword
Once the pride of Western Europe for its famed economic miracle, West 
Germany has fallen well behind. In terms of working hours, it seems that West 
Germany’s nation that once considered hard work an obligation, has discovered 
the good life. In 1981 workers enjoyed up to six weeks holiday a year along 
with 14 regional days off. The country experiences some 1.5 million people in 
a labour force of 26 million reporting sick on any given day; absenteeism is 
much higher than major competitors such as Japan and the United States of 
America. The work ethic has been undermined but morale generally is quite 
high. The West Germany currency, the deutschmark, is clearly not having a 
good time; a poor country becoming poorer is no story and hardly anybody cares 
except its creditors. A rich country appearing suddenly in a poor man’s suit 
is somewhat different. Despite agreeing, in 1981 and 1982, to deficit 
spending measures the West Germans have not halted the recession, and, with 
the economic upheaval of the 1970’s oil price problems appear to be in a long 
terms deficit situation. It had been easy to overcome the initial oil price 
increases with high currency reserves and with the deutschmark rising in value 
against the dollar. This absorbed a large part of the real impact on the 
economy. The oil crisis appeared to be a real problem only for countries with 
currencies as weak as, or weaker than, the dollar. Since 1978 the deutschmark 
has become a petro-currency though West Germany tried to dissuade foreign 
banks from holding it and to use it as a reserve currency alongside the 
dollar. Perhaps the economic bubble began to burst simply because the 
management of the economy had been beyond suspicion for too long. This study 
of Works Councils and their operation has been carried out during the 
foregoing phase in the economic life of West Germany.
(2)
The problem of employee participation is that industrial relations in 
West Germany are governed by legislation (see for example Chapter 4), which 
often seems to be far removed from the real conditions under which it is 
supposed to operate. The Works Council as one method of participation may 
face antagonism from employees who may feel it istoo buraucratised; sometimes 
employees feel that the Works Council belongs to management or is too remote.
Often the only means of communication available to a Works Council are those 
provided by the management for example, the physical space for a general 
assembly of employees (see chapter 3). Other problems facing a Works Council 
include overcoming the apparent social distance between itself and its 
electorate, frivolous complaints by employees (see chapter 6) who often do not 
have the courage of their own convictions and a strong management attempting 
to neutralise their activities (see chapter 5).
In addition to describing issues and how they were handled by both Works 
Council and management, I have tried to emphasise how management tries to keep 
all activity within a largely inflexible legislative framework.
The great expansion of research into West German industrial relations 
particularly after the 1972 Labour Management Relations Act and 1976 
Co-determination Act appears to have missed out the operation of Works 
Councils (see chapter 2). The reader is therefore invited to approach this 
study as the author has done - as a new product.
The idea that started it all was essentially mine; having worked in an
organisation as a procurement engineer (see Chapter 3) that had a Works Council 
that I neither liked nor understood, I read two books.. First, Cullingford's 1976 
study, of ’ ’Trade Unions in West Germany' which provided.,an excellent insight into the
(3)
industrial scene; secondly, Furstenberg’s 1978 study of "Workers’
Participation in Management in the Federal Republic of Germany" which 
shattered any pre-conceived ideas and illusions I held and is without doubt 
the most realistic study available.
Armed with such knowledge, the author set about the task of getting 
elected to his own Works Council - successfully, Using for reference the 
International Labour Organisation translation of the 1972 LMRA under which the 
Works Council operation was governed, the chapters of this study are the 
experiences of two consecutive terms of office, the second as Deputy Chairman 
of the Works Council.
Few if any studies exist however that have been carried out or written by 
participants in the Works Council system (see chapter 2); in particular there 
is a distinct lack of material written by Works Councillors in the white 
collar sector of smaller organisations. This study in unique because it is 
the practical experiences of a Englishman elected to two successive terms of 
office as a Works Councillor in a white collar smaller organisation with a 
multi-national background. The experience was, at times, professionally 
stimulating and at times totally frustrating. The study may lead to a 
revision of the general conclusions about the Works Council system, 
particularly as a system of management accountability, a basis of employee 
involvement and participation as well as a major influence on co-operation and 
low levels of conflict; it may also provide realistic guidance as to whether 
the system is initiating or simply reactive, and whether a Works Council can 
be a stand alone body rather than simply part of a complex system.
(4)
I have seen and been part of a Works Council and steeped in practical 
experience as I obviously am, I have tried to be objective and produce a cool 
and unemotional contribution to a debate plagued by a powerful rhetoric and 
beguiling propaganda; it is a critical and painstaking study combined with a 
unique practical experience; as objective as I have tried to be, I do not 
claim to be detached.
The debts in a formulating a text as wide ranging as this are many. 
Organisations and individuals within organisations have responded promptly and 
courteously to requests for information or materials for analysis. Footnote 
citations give credit to the source of published materials. The typing effort 
has been magnificent and patient.
Naturally, none of the individuals or organisations mentioned by name 
necessarily endorses any particular point in this study.
(5)
Chapter 1
Co-Determination in West Germany
General
The apparent success of the L.M.R.A. 1972 has led to the West German 
system generally being referred to as a model system of industrial relations; 
certainly, the system has coincided with considerable economic success up to 
the late 1970's and relative industrial peace. The studies carried out 
to-date that have contributed to the description of a model system have been 
carried out in a controlled environment - academics observing the operation of 
a Works Council - and often in unionised Companies with greater than 2000 
employees (about 650 companies) where the L.M.R.A. is reinforced by the 
Co-Determination Act of 1976. A reasonable interpretation of such studies is 
the emphasis on the system of Works Councils in West Germany being just one 
part of an interdependant institutional framework, i.e. industrial and rather 
bureaucratic trade unions involved in fairly centralized pay negotiations 
(national and regional), and regulated by an elaborate system of labour law; 
in particlar, the relationship between Works Councils and board level 
representation especially in larger companies is crucial. Existing studies 
appear to concentrate on the trade union aspects, power and influence on the 
Works Councils. Indeed, much is made of this by the trade unions themselves 
claiming 70% membership of all Works Councils and thus an implied major 
influence on policies adopted. It is conveniently forgotten, however, that 
West German unionisation is second only to France as the lowest in Europe, 
Works Councillors are legally obligated to represent all employees (not just 
trade unionists), and that the reasons for joining a trade union are many and 
varied. However, the theory goes, Works Councils should not be seen in
(6)
isolation either from the other major institutional forms or from the 
economic/material context which, in turn, has supported an ideological 
framework that is different from that in U.K. Equally, the West German system 
is seen as a successful system of management accountability, a sound basis 
for employee involvement and participation, and as a major influence on 
co-operation and low levels of conflict.
Co-determination of employees in West Germany is two-fold. Firstly, 
representation and co-determination of employees on the supervisory boards of 
joint stock corporations and private limited liability corporations.
Secondly, co-operation and co-determination of employees on the Works Council 
and in the Works. It is this second area upon which this study is 
concentrated.
With the advent of the Brandt coalition Government in 1969, came an 
emphasis on amending the Labour Management Relations Act (L.M.R.A.) 1952 
regarding employee representation; the aim being to introduce real parity, for 
example, on Supervisory Boards. After lengthy discussion, the Government 
proposed legislation covering employer and employee representation on 
Supervisory Boards of corporations with more than 2000 employees. This 
proposal essentially encompassed what can best be described as strategic and 
major employers rather than the majority of industry and commerce.
When the proposal was made public, objections were put forward. Complete 
parity and machinery set up in order to make decisions possible in cases of 
deadlock seemed to be in breach of the law of property guaranteed by the basic 
West German Consititution. Equally, election of Supervisory Board members by 
delegates instead of electing them directly by the employees would devalue 
democratic principles because of the greater influence of trade unions on 
delegates.
(7)
Similarly, the representation of the managerial personnel and the election 
procedure to be used caused considerable debate. The Government in further 
consulation with unions and employers agreed to a revised piece of legislation 
which did not significantly differ from the original; even the powerful 
Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) accepted the revisions despite their earlier 
strong opposition to the principle of parity.
The Labour Management Relations Act 1972 thus became law and it applies 
to all wage earning and salaried employees with two exceptions. Firstly, 
flying staff of an airline (Article 117) and secondly, Managerial personnel 
who by their status and under their contract of employment are entitled on 
their own responsibility to hire/dismiss employees, or, have a general 
authority and full power of representation, or, perform duties mainly in their 
own responsibility, which in view of their importance for the existance and 
development of the works, are regularly assigned to such personnel on account 
of their particular experience and knowledge (Article 5, paragraph 3). In 
only three cases, Managerial personnel are mentioned in the legislation, i.e. 
Article 105 information about hiring or change of position of Managerial 
staff, Article 107 Appointment as Member of the Economic Committee, and 
Article 108 Assist the Employer’s side during meetings of the Economic 
Committee. The significance of this will be seen later in the Chapter dealing 
with grievances.
(8)
The Legislation
The main substance of the L.M.R.A. can be broken down into ten areas
Status of Works Council and trade unions: Article 2 states that
co-operation of employer and Works Council is in the best interests of 
employees and the Works. Actide 74, paragraph 1, provides for meeting at 
least once a month for discussion of disputed matters with a sincere desire to 
reach an agreement and make suggestions for settling their differences;
r •
industrial actions between the employer and the Works Council are unlawful. 
Article 37 covers the honorary nature of Works Council office, no 
remuneration, release from work without loss of pay to attend educational and 
training courses necessary for the activities of the Works Council and 
approved suitable by the competent central labour authorities of the State 
(three weeks maximum). Under Article 78, Works Councillors are not be be 
disturbed or hindered in the performance of their duties, are not be be 
discriminated against or favoured on account of their office. Articles 123 
and 103 protect a member of the Works Council from dismissal during the term 
of office plus one year after it, unless sufficient grounds exist for 
immediate notice of termination. Such grounds must have the consent of the 
Works Council or the Labour Court in the event consent is withheld. Articles 
79 and 120 bind the Works Council to keep trade business secrets with 
financial penalties for cases of violation. Article 74, paragraphs 2 and 3, 
ensure employer and Works Council refrain from activities that interfere with 
operations or disturb peace in the works and both parties cannot undertake 
political activities within the works. Article 77 prevents interference with 
the Management of the works by any unilateral Works Council action. Article 
40 obliges the employer to provide to the necessary extent the premises,
(9)
material facilities and office staff required for the meetings, consultations 
and day-to-day operation of the Works Council; similarly, any expenses 
incurred by the activities of the Works Council shall be borne by the 
employer.
Individual Personnel Matters: Under Article 99, paragraph 1, in works
normally employing more than twenty employees entitled to vote, the employer 
must notify the Works Council in advance of any employment, grading, 
re-grading and transfer, and submit to it the appropriate information on the 
person concerned; the Works Council will be informed by the employer of the 
implications of the action envisaged and supply it with the necessary records 
and obtain the consent of the Works Council. Article 93 permits the Works 
Council to request that all vacancies for certain types of jobs are advertised 
within the works before being filled. Article 95 requires that Works Council 
approval shall be given to guidelines for the selection of employees for 
recruitement, transfer, re-grading and dismissal; ironically, if the employer 
does not wish to formulate guidelines, the legislation does not compel him to 
do so. In Article 99, the Works Council is obligated to refuse consent if 
staff movement would constitute a breach of any other legislation, a 
collective labour agreement or a works agreement or, indeed, of a court 
decision; consent can also be refused if the movement would constitute a 
violation of a selection guideline established under Article 95; other grounds 
for refusal are if it is to be assumed (based on fact) that the movement is 
likely to result in the dismissal of or other disadvantage to employees of the 
works not warranted by operational or personal reasons; if the employee 
concerned will suffer by the staff movement, although this is not warranted by 
operational or personal reasons, consent may be refused as well as the 
situation where the vacancy has not been advertised as required under Article
(10)
93; an important feature in view of the growing anti-immigrant feeling in West 
Germany is the grounds for consent refusal if (based again on facts) it is to 
be assumed that the applicant or employee envisaged for the staff movement 
would disturb the peace of the works through unlawful conduct or gross 
violation of the principles of law and equity and non-discrimination against 
persons on account of their race, religion nationality, origin, (also 
mentioned in Article 75), political or trade union activity or convictions, or 
sex. If the Works Council refuses its consent, it must notify the employer in 
writing giving its reasons, within one week of being informed by the employer. 
In this case, the employer may apply to the Labour Court to overturn the Works 
Council decision. Article 102 contains the provisions for employee dismissal; 
the Works Council is to be consulted before every dismissal and given reasons 
for such action by the employer. Notice of dismissal given without consulting 
the Works Council in advance is null and void. The Works Council may oppose a 
dismissal if the employer in selecting the employee for dismissal disregarded 
or did not take into account hardship caused, if the dismissal would 
contravene a guideline for selection under Article 95, if the employee whose 
dismissal is being envisaged could be kept on at another job or works site, if 
the employee could be re-trained or the employee could be kept on under 
changes terms of his contract to which he has indicated his agreement. Should 
the employer wish to pursue the dismissal dispite the Works Council’s refusal 
to consent, he may turn to the Labour Court to overturn the Works Council 
decision although he must retain the employee until the Labour Court reaches a 
verdict.
(11)
Vocational training: Under Article 98, the Works Council is entitled
to co-determination related to the implementation of a vocational training 
programme and may submit proposals for such a programme through Article 96; 
Articles 92 and 97 respectively, provide the Works Council with information 
related to manpower needs and information on training to be provided within 
the works.
Rights of the individual employee: According to Article 81, the employer
must identify to an employee his duties and responsibilities and familiarise 
him with appropriate safety legislation; similarly, the employee must be 
informed in good time about any changes in his working activity. Article 82 
gives the employee the right to be heard by a competent person on any 
operational matter and Article 83 gives him the right to inspect his personal 
file, defined as, all documents held by the Company referring to that 
employee; the employee can request a Works Councillor to be present during 
such a inspection. Articles 84 and 85 provide a basic grievance precedure, 
conciliation in the event of dispute and protection for the employee against 
possible recrimination for raising the grievance.
Various degrees of co-operation: The legislation permits Works Council
recommendations (Article 80), proposals (Articles 2 and 74), information 
(Articles 80 and 99), consultation (Articles 90, 92, 102 and 106) and 
co-determination within a certain framework (Articles 99 and 102). It is only 
Articles 87, 93 and 95 that permit real Works Council co-determination on the 
basis of parity with the employer.
(12)
General duties of the Works Council: These are many and varied but in
essence are detailed in Article 80 viz to observe that laws and agreements are 
carried out properly, recommend actions to benefit employer and employee, 
receive suggestions from employees and pursue them with the employer if they 
appear justified, promote rehabilitation of disabled persons, to co-operate 
closely with juvenile representation, to promote the employment of elderly 
employees and to promote the integration of foreign employees. To enable the 
Works Council to perform its duties, the same Article obligates the employer to 
furnish records at any time including sight of the payroll showing gross 
salaries/wages of employees. Equally, the Works Council may consult outside 
experts at the employer’s expense.
Social Matters: There are rights of co-determination in Article 87
for the Works Council in matters such as order in the works, conduct of 
employees, daily working hours including overtime, salary/wages payment, 
principles governing holiday periods and arbitrating on disagreement between 
employer and employee on when a holiday may be taken, introduction and use of 
new technology, industrial accident regulations, welfare services, allocation 
of company-owned housing, principles of remuneration and suggestion schemes, 
design of workplace and environment. Equally, the employer must inform the 
Works Council of action affecting such matters, particularly impact on the 
nature of work and employees (Article 90). If a change in work places a 
severe burden on employees, the Works Council may request action to compensate 
employees (Article 91).
(13)
Economic Matters: This can be considered as two distinct areas, i.e.
information and operational changes. An economic committee is required when 
there are more than 100 employees and the committee has a duty to consult with 
the employer on economic matters defined as, economic and financial situation 
of the company, production and sales situation, investment and rationalisation 
programmes, methods of work, works closure in whole or in part, geographical 
transfer of work(s), mergers, financial objectives and any other matter that 
is in the vital interests of employees (Article 106). The same Article 
ensures that the committee reports back to the Works Council the information 
supplied by the employer. Appointment of the committee is normally done by 
the Works Council for a period corresponding to the Works Councils term of 
office (Article 107). In larger companies, the committee should meet at least 
once per month with the employer (Article 108). In terms of pure operational 
changes the employer must consult the Works Councils about the changes 
envisaged. Article 111 defines reduction of operation, mergers, geographical 
transfer, fundamental changes in the organisation and introduction of entirely 
new production methods as changes requiring consulation. Agreements must be 
in writing between the employer and Works Council as has the Social Plan in 
the event of redundancy defined in Article 112.
Conciliation: Article 76 provides for a conciliation committee to settle
differences of opinion between the employer and Works Council; the committee 
may be established as a permanent feature or assembled on an ad hoc basis. 
Membership is equally apportioned between both sides with an independant 
Chairman who may be appointed by the Labour Court if no agreement can be 
reached. Decisions made by the committee are only binding if agreed to by the 
employer and Works Council.
(14)
Works Agreements: In accordance with the provisions of Article 77,
works agreements are to be negotiated by the Works Council and employer, 
recorded in writing and signed by both sides. The agreements are mandatory 
and any rights granted to employees cannot be waived or forfeited without 
approval of the Works Council. Unless otherwise agreed, works agreements may 
be terminated by either side at three months' notice. After expiry, the 
agreement remains in force until such time as a new agreement is reached.
Areas of Concentration
Chapter 2 reviews existing studies of Works Councils and chapter 3 
provides the context in which study was carried out. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
respectively, concentrate on problems encountered by the Works Council and 
employer in the areas of unequal treatment, grievances and job 
evaluation/performance appraisal. Each area encompasses the relevant articles 
of the legislation and their interrelated difficulties; emphasis is placed not 
only on the facts and the problems but on eventual solutions and how the 
system was, or was not, able to cope with them.
(15)
Chapter 2
A REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
There is no good bibliography available on the subject to Works Councils 
in West Germany. 1
Almost all of the literature available in the English language covers 
worker participation and/or industrial democracy containing an element of 
Works Council information; similarly the literature is often the result of 
comparative studies in more than one European country and generally 
restricted to the legal status of Works Councils. A study carried out by an 
elected number of a Works Council in West Germany is not available thus making 
this thesis unique.
During the last 25 years, in most European countries employee 
representation at the factory and/or enterprise level has been 
institutionalized either by law or contract. In comparing the various 
institutions, it is very difficult to find common denominators for the system 
used. Depending upon national customs or political development, these 
institutions and their impact vary considerably from country to country. 
Changes are frequent and there is a trend towards greater involvement of 
employee representation in the decision-making processes of companies.
Before trying to review the present situation and basic developments in 
West Germany it is necessary to look at the literature which has inspired the 
institutionalization of worker representation in companies. This literature 
is almost completely of a sociological/political nature with its origins going 
far back in the 19th century.
(16)
The demand for democracy has practically accompanied the development of 
the industrial age but it became especially strong in the twentieth century.
The general increase in living standardis and the higher level of education 
for large parts of the population has increased their interest in democracy.
The trend to democratize everyday life (and not only political systems) 
is obvious and includes such traditionally hierarchical systems as the 
Church and other old established instituations like universities which have 
also traditionally been hierarchic structures. Under the pressure of student 
revolts and other developments this conservative attitude has been changed and 
students have gained greater participation in various bodies of university 
administration. Other examples of increased participation are the campaign 
for nuclear disarmament or against the building of nuclear power plants or the 
counsumer movements.
People today are interested to participate in decisions which affect 
their environment or their work place. They are no longer content to 
passively accept the directives of political or other forces. 2
Working conditions have been strongly influenced by mechanization, 
automation and computers. Division of work and large industrialized units 
resulted from'these developments. Another result'’is the drive for 
humanization of work (including more democratic decision-making) especially at 
the factory level. Phrases often used in this connection are ’better quality 
of life’, both at work and outside of the working place and ’social 
responsibility’ of the enterprise towards the consumer and the employee. 3
(17)
Industrial Democracy takes different forms in defferent countries, but it 
has a common definition: that each individual in the work organization should 
share in the information and power relevant to the decisions that affect him. 
To what extent the individual receives information, and participates in 
decision-making is the point of departure for the various movements arising 
from the humanistic base. 4
The theoretical ground work for reorganization in Europe has been done 
mainly by Tavistock Institute in London and Einar Thorsrud of the Work 
Research institute of Oslo, Norway. Thorsrud has become the major theoretican 
in Europe and has conducted programmes throughout Scandinavia and much of
Europe. His approach is based on the premise that the workers have to be
instrumental in change and improving their job environment.
More specifically, his assumption is that those who actually perform a work
are most capable of making decisions ab®iat their work.
An inalienable part of democracy is freedom and the right of the 
individual to personal development. One of the most difficult questions in 
the definition of democracy is the limit attached to this freedom and the 
protection of minority rights.
Representative industrial democracy has created information rights and in 
some countries decision making rights for a large number of employees, 
critical evaluation of the institutions existing in West Germany shows the 
danger of creating too many institutions in one company for one and the same 
purpose, namely information to employees and participation of employees in 
certain company decisions. This can result in a confusion of 
responsibilities. The decision-making process must not be hampered by too
(18)
many committees and councils. Besides, too many institutions make it 
difficult for the individual to express his opinion effectively. 5
The traditional strategy ’labour opposes and fights capital’ must be 
over-come. Democratization is supposed to create a partnership between these 
two forces in the enterprise. The democratization of economic life has 
resulted in far-reaching participation of the employees in the development of 
their enterprise but also in a more efficient working of the enterprise. 
Structures leading to this result do not reduce the activity and the impetus 
of the enterprise in the free market system. Democratization of enterprises 
means that the employees elect representatives who act in their name. This 
trend imposes a very important responsibility on the trade unions which under 
this system cannot think only in terms of conflict strategy but of 
co-operation. 6
Sociological research work has shown that some degree of participation 
and involvement in desired by most employees. A question very difficult to 
decide is at which level the participation is desired. British studies have 
shown that a ’substantial proportion of individuals feel that they should be 
informed, but not necessarily further involved, in decision-making processes’. 
7. At the immediate work shop level, the desire for direct involvement is 
expecially strong. Employees feel that at this level they can contribute 
positively to developments. 8.
(19)
It is very difficult to judge whether the new participative 
employer-employee relations increase the competitiveness of European industry, 
for example compared with the industry of the United States. Cooperation 
machinery can be slow, cumbersome and time consuming. Executive privileges 
are reduced or even abolished. On the other hand a correlation can be seen 
between new participative systems and social peace. This strengthens the 
competitiveness of the countries concerned versus countries without 
cooperative schemes.
In literature one finds many terms which are sometimes confusing and this 
confusion is aggravated by the fact that terms used in one language are 
sometimes very difficult to translate meaningfully into another language. The 
terms ’industrial democracy’, ’participative democracy’, ’co-determination’, 
'work-participation’, sometimes do not have the same meaning for employees and 
employers. Additional confusion results from the different definitions in 
different legislations. This confusion is not limited to words, but includes 
the institutions: works council, joint council, enterprise or other forms of 
employee representation in factories and companies have completely different 
constitutions, powers and objectives, and this increases the difficulty of 
translating the local word for the institution into another language without 
describing in some detail the influence and objectives of the institution.
Not only can translations be confusing, terminology is difficult to 
define because each country has developed certain definitions or better 
expressions for the kind of cooperation, consultation or information rights 
which are granted either by law or agreement to the employees. To compare 
these terms with each other, one must see the individuaJ term in the context
(20)
of rights and duties granted by this institution to employee representatives 
in enterprises. This confusion can also be found in the literature of the 
late Sixties and early Seventies.
In the Twenties, in the United States the terms ’industrial democracy’ or 
’workers’ participation’ were synonymous with what is now called 'collective 
bargaining’. 9 In Europe, ’workers’ participation in management’ and 
’collective bargaining’ are now two very different processes which must not be 
confused. In both processes elements of co-operation and conflict exist.
Both are intended to solve conflict situations or to avoid them. Both schemes 
exist in most countries side by side, and subjects which are in one country 
solved by collective bargaining procedures are in another country within the 
jurisdiction of the participative institutions. ’Collective bargaining’ 
generally refers to nation-wide or local negotiation between employer and 
employees or employee organization whilst 'workers’ participation' takes place 
in factories or companies. 10 Clearly collective bargaining and participation 
can occur at any level from workplace up to a Company, and national bargaining 
is now accepted to play a fairly minor role in the private sector. 'Workers 
participation’ covers many approaches to associate people with the decisions 
in their workplace which affect them directly or indirectly. 11 Employees are 
directly affected by decisions relating to their workplace or their working 
environment, indirectly by decisions affecting their company and its future. 
Consequently, 'workers’ participation' can be institutionalized at the lower 
level of the works
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councils and similar bodies or at the higher level of the board of directors 
or supervisory boards. Some European countries have participation only from 
below, ie the works council at the shop floor, others have in addition 
participation from above, ie membership of employees in the management or 
supervisory organ of the company.
Entirely distinct from the institutionalized ’workers1 participation’ 
inside the company is the idea of ’workers’ control of enterprises'. This 
term describes financial participation in or complete ownership of the share 
capital of the company by the employees. In Western Europe, this development 
has commenced only recently and to a small extent in some countries, but it is 
the prevailing theoretical model in Eastern Europe. The best known and most 
described example of workers’ control is Yugoslavia.
For a study of the rightsand duties of employee representative 
institutions in enterprises it is necessary to differentiate between the West 
European countries with their privately owned industries and the East European 
socialist countries. The possibilities for the exercise of democratic 
economic rights are in a market oriented economy (Western-type democracy) of 
course different from centralized planned economies, which are part of a 
completely different political state and system.
This thesis only describes an employee representative institution in the 
private sector. Most European countries also have laws and regulations for 
the representation of public servants but from a legal point of view it is 
almost impossible to compare these representations with each other. They are 
part of the legal philosophy and institutions for the public service in the 
respective countries, which have grown for historical reasons and, therefore 
are not comparable.
(22)
In most European countries the trade unions have always insisted that 
they are the only exclusive representation of all employees, regardless of 
membership in a trade union or the degree of unionization in the respective 
country. This 'one channel' claim has resulted in strong opposition by trade 
unions to works councils especially the the United Kingdom, and in other 
countries. The trade unions were afraid that works councils could develop 
into collective bargaining institutions and thus become the exclusive 
bargaining partner for management or employers organizations. In countries 
having 'two channels' of employee representation, trade union representation 
exists side by side with elected works councils. Especially in countries with 
laws for compulsory election of works councils, these works councils are the 
true representation of all sections of the workforce. Such degree of 
democratic representation is almost never achieved by a trade union because 
they represent only their members and not all employees or competing trade 
unions make a universal representation impossible.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the trade unions in those countries 
where national works council systems were created either by statute of 
agreement have attempted to exercise influence in their institutions. In some 
countries e.g. Sweden the trade unions have an exclusive right or a special 
priority to present candidates for the works councils. But even in countries 
without such an established privilege the trade unions have a strong influence 
on the selection of candidates which of course depends upon their strength in 
the enterprise. Even though the Austrian and West German Works Councils Acts 
foresee voting rights for all employees regardless of membership in a trade 
unions or not, trade unions candidates in strongly organized enterprises have 
greater chances to be elected by the work force than non-union members.
Despite these facts, legally there exists 'two-channel' representation: the 
works council as the democratically elected
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institution representing all employees of the enterprise and independently 
from the trade union representation in the enterprise as partner in 
collective bargaining with management (if collective bargaining agreements are 
not negotiated at regional national or industry level).
Since the works council is an institution that is part of a system of 
industrial democracy, it can very well be argued that the word ’democracy1 in 
itself requires a universal electorate and voting rights for every employee 
and not reserved for members of a trade union.
Works Councils or committees can be legally established in two ways: they 
are either mandatory by law or they are negotiated in industrial agreements or 
collective bargaining agreements. Whether a law or a collective agreement 
serves as basefor-’-such a committee depends to a large extent on the legal 
tradition of the country concerned. The United Kingdom and Ireland have 
traditionally relied on collective bargaining concepts. The Scandinavian 
countries also have used this system, probably due to the face that in these 
countries strong trade unions and strong employer associations exist. In West 
Germany, and in line with its tradition of labour law, legislation has been 
used.
It remains to be seen whether other countries follow this principle of 
having broadly defined legislation combined with agreements which are flexible 
and can be better suited to the needs of the factory or enterprise.
The choice between legislation and collective agreement depends partly on 
the legal history and custom of the various countries. Central European 
countries with legal systems emanating from Roman law rely more on legislation 
than common law countries. Their legislation has a tendency to be very
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explicit and complete and to regulate every detail of the works council system 
(good examples are the Austrian and West German election ordinances).
The joint relations between management and the workforce take place in 
institutions which are specifically designed to promote cooperation and to 
solve problems at the shop floor level. These institutions are in general not 
instruments of collective bargaining. The trade unions watch these 
institutions to make sure that the collective bargaining rights which were 
granted in most of these countries to the trade unions by legislation are not 
impaired by works councils. In the beginning, the works councils had only to 
be given information on various aspects of the company or the factory. 
Gradually the amount of information has been increased, and the information to 
be given now includes economic and financial information. The more rights 
were granted to the works councils by the various parliaments or by agreement, 
the easier it became for these councils to engage in collective bargaining 
with management on questions immediately connected with shop floor activities. 
Many countries have in their legislation regulated agreements to be concluded 
between the works council and the management of the firm. A very typical 
expression for these agreements is the German word’BetriebsvereinbarungT, 
which means 'Agreement for the Plant’ and which regulates questions which 
have a close connection with the plant level. These agreements can be seen as 
supplementary to nation-or industry-wide collective bargaining agreements 
which are negotiated by trade unions on one side and employer associations on 
the other side. Thus a double layer of agreements is developing and the
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development in the Scandinavian countries can be seen as typical. Broad 
agreements or laws are expanded by detailed and specific agreements for a 
plant or a company and have a certain flexibility of approach taking into 
consideration the needs of the plant. Centralized collective bargaining 
cannot make provision for the differences that can arise between the employees 
and management in the factory and these local differences must be solved under 
local circumstances which require negotiation 12
There are a further twenty five studies published during the 1970s which 
are little more than an index of West German labour legislation; whilst they 
are of relevance to the overall literature concerning Works Councils, they are 
of little or no relevance to the operation of a Works Council in reality. The 
publications are however briefly reviewed below:
Klein (1963) produced a monograph on co-determination with comments upon 
legislation at that time; definitions of Works Council and Staff 
representation in the public services of West Germany are provided. The 
monograph also covers the rights of Works Councils under the LMRA 1952 (see 
chapter 1), joint consultation provisions and the legal status of the Works 
Council and Works Council membership. 13
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Beinhauer (1972) produced a one hundred and thirty two page english 
translation of the LMRA 1972 which introduced co-determination rights 
additional to the provisions of the 1952 Act. 14
The Confederation of British Industry (1973) published a brief outlining
the labour relations systems and working conditions in West Germany. The
brief covers trade unions, employers associations, Works Councils, collective 
bargaining, arbitration, hours of work, overtime, public holidays and paid 
annual leave. 15
Roberts' (1973) article comments on labour legislation in West Germany 
with particular emphasis on the rights and powers of the Works Council. The 
rights and role of the trade unions receive some attention as does a brief 
comparative study of the situation in UK. 16
National Economic Development Office (1973) formulated a report on a
comparative study of labour relations and productivity in the chemical 
industries of UK, France, Holland and West Germany. The study covers employee 
attitudes, shift work, practices, maintenance, occupational safety and 
comments on labour legislation relating to collective agreements, collective 
bargaining, Works Councils management Boards, vocational training and profit 
sharing. 17
International Labour Organisation Management Development Branch (1973) 
produced an article on co-determination in West Germany including an historcal 
and legal review of the LMRA 1972; the article also covers the functions of 
the Works Councils and worker representation on management Boards. 18
(27)
Albeda (1972) published a conference report of workers participation 
experiences in Holland, Belgium and West Germany; the report comments on Works 
Councils and the concept of co-determination in each of the three countries. 
Some attention is given to the comparative state of labour relations and the 
position of the respective trade union movements. 19
Jones’ (1973) article comprises a comparative study of worker 
participation systems in Europe with particular reference to co-determination 
in West Germany; the article examines the structure and powers of the West 
German Works Council and the general impact of the 1972 LMRA on that country’s 
labour relations. It also covers the obstacles to adoption of the West German 
model in the UK. 20
Blanpain (1974) in an article presents a comparative study of labour 
legislation relating to worker participation and the functions of Works 
Council in Belgium, France, Holland and West Germany. 21
Ramm (1974) in a revised conference paper identifies the provisions of 
the 1972 LMRA, which differ from the 1952 Act, thus leading to increased 
powers of co-determination for West German Works Councils; the article also 
covers the role of the trade unions and employers organisations resulting from 
the change in legislation. 22
Szakats (1974) comments in an article, on the concept and practice of 
co-determination in West Germany. Works Councils are included along with the 
role of the worker Director. Emphasis is given to the changes in legislation 
historically most notably the LMRA's of 1952 and 1972. 23
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Wilpert (1975) discusses in a social research article, the West German 
model of co-determination and covers the intitutional framework and functions 
of the Works Council; generally reviews the legal status and impact on labour 
relations of the Works Council in the country. 24
The Industrial and Commercial Training Periodical (1976) contains an 
article reviewing the status of worker participation in West Germany including
the function of the Works Councils and trade unions. 25
Adams (1977) assesses the role of the Works Councils and the trade unions 
in West Germany; the article traces the historical background to Works 
Councils and comments on current legislation. 26
Connagham (1976) focuses on the history of workers participation in West
Germany since 1922. The article covers Works Councils.and their 
co-determination rights suggesting that co-determination is a partial answer 
to good labour relations. 27
Vollmer (1976) details worker participation in the Works Councils of West 
Germany and examines the impact of co-determination on trade unions and 
management. 28
Virmani (1978) produced a comparative study of historical Works Council 
legislation in West Germany and Yugoslavia with a view to creating a workable 
plan for India; suggests that co-determination should be limited to social 
policy in his new model based on West German Works Councils for India. 29
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Hoffman (1976) reviews the LMRA 1972 and comments on the co-determination 
Act 1976 in a monograph outlining the historical and legislative development 
affecting Works Councils in West Germany. 30
Endruweit’s (1978) article summarises new powers of West Germany’s Works 
Councils resulting from the 1976 Co-determination Act and the differences 
between it and the LMRA 1972. There are comments on trade unions and 
employers organisations attitudes towards the new powers and the general 
movement of worker participation resulting from both sets of legislation. 31
Blanpain’s (1978) monograph covers the role of Works Councils of 
multinational organisations in France and West Germany. Includes a 
comparative analysis of work organisation and management attitudes in the 
decision making process. Essentially a review of historical developments in 
collective bargaining and joint consultation. 32
Hartmann's (1979) article on alienation between leadership and membership 
of Works Councils in West Germany is one of the better studies. He applies 
the social theory known as the "Iron law of oligarchy" to Works Councils and 
on the basis of a survey finds that the size of enterprise and training are 
directly related to leadership tenure. 33
The German Information Centre in New York (1977) produced an introductory 
pamphlet on worker participation, especially co-determination, in West 
Germany. Includes excerpts of text pertinent to labour legislation such as 
the Co-determination Act 1976 and LMRA 1972. 34
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Archer, Matschke, and Schobel (1978) surveyed the state of industrial 
democracy in UK and compared it to co-determination in West Germany; the study 
uses conclusions and impressions of a working group that toured major 
industrial enterprises discussing the role of the trade unions and Works 
Councils. 35
Koch (1978) in a research report provides a comparative analysis of 
labour relations in West Germany and UK; the report concentrates on the role 
of shop stewards in both countries but only comments on Works Councils status 
under the 1972 LMRA. Also describes the origins of the metalworker’s unions 
(I.G. Metall). 36
Jacobs Orwell, Paterson and Weltz’s comparative study (1978) reviews 
labour relations and employers policies with respect to technological changes 
at the enterprise level in West Germany and UK. The study considers trade 
union attitudes and employers organisation reactions to major innovations for 
example relocation of industry, new factory organisation, computerisation; 
discusses the desire to reduce costs in UK industries as well as the West 
Germany system of co-operation through the Works Council framework. 37
The foregoing twenty five studies have covered a decade of what in some 
sense is a hybrid of two subjects - conflict and the theory of the labour 
movement. It is an index of the concern with the topic variously called 
"worker’ participation” and "industrial democracy" albeit heavily 
concentrated into a legislative review.
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Over the period the prinicipal objects of concern were historical and 
descriptive accounts of participation in individual countries, evaluations of 
the effects of the various experiments on the welfare of workers, and 
comparisons of the participation gained in various schemes of industrial 
democracy. Although the general economic orientation with regard to the 
evaluation of the benefits of participationtends to be ignored in favour of 
legislative reviews, the more micro tools of industrial psychology have not 
made a major impact on the mainstream industrial relations literature on 
workers’ participation. The major exceptions are the Industrial Democracy in 
Europe Project (IDE 1979) and the Norwegian Volvo experiments. 38
The studies of individual country experiences fall into two categories. 
First, the kinds of participation arrangements which appear to be of interest 
to researchers are confined to only part of the range of possible forms of 
participation. Profit-sharing as a form of participation seems to be of 
limited interest. There is very little interest in Works Councils which is 
overshadowed with two general line of interest; one of primary academic 
interest as relates to "capitalist” countries and the other related to 
experiments in some form of market socialism The first line of enquiry draws 
on the rich complexity of the West German system of co-determination, with its 
varieties of forms and scopes of participation over various issues and 
subjects (Hartmann 1970) 39, looking at its application in other countries 
(Emery and Thorsrud 1970, Westenhole 1979) 40, and perhaps towards the likely 
adoption of some parts of the German system in EEC Company Law.
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The second line of work has generated study of the Yugoslav model of 
self management. As with many experiments in industrial democracy, there is 
usually conceded to be a gap between theory and practice (Bertsch and 
Obradovic 1979) 41 and by no means is participation evenly spread across the 
workforce (Rus 1970, Obradovic 1975). 42
The evaluations of the worker participation schemes which accompany 
individual country or comparative studies tend to indicate that the fruits are 
generally modest (Rosenstein and Strauss 1970). 43
Although there is evidence that the organisation itself has a substantial 
impact on the kind and amount of participation (Nightingale 1979, IDE 1979). 
44, the bulk of the evidence suggests, as the DIO group found in its study, 
that workers have very little control on any topic (DIO 1979). 45
A glaring omission from research in the decade is that of how to apply 
the knowledge gained from study in one country to the conditions of another 
country. What can be applied to the British or indeed the American industrial 
relations systems that has been learned from West Germany? Ironically the 
only major attempt of transposing a system from one country to another was the 
British Industrial Relations Act in 1971. As is well known the Act rapidly 
failed to achieve any of its prime objectives. As is also well known, the Act 
contained numerous attempts to implant or graft American ideas and practices 
eg. enforcable contracts, unfair industrial practices; the attempt was in part 
the product of direct Anglo-American scholarly interaction. One article by 
Englemann and Thomson (1974) explored the failings of the Act but did not 
grapple with the underlying issues of transferability of industrial relations 
practice. 46 Given that there is considerable Anglo-German scholarly 
interaction and that many studies indicated in the chapter, review the legal
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status of workers participation/industrial democracy, it appears to me there 
is not enough research into how institutions like Works Councils actually 
operate nor is there sufficient research to establish transferability of the 
system; cultural differences are a matter of opinion and trade union loss of 
power fears are too often used to dismiss transferability.
Furstenberg is a rare exception to the picture of research I have painted 
here; in a 1978 research paper 47 reviewing a series of projects predominantly 
carried out in West Germany (and in the German language) he summarised the 
main features of the situation created by the legislation concerning workers' 
participation in West Germany
a. Certain rights have been established enabling every employee to 
participate through his elected representatives at plant level in some 
important areas of management activity.
b. These areas, however, do not include the economic organisation of the 
undertaking and the shaping of the respective policy.
c. With the exception of a presence on the supervisory boards as 
institutions, the trade unions are not present within the undertaking. 
Their influence is indirect, operating mainly through the personal link 
between Works Council members and union members on account of the fact 
that many Works Council members hold union office.
d. In case of disagreement or conflict within the plant, there is legal 
provision for placing the issues before a mediator or the labour court. 
This procedure in turn fosters the tendency to shape each issue in a 
legally acceptable form.
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e. One of the most important trends in industrial relations in the Federal 
Republic of Germany is increasing institutionalisation. Qnpatterned 
interactions have become regulated and functionalised within a growing 
systems of legalised social norms. But even when occasional meetings to 
resolve conflicts, give advice and make decisions are transformed into 
committees or councils, the task of integrating the participants remains.
The legal aspect of industrial relations institutions differs greatly 
from the real conditions under which they are supposed to operate.
Kolvenbach (1978) in his study of employee councils in European companies 
is an equally rare example of being accurate about Works Councils in West 
Germany. 48. He concludes that Works Councils do play an important role in 
German enterprises; when the LMRA 1972 came into effect, serious difficulties 
were foreseen by trade unions as well as employer organisation. Fortunately 
this has not materialised. The co-operation between Works Councils and 
management is an integral part of the day to day life of the enterprise. In 
many cases the legislation has avoided conflict situations and the influence 
of the Works Council has gradually increased. The Labour Courts have defined 
the co-determination rights of the Works Councils and sometimes enlarged the 
possibilities for the employee representatives to participate in decision 
making at the shop floor as well as the Board level. Kolvenbach also remarks 
that West Germany has often "contaminated" its neighbours with employee 
representative institutions. This may well be correct but I feel it should 
not be overlooked that such institutions are generally as a result of seeking 
comparable economic success to that enjoyed by West Germany during" the 1960's and 
1970Ts. The German national character favours formal institutions although I do not 
believe this in itself is an essential criterion for industrial peace or 
industrial democracy.
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Macbeath (1973) considers that the positive result of worker 
participation through Works Councils and the attitude of the trade unions has 
brought West Germany freedom from industrial strife, and joint responsiblity 
of worker and employer. 49
Schlotfield (1976) claims that through the early involvement of workers 
representatives, mistakes in planning are avoided and thus difficulties with 
the workforce recognized at early stage. 50
It must be said however that whilst literature appears preoccupied by 
legislative reviews and the involvement of the trade unions in the Works 
Councils systems in West Germany, it ignores the fact that the Works Councils 
are not trade union instruments and they are not elected by union members only 
but by the entire work force; this factor should strengthen the Works Council 
position and give them an influence based on their own right and confidence of 
their constituency. The following chapters should prove this to be an 
important factor in the way Works Council’s handle specific issues.
Millar (1979) in a comparative study of German and British Management 
does cover the consultation structure in West Germany and even gets away from 
a preoccupation of legislation in pointing out that there is a more to the 
Works Council system than Workers Directors in large enterprises 51. Millar 
also found a striking aspect of Works Councils in West Germany was their dual 
interest; firstly, as a representative of the workforce who elected them but,
secondly, as having a concern with the welfare of the Company as a whole.
This contrasts with an exclusively Union form of representation where 
interests tend to be more partisan and sometime directed towards outside
pressures rather than the interests of the Company as a whole or even of most
its workers. Certainly Millar considered that Works Councils in West Germany
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felt that "if things are going well for the Company, they're going well for 
us"-that the Company's welfare was their welfare. Demands were tempered with 
this constraint in view. Millar clearly feels there is some scope for the 
adoption of the West German Works Council system in UK; Millar holds that 
writers on industrial relation in UK indicate that due to it unique history, 
the UK is above or beyond legislative solutions 52. American styles of human 
and industrial relations, Millar also argues, have been treated with 
scepticism but both American and European type Works Councils seem to have 
achieved a communication network, which is all too frequently absent in 
Britain. 53.
The remaining three useful publications are firstly, Cullingford (1976)
54; in his trade union study of West Germany there is an excellent historical 
sketch covering the labour movement prior to the 1939-45 War and its 
recreation thereafter; the present organisation and functions of the German 
Trade Union Federation: attitudes and policies of the German Unions in the 
industrial relations field; strikes in West Germany up to 1969 with particular 
reference to the metal workers' strike of 1971 and the dispute in the chemical 
industry in the same year; co-determination background and practical 
application along with the LMRA 1972 and Co-determination Act 1976 are 
reviewed; the study concludes with a review of the state of the trade unions 
and their future objectives. The study was produced in close co-operation 
with the German Trade Union Federation and especially with the Federations 
then President, Heinz Oskar Vetter. The study is without doubt the most 
accurate guide to the evolution of the German Labour movement.
Secondly, in the ILO (1981) study of workers' participation in decisions 
within undertakings 55, the subject is participation in decisions - whether 
they belong to the private, the mixed or the public sector.
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The study concentrates on institutional machinery for participation and does
not deal with new forms of work organisation that tend to associate the
workers with the programming and organisation of their own tasks in factories
and offices; there is a whole chapter devoted to Works Councils and similar
specialised bodies. Despite the diversity of participation machinery in many
countries the ILO concludes that they tend to have the same objective; an
attempt is made to associate the workers and their representatives in
decisions thereby avoiding whenever possible a situation in which those
decisions would be taken unilaterally; the trend is the communication of 
information, followed by consultation with the Works Council (E.G. West Germany), 
leading finally to proper collective bargaining.
Finally, Thimm's (1980) book based on three case studies at Volkswagen,
BASF and Siemens in West Germany which is probably the only scathing attack on 
the West German system. 56. Thimm argues that the admiration of American 
academicians and journalists was equaled by the interest of Amercian 
management in the stable nature of German labour relations; thus German 
co-determination became to be viewed as the wave of the future, which every 
country would have to adopt if it was not to be left behind. He shows that 
co-determination is complex, not stable or well defined. Rather he expresses 
an ever shifting compromise between two entirely different and mutually 
exclusive visions of worker participation, which consistently reflects 
changing economic conditions. German co-determination has changed greatly 
from 1952 to 1972 to post 1976. Moreover he argues that other European 
countries have not been able or willing to adopt German co-determination 
legislation since they lacked the necessary historical and political 
traditions of Germany. His analysis of European Co-determination phenomena 
considers the following points to be of importance:-
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a. employee co-determination practices and legislation are deeply rooted in 
a country’s history and institutions cannot easily be transported from 
one country to another.
b. co-determination laws change with political and economic conditions; a 
Socialist government during a period of stagnation, for instance, will 
provide an entirely different environment for employee - union 
participation in economic decision making than will a Liberal
Adminstration during an economic expansion phase.
c. there is a difference between employee and union co-determination though 
frequently this is not recognised.
Summary
Bernstein (1976) offers a list of six necessary conditions for a democratic 
workplace 57. These include the formal structures of participation and a 
participation/democratic consciousness among labour and management, an 
economic return to the workers on the surplus they produce, ready access to 
management - level information, guaranteed individual rights, and an appeals 
procedure to protect workers from possible management reprisals when they 
criticize existing procedures or oppose proposed policy changes. These 
requirements are met only in West Germany by virtue of the LMRA. 1972 and 
Co-determination Act 1976. The results of research show a rather limited 
effect of participation on organizational democracy. The potential for worker 
influence in the running of the enterprises by legally based participation 
would not appear, from research, to have been realised. Workers participate 
in the execution but not in the setting of organisational policies. Research
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has not however identified what factors individually, or in combination, 
hinder or facilitate democracy in the workplace. Research does not specify 
whether worker participation leads to more effective organisation in the 
longer term.
Further, research findings do not show how extensive the involvement of 
workers is even in the execution of company policies. Where participation is 
by representation, the vast majority of the workforce remains outside the 
decision making process. Where participation is direct, the workforce appears 
to be only marginally involved. As a rule, the research describes small 
groups of workers usually in larger companies who over time become islolated 
in the organisation. When participation structures are diffused throughout 
organisation, some workers are more active than others. The evaluation 
research is silent on the questions of the extent and depth of participation.
There is a need for research that examines the participation process 
itself and addresses the relatively simple questions of who participates, how 
participation occurs, and what organisational characteristics faciltate or 
hinder their participation. Such questions are being raised by organisational 
behaviour researchers on union participation (Gordon et al 1980) 58 and they 
should be raised with respect to organisational participation as well.
The following chapters should help to fill part of the research void by 
providing an empirical insight of the operation of a Works Council in West 
Germany; not a controlled experiment based on "story telling" but realistic
views on major and minor issues, how they were .handled by both sides and 
written by the former Works Councillor.
(40)
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Chapter 3
The Company and the Works Council in General
The Company
The Company is a tri-national European industrial organisation 
registered in Southern Bavaria on 26th March 1969, to design, develop and 
produce a military aircraft for service from the late seventies with the Air 
Forces of UK, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and the German Navy.
The three parent Companies of the organisation were located in UK, FRG 
and Italy.
A UK-based engine consortium was building the turbofan to power the 
aircraft and was responsible contractually to the tri-national organisation 
located in Southern Bavaria.
The initial production requirement was for 807 aircraft. Nine prototypes 
were being built - four in the UK, three in Germany and two in Italy. The 
flight test programme was being monitored and co-ordinated by the Southern 
Bavaria organisation.
The Division of work was arranged such that the Italian parent Company 
had designed and was building the wings, the British parent Company the nose 
fuselage and cockpits, rear fuselage and tail unit, and the German parent 
Company the centre fuselage and wing pivot. Aircraft were assembled in all 
three countries according to national requirements. More than 200 
sub-contractors in three parent countries were working on components, 
equipment and materials for the aircraft. Those sub-contractors had, in turn,
(49)
sub-contracted work to some 300 other companies, the majority of which were in 
UK, Germany and Italy.
Parallel with aircraft development, sub-systems were procured through a 
framework of special equipment selection procedures agreed by the Customers 
and the Southern Bavaria Company. Aircraft equipment was procured under the 
Company's control by the parent companies; those measures ensured that the 
Customers and industry operated a central selection systems of suppliers. 
Equipment selection was divided into four categories: first, Customer 
furnished equipment e.g. Weapons; second, jointly selected equipment in which 
the Company analysed competitive tenders and made recommendations which were 
considered by the Customers; third, in cases where the Customers had elected 
not to make a selection, the Company was free to make its own; fourth, 
equipment for which the Company was responsible.
As stated earlier, the Company was first registered in 1969 and 
established in Southern Bavaria; whilst being a West German limited company 
organisation, the employee population was intended to reflect the shareholding 
of the three parent companies located in the United Kingdom, Italy and West 
Germany respectively. The employees were initially assigned from the parent 
companies prior to additional recruitment from the international and local 
labour markets. The manpower planning target was three hundred employees by 
the mid-1970s, stabilising at that level until the mid-1980s. The Personnel 
function was to be staffed purely by West Germans despite the probable mix of 
nationalities to be employed.
Manpower figures in three year phases were planned and achieved as 
follows:
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1969 to 1972 - 1 to 150
1972 to 1975 - 151 to 300
1975 to 1975 - 300 per annum average
1975 to 1978 - 300 per annum average
1978 to 1981 - 300 per annum average
(Actual July 1980, 317 employees)
1981 to 1984 - 350 per annum average
1984 to 1987 - Gradual reduction by natural wastage to 250 
No data available post-1987
The Company’s primary business objective was the project management of a 
tri-national high technology military aircraft; the employees were 95% white 
collar and 5% blue collar. Unionisation of the white collar employees was 8% 
and the blue collar were 90% unionised; the Company therefore saw no necessity 
to become members of the employers federation (BDA). The federation had a 
national agreement with the giant I.G. Metall (IGM) trade union; federation 
members implemented collective bargaining agreements in full, but non-members, 
or those having observer status, tended to implement circa 90% of such 
agreements. For example a federation pay award of 5% would be 4.5% for non 
federation members. It should be noted that Company employees were split 80% 
male and 20% female. The project management function governed production, 
design and modification of the aircraft which took place in each of the 
partner enterprise Companies. Interface with the Customer was the prime 
central role within the project management function.
As the Company grew towards its.manpower targets, there was some 
entrenchment of national attitudes, particularly between the non-West German 
assignees and those recruited from the international and local labour markets;
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Southern Bavaria itself was not hostile to foreigners but had a tradition, 
custom and a language dialect that even non-Bavarian West Germans had 
difficulty in understanding.
Each year the Company informed all employees of its objectives for the 
following year using the opportunity presented by the general assemblies 
called by the Works Council. The approximate time centre of this study was 
December 1980, thus making the Company’s 1981 general objectives an 
appropriate matter for summarising as below from the Autumn 1980 general 
assembly statement by the Company.
Basic development of the aircraft was largely complete although 
development flying and supporting engineering work would continue for quite 
some time. The initial clearance of the aircraft for use was issued in June 
1980. Continuing development, as well as modifications and 'Post Design 
Tasks', were envisaged.
The production programme made very good progress during 1980. By the end 
of the year 17 aircraft had been delivered. Detail parts manufacture and 
structural assembly had reached the planned maximum rates and the front 
fuselage, as the pacing component of the programme, was brought forward by 
several weeks against an already very challenging build schedule.
Initial experience with the aircraft during Instructor Aircraft Training 
and at the Aircraft Tri-national Training Establishment was very good.
However, progress in the supply of Spares, which would determine maintenance 
and overhaul timescales in the near future, had been far from satisfactory and 
continued to require attention.
(52)
Since the aircraft programme represented a' significant part of the 
overall Defence Budget of Germany, Italy and United Kingdom over the next 
years, it was expected that it would have to undergo very critical programme 
reviews, particularly with regard to funding.
The following particular objectives were highlighted
(1) The impetus of the Production Programme must be maintained in line 
with the planned aircraft delivery schedule. This required 
dedicated efforts in particular, from the Production and Procurement 
areas, but all other areas needed to acknowledge this goal in their 
activities as well as provide all support required.
(2) Good serviceability of the aircraft must be demonstrated.
Therefore, the basic supply of spares must be substantially 
improved.
(3) In the Engineering area-'the Company must achieve the gradual 
finalisation and completion of the basic development in order to 
demonstrate efficient industrial programme control. At the same 
time, the Company must process the increasing load of modifications 
more efficiently.
(4) In order to safeguard the aircraft’s efficiency in future years and
to expand the range of applications with the present customers, the
company must firmly establish the technical growth potential of the
system and initiate customer-supported work to prepare for the
development of further variants of the aircraft.
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(5) With the aircraft being introduced into service, the Company must 
establish it as a leading candidate for procurement programmes in 
the forthcoming years on a defined export market.
(6) Internally, the Company must implement the already initiated 
co-ordination and integration of data handling by means of concerted 
efforts between all functional areas concerned.
Through efficient performance of all tasks, the Company must present 
itself to Customers as the most attractive contractor for all up-coming tasks. 
International collaboration must be demonstrated as being the preferable 
alternative to choose. Obvious problems and difficulties of such 
collaboration must be kept at a level where they are outweighed by the actual 
benefits. Once that was achieved, the Company had an excellent chance to be 
requested to carry out additional work as had happened already in the past 
with development of the aircraft, procurement of engines for the series 
programme, and the substantial support efforts for In-Service use. It was the 
Company’s aim to remain active in managing series production, enhanced 
development and logistic support well through the nineties and, by qualifying 
for the management of a future European aircraft programme, to provide 
indefinite future prospects for the Company.
The Company was the Weapon System Contractor for the aircraft and, as 
such, had to prepare and arrange the timely supply of aircraft to the 
Customers participating in the programme and its proper support.
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The Company, being answerable for entire contracts, needed to exercise, 
in all areas contributing to the implementation of contracts, a management 
overview. In particular, the responsiblity for formal commercial contacts 
with the Customer and for marketing the product outside the three 
participating Nations.
In order to comply with its task, the Company must continue to organise 
its affairs such that efficient management for a complex programme in an 
environment of international collaboration was provided. This required 
maintaining a determined ordering and monitoring function versus its suppliers 
and sub-contractors.
Special effort must be undertaken to integrate the possibly diverging 
interests and aims of all of the many participants in the programme to enable 
progress towards jointly accepted targets. Particularly in relation to its 
parent Companies, the Company's staff acted as the joint organisation of an 
industrial consortium rather than as the prime contractor vis-a-vis its 
sub-contractors. That situation was reflected by the very close 
inter-relationship between parent Company representatives and staff on the 
various levels.
The composition of the Company's staff reflected the co-operation of 
three Customers and parent shareholder Companies in the aircraft programme; it 
was the Company's objective to provide a framework for harmonious and, . 
therefore, successful working relationships between the staff with the 
different backgrounds essential for co-ordinating an international project.
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The Company pursed a tightly controlled staffing policy to allow its 
manning to remain concentrated and flexible and to provide job security.
The Company had adopted a policy of supporting wherever possible within 
its scope of activity, the development of professional and management 
capabilities of its in-house staff. For all vacancies in management 
positions, the potential of in-house staff would be considered.
- end of general objectives summary.-
The organisational structure of the Company was nine separate 
Directorates. Each Directorate was headed by a Functional Director, 
responsible directly to the Managing Director, a Deputy Functional Director, a 
Head of Department and, depending upon the size of the Directorate-, two 
Section Leaders each with staff reporting to them.
The 1981 main objectives of each Directorate are also summarised below 
from the Autumn 1980 general assembly presentation given by the Managing 
Director:-
FLIGHT OPERATIONS (British Director, German Deputy)
The primary objective was to complete flying and reporting which would 
allow the best possible standard of aircraft delivered in the declared 
timescales. This was not wholly in the Company's hands since recommendations 
for clearance to the Services ultimately emanated from them, however, Flight 
Operations needed to ensure that all possible measures were taken to enable 
the Services to complete their task.
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PROCUREMENT (British Director, German Deputy)
Procurement would, through the provisions of the arrangements with the 
parent Companies, continue to co-ordinate and monitor the activities of these 
Companies for purchases of aircraft equipment.
The availability of equipment to the series production build line must be 
assured as a first priority. Special attention was needed to the reliability 
of equipments, particularly in the aircraft final assembly stage, where 
experience to-date had indicated a high level of defects. In that context the 
combined efforts of System Engineering, Quality Assurance and Procurement 
would ensure that appropriate action was taken with those Suppliers whose 
equipment fell short of acceptable reliability levels. Careful attention to 
configuration standard of equipment would also be necessary to ensure 
equipment standard was compatible with aircraft needs.
FINANCE AND CONTRACTS (German Director, British Deputy)
Finance and Contracts would maintain its overview of the commercial 
aspects of the programme, in particular by maintaining contractual cover for 
all areas of work and passing this on as required to sub-contractors/suppliers.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (British Director, German Deputy)
Programme Management would continue to provide functional expertise and 
fulfil the Company’s responsiblities in the areas of configuration management, 
work definition, central planning, and central document control, as well as to 
support the Managing Director’s office in a staff function.
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PRODUCTION (Italian Director, German Deputy)
Production would maintain its overview and direction of aircraft assembly 
carried out at the parent Companies; in particular, the Directorate was to 
improve communications between the parent Companies to ensure expertise was 
shared and duplication of effort avoided.
PRODUCTION SUPPORT (German Director, British Deputy)
The Directorates activities centred upon eliminating short falls in 
achieving a satisfactory level of support in terms of spares, ground 
equipment, technical publications, and training for each of the Company’s 
Customers; in addition, the levels of support were to be placed on a proper 
contractual basis at an early date.
MARKETING (German Director, British Deputy)
Planning specific market compaigns in those areas where sales 
opportunities had been identified; organise and co-ordinate the necessary 
activities for sale of the aircraft to other European Customers on behalf of 
the parent Companies.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (British Director, Italian Deputy)
Were to continue to co-ordinate and manage progress with the development, 
production investment and aircraft production programme, with particular 
reference to: design improvements and appropriate modifications.
-end of the main objectives of each Directorate-
(58)
The nationality of the Functional Director and his Deputy was allocated 
by the parent Companies and did not change throughout the life of the aircraft 
project; similarly, the Managing Director was German and his Deputy, British.
The Managing Director was a full member of the Board of four; the other three 
Directors were the Chairman of the respective parent Companies.
Below the level of Deputy Functional Director, no specific allocations 
were made by the parent Companies but theapproximate nationality, parent Company 
assigned and labour market employees was:-
46% parent Company, 54% labour market.
Of the parent Company employees 50% are British,
42% German and 8% Italian.
Of the labour market employees 33% are British,
64% German, 4% Italian and 1% other nationalities 
(Dutch and American).
(Percentages calculated on July 1980 status which was representative of 
the normal situation within the Company at the time of the study.)
The nature of employee’s employment Contracts caused allegations of 
discrimination; details of the Contracts and the issue of discrimination are 
identified in chapter 4.
The Company's comparative place in the industrial structure was unique 
only in the respect of its business. Hitherto, such aerospace projects had 
been on a two-party share basis, e.g. Anglo French or French German. The 
Company bore some similarity to the two party form; it was established to 
manage a specific long-term project while the other projects were initially
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managed by assigned parent Company employees prior to recruitment on the 
international and local labour markets; similarly, the Companies were located 
in major European cities. Equally, the Company’s Personnel staff were 
nationals of the locations site. All West German Companies employing more 
than 20 employees were required to have a Works Council.
The Works Council
A Works Council was first established in February 1971 under the L.M.R.A. 
legislation of 1952 consisting of five members, all of whom were German, 
three of them were women.
Subsequent Works Councils were formed under the 1972 legislation and were 
made up as shown below:-
May 1972 five members; all German
Two of whom were women
May 1974 seven members; five German, two British
Two members were women
April 1978 seven members; five German, two British
All male
Nov 1979 seven members; three Germans, four British
One member was a woman
April 1981 seven members; four Germans, two British
and one American
Two members were women
Dec 1982 seven members; five Germans, two British
Three members were women
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Membership was determined by Article 9 of the 1972 legislation
Number of Eligible Voters Works Council Members
5 to 20 1
21 to 50 3
51 to 150 5
151 to 300 7
301 to 600 9
From the nationality membership of the early Works Councils, it may be 
surmised that only the Germans understood the functions and duties of a Works 
Council. Similarly, although the working language of the Company was 
generally English, all of the Works Council correspondence was German and 
operated under German legislation; other nationalities, notably the British 
contingent, were not proficient in German, nor had they a great desire to be. 
Further, there may have been thoughts in the minds of non-German employees 
assigned from parent Companies - these employees made up the majority of the 
non-German in the early days- that the former partner Company senior 
executives who held Director posts in the Company, would look after their 
interests. These Directors, however, knew less about the system of 
representation than most employees and it was not until the advent of the 1974 
election that non-Germans began to realise that their interests could best be 
served by representation on the Works Council. By 1979, the next election 
reflected a desire for a redical change of approach by the electorate after a 
prolonged period of domination by the then German Chairman. The 1979 and 1981 
Works Councils to which I was elected, the latter being the one for which I 
became Deputy Chairman, attempted a more informative approach to the 
electorate to overcome an image of Works Council isolation. Isolation was 
such that three separate bodies had been created. Management; employees; the
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Works Council. In some previous Works Councils information was given by 
inspired leaks from Works Councillors who disagreed with the Chairman’s 
policies but were not prepared to engage in open confrontation with him, 
particularly as they considered themselves a very small minority.
The history of the Works Council can - be divided into two main phases.
First phase 1971 to 1979; second phase 1979 to 1982. The criteria for this division
are: regularity of meetings and reporting, nature of contact, such as
special and informal versus formal meetings, and the turnout at meetings; these are 
discussed in more detail below.
This thesis will, however, concentrate on the second phase, most notably
because I was an active member of the Works Council during that phase and able
to closely study its operation, but also because this was the period in which a 
great deal more activity took place.
Throughout the first phase, (197^-79) the Works Council were passive compared to
phase two. For example, legislation provided the opportunity and obligation
to regularly report their activities to employees by means of a quarterly
general assembly; during phase one, the Works Council reported only on an
annual basis. 1 .Technically this was ir breach of legislation but common sense
prevailed. The report centred upon the four social occasions per annum which
were organised by the Works Council (Spring, Summer, Autumn and Christmas
festivals) but paid for by the Company; the assembly was essentially called to
hear the annual report by the Company covering the financial s;f e e  and trends of
business. During phase 2, the Works Council averaged two general assemblies. 
Discussion with other Works Councils in the region, reveals that they chose to
report to the employees 4 times per annum.
Whilst contact with employees took place daily in the course of business 
during phase 2, at specially convened meetings to discuss an employee’s
/
problem if he so wished, there was considerable contact out of working hours,
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for example, at social occasions. Average turnout at general assemblies 
(Phase 1 and 2) was 35% of employees entitled to attend. All assemblies were 
held during normal working hours. Whilst turnout was restricted by the space 
available within the building and rarely varied, the percentage was similar to 
the attendance experienced by other Works Councils in the region regardless of 
industry. The similarity was established by my discussions with those Works 
Councils.
The forum presented the phase 2 Works Council not only with the 
opportunity to report activities to the electorate, but to make its point 
(hopefully truly reflecting the whole employee spectrum), to the Company on 
matters considered to be of serious concern and particularly those matters 
about which the Company needed to be embarrassed.
At the first general assembly of the phase 2 Works Council in March 1980,
only four months after its election, the report covered thirteen areas of
activity which were of direct concern to all employees. The areas were health
and safety at work; pension scheme proposal; canteen committee to investigate
complaints; holiday regulation changes; labour turnover and manpower planning;
communication between the Company and employees; attempted amendment of the
general Company/Works Council agreement governing working hours; clarification
of business travel regulations; proposal by the Works Council to compensate
employees for travel costs incurred to and from place of work; effect of
adverse publicity on employee morale; information required by the Works
Council to enable proper assessment of hirings and transfers and finally,
Works Council investigation of alleged unequal treatment of employees. At
each successive general assembly, employees were given a progressive report on
each of those activities. Not only was this an essential feature of phase 2
/
in terms of providing employees with information but it was also a
rfpmrmfit-rfltinn
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of the range of problems that employees had requested the Works Council to 
investigate; requests were rarely, if ever, made in writing and normally took 
the form of oral requests to individual Works Councillors either during or 
outside working hours. Works Councillors did not reveal sources of requests 
in order to respect employee confidentiality. The confidentiality ’rule' did 
leave the Works Council open to allegations of pursuing its own personal 
interests, but as an individual member, I took it upon myself to investigate 
requests by other Works Councillors prior to making my own decision whether to 
support such requests. The only exception was that of alleged unequal 
treatment (see chapter 4) which all Works Councillors were requested to 
investigate as soon as the November 1979 election had been completed. It 
should be noted that employees making the requests were not just those from 
the labour market, i.e. former partner enterprise employees were also 
concerned about the allegations of unequal treatment. The confidentiality 
rule was, however, rigorously maintained in this matter.
The Company was always given the right of reply at phase 2 general
assemblies by pre-arrangement, although they rarely, if ever, knew the content
of our presentations. In terms of the economic state of the business, the
Company took the opportunity annually to provide broad information. On at
least one occasion, however, in 1981, the Company merely presented economic
information and chose not to comment on the phase 2 Works Council activities
report. The economic information presented on the occasion was an explanation
of the Company's balance sheet and profit and loss account* and a summary is 
presented here as an illustration of the content of this kind of presentation. It 
stands in marked contrast to the issues ‘raised by the Works Council as .
illustrated above.
The Managing Director explained in general terms the two documents and the 
following points were highlighted:-
BALANCE SHEET
1. ASSETS (Aktiva)
a) Outstanding Share Capital (Aktienkapital)
The Shareholder Capital (Stanunkapital) .was announced as being DM X 
millions, of which an amount of DM X - Y millions was still outstanding. 
Due to the good cash flow situation it was not necessary to request the 
remaining outstanding capital from the shareholders. The reason for the 
increase of the share capital being that the Company was acting as the 
selling Company for products to other Customers and, therefore, must show 
more credibility than the previous share capital in relation to the value 
of possible orders.
b) Fixed Assets (Sachanlagen)
The fixed assets of the Company (furniture etc) were declared as being XX 
thousand DM at the end of the year. This included depreciation. It 
should be noted that as a general rule the Company chose the method of 
depreciation which spreads the cost in equal annual amounts over the 
estimated period of life cycle of the asset (lineare Abschreibungen).
c) Investments (Finanzanlagen)
The Company’s Canadian office was a 100% owned subsidiary company valued 
at approximately YY thousand DM. This Company had been created to 
support potential sales in Canada. It was staffed by two marketing 
executives recruited from that country.
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d) Current Assets (Umlaufvermogen)
The current assets had been valued at DM X Y Z million.
e) Deferred Charges (Rechnungsabgrenzungsposten)
The final item on the asset side showed an amount of DM A Z million of 
deferred charges.
2. LIABILITITES (Passive)
a) Share Capital (Aktienkapital)
The share capital amounted to DM X million as already stated.
b) Revaluation of Assets (Wertberichtigung auf Sachanlagen)
There had been an amount of DM Z Z thousand shown in respect of assets 
which had been revalued.
c) Reserves (Ruckstellungen)
An accrued amount of X thousand DM was declared for items such as 
equipment risks, marketing risks, outstanding taxes and auditing risks.
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d) Current Liabilities (Verbindlichkeitch)
The total of DM X Y Z million refered mainly to the partner Company 
enterprise efforts as already stated under Current Assets (whichwas split
into trade creditors, installment payments received, bank loans).
e) Deferred Income (Rechnunsabgrenzungsposten)
This was the amount as shown under Deferred Charges and a small amount of
A B C  thousand DM was shown purely as a cosmetic accounting balance.
f) Net Profit (Bilanzgewinn)
The net profit was declared as' A B C thousand DM. It should be 
remembered that this profit was not all distributed to the Shareholders, 
but activities like Feasibility Studies had been financed from this 
profit figure.
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
I) SALES
The trading revenue (Rohertrag) of DM X Y millions being the difference 
of the net sales (Umsatzerlos) of DM A B C million and expenditures 
(Aufwendungen) of DM X Y Z million was, in fact, the real Company 
in-house basic sales, or turnover (Company own cost).
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This amount was further increased as a result of:-
a) Income from money lent to Company personnel (Ertrage aus 
Ausleihugen).
b) Dividend from bank accounts (Sonstige Zinsen).
c) Income from the sales of Company equipment above book value (e.g.
sale of company car) (Ertrage aus dem Abgang von Gegenstanden des
Anlagevermogens).
d) Income from previous reserves being cashed (Ertrage aus der 
Auflosung von Ruckstellungen).
e) Other income (e.g. income from letting office space).
Those various increases brought the Company in-house total gross sales 
(Erlose) to DM A B million compared with the total Company expenditure 
(Aufwendungen) amounting to DM X Y Z million detailed as follows
2. EXPENDITURE
a) Labour Costs (Lohne und Gehalter)
An amount of DM X Z million was accounted for by costs which constituted
basic labour cost, Christmas bonus, holiday bonus, housing (rental) 
allowance, education fees, health insurance contributions and savings 
premiums.
(68)
b) Social Expenditure (Sozialabgaben)
The amount of Y Z Z thousand DM referred to those contributions which the 
Company had to pay as stipulated by legislation in respect of:-
State pension, health insurance, 
insurance for unemployment 
(gesetzliche Sozialabgaben,
Alters-, Kranken- und Arbeitslosenversicherung).
Berufsgenossenschaft
(roughly equivalent to the English
"Factory and Office Acts" provisions).
Insurance for holiday entitlement reserves 
(Sozialabgaben wegen Urlaubsruckstellungen).
Fine to cover failure to employ disabled persons 
(Schwerbehindertenabgabe).
c) Allowance for Old Age Pension (Aufwendungen fur Altersversorgung)
This allowance referred only to three employees for which the Company 
directly had made pension arrangements.
d) Depreciation on Fixed Assets (Abschreibungen auf Sachanlagen)
This item took account of the normal depreciation of the fixed assets of 
the Company.
(69)
e) Interset (Zinsen)
The Company paid a nominal amount for interest on bank loans.
f) Taxation (Steuern)
X Y Z thousand DM was paid in various kinds of taxes in accordance with 
German Tax Law.
g) Other Costs (Sonstige Aufwendungen)
Approximately 50% of the total Company in-house turnover referred to this 
item and covered the following items: —
personnel secondment, rent of buildings, insurance, travel costs, telex 
and telephone, advertising, stationery, outside computer time, 
photo-copying, electricity, printing costs and marketing activities.
No question time was allowed during Phase 1 Works Council assemblies. 
However in Phase 2 time was usually allocated for questions from the employees 
to either Works Council members or the Company; this proved unsatisfactory at 
first since the questions were extremely slow in coming due to an 
unwillingness to speak in public. This was rectified by allowing written 
questions submitted prior to and/or during the respective presentations, an 
innovation introduced at the April 1980 General Assembly. The questions were 
quickly grouped as far as possible during a short break; the questions read 
out the the Works Council, ensuring the questioner’s anonymity,
(70)
and answered by the person to whom the question was directed. There was no 
question time during phase 1 Works Council general assemblies.
General assemblies lasted circa 35 minutes during phase 1, and 3% hours 
during phase 2. The feedback received in phase 2 was normally favourable in 
organisational terms and mixed in reaction to content. Feedback was sought 
verbally by each Works Councillor from as many employees as possible within 24 
hours of the assembly. Presumably, the phase 2 Works Council were not always 
able to please all of the people all of the time but whatever the reaction to 
content, feedback was fully discussed by the phase 2 Works Council with the 
objective of ensuring that it encompassed asmany employees' views as possible 
in the concepts and policies pursued on their behalf. At no time did feedback 
indicate that activity should cease in any matter or policy pursued except 
that of unequal treatment. (see chapter 4). The discussion took place at 
specially convened Works Council meetings arranged circa 48 hours after each 
assembly.
Evolution of Works Councils in Companies of this size might be 
caricatured as follows: enthusiasm - we will change the world - realism and 
recognition of the limitations of Works Council rights, cynicism - and 
acceptance that one does the best one can in the light of lack of rights and 
the personalities of the management representatives with whom one is forced to 
interface. True dedication in either phase 1 or 2 was rare, therefore, and 
less than forty percent of members sought re-election. Of that percentage, 
less than half were successfully re-elected. This, naturally, gave management 
the distinct edge; professionalism and experience was generally low on the 
Works Council but the management representative with whom they interfaced was 
the same person from 1971. As a Works Council body, however, the reasons for 
seven elections when only four were required by legislation were generally:-
(71)
employee size had increased sufficiently to warrant two 
additional members.
term of office completed by legislation, 
membership thought to be unrepresentative of employee 
nationalities and dominated by the personality of the 
Chairman.
election required by legislation, 
election caused by my re-assignment to U.K.
Election data is tabulated in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.
From Figure 1 the following interpretation is made:
average number of candidates during Phase 1 and Phase 2 are similar; 
14 in Phase 1, 13 in Phase 2.
average number of candidates seeking re-election in Phase 1 is 1
(7%) and Phase 2 - 4  (30%); this demonstrates a more determined set 
of candidates in Phase 2 who were also free from the domination of 
the Phase 1 Works Council Chairman.
average voter turnout during Phase 1 is 77% whereas the issues
undertaken by Phase 2 prompted an increase to 88%.
it should be noted that the turnout at elections held by other Works 
Councils in the region averaged 80% during the same periods and that 
candidates seeking re-election averaged 30%; Phase 2 would thus 
indicate a return to the norm although the turnover of candidates is 
clearly high.
1974 -
1978 -
1979 -
1981 -
1982 -
(72)
From Figure 2 the distribution of votes indicates that, in terms of the 
successful white collar candidates, 50% of the Phase 1 electorate achieved 
the Works Council team that they wanted; equally the distribution indicates a 
lack of concensus within the electorate as to whom they wished to elect.
During Phase 2, 76% achieved their desired Works Council team and the 1979 and
1981 elections, in particular, demonstrates a much greater consensus within 
the electorate concerning the candidates they preferred. It should be noted 
that my discussions with other Works Councils in the regions suggest that.the- 
1979 and 1981 elections were very similar to the voting patterns for 
successful candidates in elections held throughout the total period of 1971 to
1982 inclusive.
Despite the high turnover there was a consistent Works Councillor trade 
union membership of forty percent throughout the life of the Works Councils. 
(This percentage is low compared to national results shown in Figure 3).
Whilst the length of trade union membership was impossible to establish, many 
Phase 1 and 2 Works Councillors conceded that their membership for protection 
purposes was essential during their respective terms of office. Trade unions 
were the usual source for almost all the Works Council training courses, 
either general, informative and operational, or specialist in one area of the 
legislation. The legislation itself (Article 37) permitted four weeks paid 
leave for training of new Works Councillors in their first term of office and 
three weeks for subsequent terms. Such training opportunities would have 
increased the professionalism of both phases of the Works Councils but were 
rarely taken up.
(73)
It is clear that the Phase 1 Works Council adopted a passive role and did 
no more than was necessary to achieve a relatively smooth operation of 
management - Works Council relationships; this was due to the dominance of the 
Chairman. This dominant character was able to establish himself as leader of 
three Phase 1 Works Councils, enforce his viewpoint without unified resistance 
or equally forceful argument. Article 26 LMRA clearly defines the role of the 
Chairman as merely the speaker of the Works Council and to represent the 
adopted view of the Works Council. The Chairman is not permitted to act 
independently 2* If a Chairman is dominant, however, this definition can 
easily be circumvented. Similarly, if Works Councillors lack the knowledge of 
relevant legislation and do not rectify this by training, a Chairman can 
virtually run the Works Council single handed. The effect was that the Phase 
1 Works Councils built themselves a reputation solely for organising Company 
social functions. This produced a considerable amount of apathy by employees 
towards the Works Council as a body. Not until the 1979 election, however, 
was anything done to change the situation.
The Chairman managed to dissolve the Phase 1, 1979 Works Council on the 
basis of not being truly representative of the nationality split of the 
electorate. This was permissible under Article 21 of the legislation as was 
the voluntary resignation of all Works Councillors. A return to power would 
have given him a considerably longer term of office and it was known that some 
relatively new employees were creating a groundswell of opposition; an early 
election was a gamble on the electorate being unwilling to vote such employees 
onto the Works Council if, indeed, they were willing to accept nomination to 
run against him. The gamble failed and an election list of sixteen saw him 
finish in the bottom half. The issues raised by the Phase 2 Works Council 
changed the role of the Works Council into one of initiative taking and 
keeping employees informed about what was happening. The difficulty remained,
(74)
however, of changing the image of the Works Council as being a separate entity 
from management and employees rather than a truly representative body of all 
employees. During Phase 2, great emphasis and effort was placed on and in 
reacting to upward pressure from employees whilst at the same time, keeping 
them informed about issues at national level. The trade union members (40%) 
of the Phase 2 Works Council were encouraged to seek free advice and relevant 
literature from their trade unions to develop professionalism. Similarly, 
contact was developed in Phase 2 with other Works Councils in the region to 
enable advice to be sought if necessary; Phase 1 Works Councils contact with 
other Works Councils had been limited to discount purchase schemes for 
domestic appliances.
Another major difference between Phase 1 and 2 Works Councils was that of 
administration and, particularly, records.
To obtain a record of the actions of the Works Council, and proof that 
the meeting met the quorum requirements before a vote is valid, Article 34 
LMRA requires preparation of written minutes to be signed by the Chairman and 
one other member of the Works Council. The article applies to all other works 
committees and representative organs. As a minimum, the minutes should 
indicated the persons present at the meeting, the vote with which resolutions 
were adopted or rejected, and the exact text of any resolution which was 
adopted.
Failure to prepare written minutes does not affect the validity of a
resolution, but constitutes a breach by the Chairman of the Works Council of
his duties as Chairman. The Phase 2 Works Council chose not to exploit this
breach at their first meeting in December 1979 because it was considered that
/
the bad publicity would serve no useful purpose to either the Works Council or
i n ____________
(75)
All members of the Works Council are entitled to inspect the files of the 
Works Council, including its written minutes. The employer and union 
representatives do not have a right to inspect the minutes of the Works 
Council but may obtain a copy of the minutes of those meetings (or portions 
thereof) in which they participated.
The archives of the Phase 1 Works Councils contained a mere four sets of 
minutes covering the period 1971 to 1979; the Phase 2 Works Councils 
documented every weekly meeting. It is apparent that during Phase 1 very few 
meetings took place and very little was discussed. Phase 1 Works Councils 
seemed content to be passive and achieved very little during their terms of 
office. Phase 2 Works Councils chose, however, to be more professional in 
their administration and ensure their Chairman was not in breach of his 
duties.
There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the two phases of the 
Works Councils in the Company. This study took place in Phase 2 where the 
Works Council took the initiative, ceased to be merely a social function 
organisation and tried to be purposeful wherever feasible; success, in achieving 
the purpose v however is a sub jective evaluation-as will".be seen "later in 
identifying initative achievement.
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NOTES:
1. Article 43 LMRA obligates the Works Council to call a general assembly 
once in every calendar quarter and report on its activities.
The employer must be invitied to the works meetings and department 
meetings and notified of the agenda. He is entitled to address the 
meetings. At least once in every calendar year the employer or his 
representative must make a report to the works meeting on staff questions 
and social affairs in the establishment as well as on the financial 
position of and trends in the establishment, in as far as there is no 
risk of a disclousure of trade or business secrets.
2. The Chairman is the speaker of the Works Council and represents that body 
in the decisions it adopts. The Chairman is not authorized, however to 
act independently on behalf of the Works Council or to adopt decisions in 
the name of that body. Unauthorized acts of the Chairman may be binding 
on the Works Council if relied on in good faith by third parties (e.g. 
the employer) and if ratified, expressly or implicitly by failure to 
object, by the Works Council. The Chairman is not authorized to manage 
the affairs of the Works Council, even in those cases in which no 
committees of the Works Council have been formed and the Works Council 
may not delegate that function to him or ome of its other members, 
whether pursuant to a general power of attorney or individual powers of 
attorney. If, however, the Works Council has less than nine members, the 
Works Council may delegate to the Chairman, or to the Chairman jointly 
with another member of the Council, the authority to conduct the current
(82)
business of the Works Council (i.e. internal, organizational or 
administrative matters). There is no evidence that the phase 1 Works 
Councils delegated such responsibility to their Chairman.
The Chairman, however, is the person entitled to receive all statements 
and declarations which are to be made or submitted to the Works Council.
Works Council Chairmen, however, have been known to be authoritarian.
For example, as part of an empirical study on co-determination, the 
highly competent Works Council Chairman of a German multi-national 
Company was interviewed. During the conversation, the Chairman’s wife 
telephoned and said that her physician had prescribed a new medication. 
The Works Council Chairman had his chauffeur in his Company car pick up
the medication in the Company clinic and immediately deliver it to his
wife. Clearly, the Works Council Chairman had become an integral part of 
top management and did not hesitate to adopt all the perquisites due to
his position. For further details, see Thim "The False Promise of
Co-determination", p.128. Toronto. 1980. Lexington Books.
(83)
Similarly, the epitome of a cadre of conscientious trade union officials 
is Kurt Herrmann, the Works Council Chairman of BASF A.G. in
Ludwigshafen, a class conscious skilled worker and a patriot, the very
backbone of the Social Democratic party. In an interview with the 
"Mannheimer Morgan" 9th May 1978, Herrmann freely admitted that he is 
authoritarian in the sense of authority and believed that running a tight 
ship (straffe Fuhrung) is a necessity. He differed from his predecessor, 
Rudi Bauer, who had been Works Council Chairman for over a decade, and 
from most Works Council Chairman of the era, by accepting an adversary 
relationship between employer and employee, Works Council and management. 
Herrmann recognized the pluralistic society and represented specific 
interests, which he considered that even management cannot understand.
He further considered that there are group interests and, hence natural
conflict. See also, Thim. op.cit., pp.152 and 153.
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Chapter 4
Discrimination and Equality of Treatment
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify a major issue that arose in 
the Phase 2 Works Council terms of office and how the issue was handled by 
both the Company and the Works Council.
The issue was considered by the Works Council to be one of discrimination 
and equality of treatment as a direct result of the differing nature of the 
employees' contracts of employment.
The Chapter will also establish the relationship between law and 
negotiation.
The facts and the problem
As stated in Chapter 3, the Company was incorporated by the partners from 
Italy, UK and West Germany (termed the partner enterprises hereinafter).
At July 31, 1980, the Company employed a total of 317 persons of whom 116 
(46.6%) were assigned from the partner enterprises whilst 201 (53.4%) were 
recruited from the labour market. All labour market recruited employees had a 
standard labour contract regulating primarily basic salaries and working 
hours. Employees from partner enterprises had standard contracts plus an 
agreement that the Company will pay such employees certain allowances which 
are identified below. The Company provided all payments and carried these 
payments as aggregates in its balance sheet.
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As a result of the separate agreements, all of the former employees in
the partner enterprises enjoyed the following privileges:-
a) Christmas bonus: an additional 1% of their salaries to be taken as the
basis of calculation was paid for each year of 
service in the partner enterprises.
The former partner enterprise employees coming from Italy and Gt.Britain 
enjoyed the following additional privileges:-
b) Interim payment on their arrival in Germany.
c) Hotel expenses for the individual employees and their families for a 
period of up to 4 weeks following their arrival if private accomodation 
is not available.
d) The estate agents fees were paid.
e) An interest-free loan was granted to put up a required deposit/guarantee 
for rented accomodation.
f) Re-location expenses for furniture and household equipment.
g) A current monthly lodging allowance to compensate for the difference in
rent between the employees’ home countries and Germany.
h) Payment of the return travel expenses for the employees and their 
families once a year.
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i) Payment of the education and training costs for the children at an
International school.
These allowances were paid by virtue of agreements made between the 
Company and the former employees of the partner enterprises. Company 
employees other than defined do not enjoy these privileges even if they came 
from abroad (Netherlands, Italy, Gt.Britain, USA).
As far as retirement pension provisions were concerned, the following 
distinction was made between the former employees of the partner enterprises 
and the other employees. The former employees had the right to maintain their 
affiliation with the partner enterprises’ pension funds by voluntary 
independent contributions. The other employees may join a pension scheme 
provided by the Company following 10 years of service.
Moreover, the partner enterprises had agreed to taking back their former 
employees. The Company and the partner enterprises made an agreement to the 
effect that the Company could not dismiss the former employees except on 
consultation with the partner enterprises.
Those agreements were concluded with any former employee of the partner 
enterprises whilst, in general, all of the other employees were precluded.
Legislation
The legislation provides protection and, indeed, penalties against 
discrimination by either employers or employees and attempts to ensure 
equality of treatment. The principle is Article 75 and is summarised below.
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1) The employer and the Works Council shall ensure that every person
employed in the establishment is treated in accordance with the 
principles of law and equity and, in particlar, that there is no 
discrimination against persons on account of their race, creed, 
nationality, origin, political or trade union activity or convictions, or 
sex. They shall make sure that employees do not suffer any prejudice
because they have exceeded a certain age.
2) The employer and the Works Council shall safeguard and promote the
untrammelled development of the personality of the employees of the 
establishment.
Sub-section (1) specifically prescribes equal treatment of all employees 
in the works. The Works Council and employer must accord all employees equal 
treatment and treatment in accordance with general principles of fairness and 
justice, and must assure that all employees in the works similarly comply with 
the standards of this paragraph. If necessary, both the employer and Works 
Council have the duty to advise and educate the employees of their duties 
pursuant to this Article. Any employee who violates this fair and equal 
treatment provision may be dismissed, and the Works Council may insist upon 
the dismissal pursuant to Article 104, which governs the grounds for such 
dismissal.
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Similarly, sub-section (1) prohibits discrimination based on race, 
nationality, national origin, religion, political persuasion, union 
affiliation or non-affiliation, sex and age. While some degree of 
differential treatment is permissible in accordance with general principles of 
freedom of contract when structuring the initial employment relationship, 
equal treatment is the norm and a fundamental right of all employees.
Political activities by employees outside the works are permissible unless 
such activities directly and adversely affect the works. Similarly, 
differential treatment on the basis of union affiliation or non-affiliation is 
absolutely prohibited. This does not mean, however, that union and non-union 
members must be granted identical terms of employment. Specifically, it is 
not required that non-union members must be accorded coverage under the 
provisions of collective labour agreements negotiated between the union and 
the employer. The prohibition against sex discrimination generally requires 
equal pay for equal work. Finally, there is not to be discrimination on the 
basis of age. Employees may not be forced to retire, be dismissed or denied 
employment, transfer, or participation in educational programmes because 
they have passed a specified age.
In addition to the general non-discrimination provisions, sub-section (1) 
proscribes any other forms of discriminatory or differential treatment which 
is not required by the needs of the works. Certain exceptions from 
application of Article 75 may be created for enterprises serving special 
purposes. 1 Thus, a political party may require, as a condition of employment, 
that the prospective employee is not a member of an opposition party; a church 
organization may condition employment upon membership of the organization.
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Sub-section (2) is designed to maximize the personal development of all 
employees. This Section proscribes unnecessary regimentation of the employees 
and of the employment process and procedures. To the extent possible, 
consistent with the needs of the works, employees should be assured a humane 
working environment and must not be subjected to requirements which are unduly 
demeaning or restrictive. Hence, codes of conduct, dress codes, general 
programmes of employee supervision and control, medical examinations, searches 
of employees when entering or leaving the works, are permissible only to the 
extent required to assure the proper conduct of the works and must minimize 
interference with the personal rights of employees.
Infringement by the employer or the Works Council of its duties of 
complying and assuring the compliance with the requirements of Article 75 may 
constitute a violation 2 and may cause the dissolution of the entire Works 
Council or the dismissal of certain of its members. If the employer violates 
the requirements of Article 75, employees damaged by such violations may bring 
an action for damages. If the employer violates the provisions of Article 75 
in connection with the hiring, integration, re-classification or transfer of 
employees, the Works Council is entitled and required to refuse its consent. 3
Every Works Council enters office determined to change the world. Sooner 
or later - sooner, if is fortunate - it is forced to reconsider its 
assumptions and procedure. It is the making of the Works Council if it is 
prepared to examine itself seriously and to draw the necessary conclusions.
If that test is failed, if energy is expended on rationalizing the status quo, 
mounting crises and disarray are inevitable.
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In that sense, the grace period of the Phase 2 Works Council ended when 
the matter of discrimination by virtue of origin, was raised with the Managing 
Director as will be seen later in this Chapter.
The successful candidates elected to the first Phase 2 Works Council had 
openly declared to any member of the electorate who enquired about their 
policies, that alleged discrimination by the Company would be investigated 
should they be elected. As far as I was able to determine in discussion with 
my new colleagues, only two of the seven successful candiates considered 
discrimination as the sole reason for their candidature. The remaining five, 
including myself, considered their election due more to the need for a united 
and democratic Works Council than had been apparent during Phase 1. Thus, the 
debate by the new Works Council was relatively short on discrimination as an 
issue for investigation along with many other issues discussed in later 
Chapters of this thesis.
Works Council Debate
The Works Council debated to what extent the employment contract 
arrangements were contrary to the law, in particular to what extent they 
infringed the principle of equal treatment, and:
a) which legal instruments could be employed, and what could be achieved, in 
the event of the Company being unwilling to harmonize the situation;
b) to what extent contracts concluded by the former employees of the partner 
enterprises could be amended in such a way that the employees are 
deprived of the privileges so far conceded;
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c) to what extent the Company could properly offer amendment of the 
contracts concluded with the former employees of the partner enterprises, 
in such a way that they became secondees from the partner enterprises and 
not being employed by the Company under German Labour Law Contracts.
d) and to what extent an individual employee could be sued for breach of 
contract if during a Labour Court Case the details of the employee rs 
personal contract of employment became public.
The debate began at the first meeting of the Phase 2 Works Council on 6th 
December 1979, continued at a further two meetings in the same month 
culminating on 25th January 1980 after which meeting a memorandum was 
formulated for presentation to the Company; the memorandum identified the 
nature of the different employment contracts, expressed the view that such 
contracts may constitute an infringement of Article 75 and requested the 
Company to comment. The decision by the Works Council to submit the 
memorandum was taken after several oral complaints were made by non-partner 
enterprise employees to individual Works Councillors about partner enterprise 
employees enjoying the additional financial benefits. None of the complaints 
were supported in writing because of the fear of reprisals by the Company, and 
cannot herefore be documented.
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Company/Works Council Dialogue
The Company did not formally respond to the Works Council memorandum so 
the Works Council requested a meeting. The request prompted the Managing 
Director to advise the Works Council Chairman in a February telephone call 
that discrimination was not an issue he was willing to discuss because he 
considered discrimination did not exist. The Works Council pursued the 
request.
It took until late March 1980 before a meeting with the management could 
be arranged. Many of the non-partner enterprise employees were meanwhile 
reaching a peak of disenchantment and many had discussed departure for greener 
and perhaps less discriminatory pastures. When the management finally 
responded to the discrimination charge, it was an anti-climax - action should 
be postponed, preferably forgotten. Most employees were unaware that the 
question of discrimination had briefly been raised by the Works Council in 
office during 1974, without success. 4 Employee morale was at a low ebb in 
late 1979, as reflected in the number of predominantly oral complaints made by 
employees to the Works Council about management attitudes in general. Such 
complaints were in addition to those made about discrimination and were made 
by both former partner and non-partner enterprise employees.
The emptiness of the management reaction to a charge of discrimination 
had consequences far beyond employee unhappiness. It symbolized the lack of 
consensus on what constituted discrimination and a lack of preparedness on the 
part of management for this kind of issue - carrying with it the possible 
implication that it might have to be resolved by the Labour Court, an 
experience which this management had not contemplated and clearly viewed with 
some trepidation. The extent of concern - perhaps verging on panic - on the
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part of management was reflected in (unprovable) warnings to individual Works 
Councillors not to press the matter, as it might damage their prospects.
Whilst this cannot be substantiated, it is important to register something of 
the atmosphere surrounding this issue.
Events within the Company presented the Works Council with a searing 
dilemma. It had no strike option (Article 2) and it would have been wrong to 
conduct itself as if it had. The Works Council was understandably reluctant 
to encourage employees into open resistance that it could not then support. 
With a low percentage of trade unionists (see Chapter 3) a strike called by 
unions would have no effect. On the other-hand, Works Councillors are 
ultimately judged not by their contemplation of dilemmas but their ability to 
conceive alternatives.
From the first day discrimination was raised, oral arguments for inaction 
cascaded from employees. At first the Works Council was warned not to push 
too vigorously or history would blame it if the management decided to close 
down operations and move elsewhere. It was also said that the Works Councilfs 
action should be a measured one in order not to destroy the possibility of 
eventual tolerance for some diversity held out by the early proclamations of 
the management that there was no case to answer. Then restraint was urged to 
remove the incentive for legal proceedings and the potential bad publicity 
that could be involved. Next, the Works Council heard that the management 
must not be driven into a corner by rash Works Council actions. In any event, 
it was said, discrimination had been conceded by previous Works Councils which 
legitimized the whole situation. Employee arguments were ignored.
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The Works Council decided that despite the flagrant violation of the 
LMRA, all high level Works Council/Management contact should continue and, 
indeed, be intensified. The worse the crisis, so the argument runs, the more 
important such contacts are - even a closed door meeting of the Works Council 
Chairman and the Managing Director.
These arguments reflected an odd coalition of extremist views between 
those who wanted to do nothing and those who argued that unless one did 
everything, it is better to do nothing. In a deeper sense, the Works Council 
faced a conceptual breakdown. Once the Works Council was unleashed, it should 
have been clear that discrimination, as it had developed, would be crushed 
unless a decisive reaction by the management imposed the need for a 
reconsideration.
All the time-wasting indecision - all the threats of action unless 
discrimination ceased - missed the two principal points. First, time was on 
the management side. The longer discussion lasted, the more likely was the 
collapse of resistance; discrimination would continue because opposition had 
been quelled. Second, the only chance of saving anything would have been a 
management reaction so immediate, so clear, so beyond rhetoric, so strong - 
and at the same time, leaving open a road for negotation - as to have given 
some pause to the Works Council and raised some thought for compromise. The 
prospects for this were admittedly slim; but even these prospects vanished 
completely when the management carefully rehearsed reasons at the April 1980 
General Assembly and later in the Labour Court why nothing should be done and 
so tacitly, if unintentionally, colluded with discrimination. The Managing 
Director also stated at the Assembly that "only a Labour Court decision would 
change my view that discrimination does not exist in this Company".
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Any fear of employee reaction against the Works Council policy seemed to 
me similarly unwarranted. No doubt the employees expressed some unhappiness 
from the beginning about any effort to make the management pay a heavy price. 
But the Works Council could argue that it was in a better position to protect 
the employees over discrmination arguments, with respect to which it suspected 
they were more clear-sighted than their electorates and, in the end, it was 
the Works Council who had to take the lead. It had a duty to make it clear 
that discrimination was not acceptable. It had to defend the policy of 
co-existence by defining not only its possibilities but also its limits. If 
it had equated policy with a fear of Company reprisals, it encouraged the 
sense of impotence that breeds employer dictatorships. Moderation is a 
virtue only in those who are thought to have an alternative.
As for the 1974 Works Council acceptance of discrimination by virtue of 
origin, there, was something self-destructive, almost masochistic, in the 
management's penchant to sell itself short. Ignorance of Labour Laws is not 
an acceptable excuse for a policy which, apparently, flouts the law.
Two further meetings with Company, solely to discuss this problem, took 
place in April and July of 1980. Neither meeting was able to reach any form 
of agreement in the face of a hostile Company attitude.
The problem of devising some form of sanctions against the management was 
difficult. The Works Council could have vetoed every new employment contract 
to force the discrimination issue or have quietly discouraged employees from 
working overtime - the level of which, in its view, was colossal. Dangerous 
sanctions they may have been, in terms of a possible violation of Works 
Councils legal duties, but they would have been effective.
While one can applaud dedication to a policy of co-existence with 
management as the whole concept of the LMRA, in terms of discrimination, this 
goal could not be achieved unless the Works Council could devise its own 
penalties for management intransigence together with incentives for 
moderation. Peace in the organisation, to be meaningful or lasting, must 
ultimately reflect not only an accommodation but a sense of justice.
The foregoing, then, is the background to the Works Council versus 
Management battle on discrimination which led the Works Council almost a year 
after it was first raised in 1979, to seek legal advice in November 1980.
There had in reality been very little dialogue which would have enabled the 
Works Council not to have taken the unanimous decision at a November meeting, 
to seek legal advice; in'the opinion of the Works Council legal advise did not 
constitute an issue on which all employees needed to be consulted.
Legal Consideration
Between November 1980 and January 1981, seven meetings took place with the 
Works Councils legal advisors to discuss the problem of alleged unequal 
treatment (see also para (a) to (d) pp 90 and 91) and what rights of 
co-determination - if any - were available to the Works Council. Detailed 
below are the results of the discussions with the Works Councils legal 
advisors.
The problem of equal treatment under labour legislation is fundamentally 
beyond controversy. There are, however, a number of decisions and comments 
with partly diverging results, relating to the question of the rights of the 
Works Council (co-determination).
The facts involved and the questions raised bring up additional problems, 
including the question to what extent more or less confidential separate 
agreements between the Company and the former partner enterprise employees are 
actually permitted, and to what extent the Company is bound to disclose the 
general framework, as well as to what extent the Works Council can aim at a 
Company-internal employment agreement in the sphere of allowances and 
retirement pension provisions.
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The validity and the general impact of the principle of equal treatment 
in the German legislation governing the relationship between Management and 
Labour are beyond any controversy. Similarly, the principle of equal 
treatment has been applied as an independent legal principle in private law.
The principle of equal treatment forms part of private law. It prohibits 
arbitrary, i.e. biassed discrimination of individual employees as compared 
with others in a comparable position.^ On the other hand, it does not prohibit 
the preferential treatment of individual employees. 6*
This principle implies the requirement of unbiassed distinction or the 
prohibited exemption from a specified system. 7 It is ruled that individual 
or groups of employees may not be treated more unfavourably than the majority 
of their colleagues without a sensible substantive reason, i.e. by mere 
arbitrary action. 8
However, the problem of when infringement of the principle of equal 
treatment is involved or which reasons justify unequal treatment, needs 
material clarification on the merits of each case. 9 It is taken for granted 
in literature and court practice that the principle of equal treatment is 
applicable without any restriction in the sphere of bonuses, wage supplements 
and retirement pension scheme. 10 Court practice has also accepted the 
application of the principle of equal treatment to wage bracketing frameworks. 
11
The Works Council took the view that varying payment of voluntary 
employer's allowances (lodging allowances, travelling expense allowances, 
Christmas bonuses) and the varying arrangements in relation to the Company 
pension scheme should have been subject to the principle of equal treatment.
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Another requirement of applicability of unequal treatment exists in the 
fact that employees in one and the same Company are involved. This 
requirement is beyond controversy. What is controversial is whether the 
principle of equal treatment is applicable also to employees of different 
companies of the same enterprises, by way of analogy to the different 
companies in one group. 12.
The principle of equal treatment is fundamentally applicable only as long 
as employment exists; it does not apply to engagement and application for 
employment. Such arrangements rule out agreements which have been concluded 
between partner enterprises’ former employees and their former employers, 
namely
a) the opportunity to continue contributions to their former Company 
retirement pension funds.
b) the consideration of the years of service at the Company when they are 
re-employed;
c) the agreements regarding dismissal and possible return to their former 
employments.
The principle of equal treatment reaches its bounds in the individual 
freedom of contract. The Works Council and its legal advisors interpreted 
this to mean that equal treatment can never be applied when a certain 
arrangement has been made between the contracting partners in separate 
agreements. The principle of freedom of contract thus takes precedence over 
the principle of equal treatment under labour law.
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The preferential arrangements were made in all cases by way of separate 
contracts (the so-called side letters). The arrangement per se comes under 
the realm of unrestricted freedom of the contracting partners to design 
contracts. These arrangements by separate contracts are, however, made with 
all of the former employees of the partner enterprises, and not with the other 
employees. Hence, a standardized attitude of the management is involved which 
comes close to a business practice of uniform arrangement by separate 
contracts.
The arrangement that employees from the parent Companies receive 
additional allowances and bonuses while the other employees to not, creates 
unequal groups of employees. Only when individual employees, regardless of 
origin, recieve these alowances as well, can there be no infringement of the 
equal treatment principle.
The matter under investigation is therefore the problem whether the 
regulations established by the employer and the resulting formation of groups 
in the Company, constitute, as such, an offence against the principle of equal 
treatment. The general question of whether the distinction of former 
employees is admissible needs to be considered and only then can the 
individual preferential arrangements be discussed. From the precedents 
studied, the employer is given a fairly wide scope of discretion for grouping 
so that he has enough margin for differentiation by certain criteria. The 
employer is fundamentally free in his ability to exempt certain groups of 
persons but this precludes entirely biassed arbitrary discriminations. 13 
Particularly in the case of bonuses, the employer is permitted to form groups 
by family status, period of service in his Company, age, but not by groups 
that are distinguished by the employees coming from certain companies 
(associated with the Company). Until November 1980 only the comparable cases
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had been decided in legal practice, where employees were given a distinctive 
treatment following their takeover or new association of several companies.
In such cases, the employees were given different treatment depending on their 
former employments as far as anniversary allowances and regulations concerning 
the Company pension schemes were involved. It was always acknowledged that an 
offence against the principle of equal treatment would not be involved when, 
for instance, Christmas bonus payments were continued. A differentiation by 
the payment of such a bonus is generally deemed admissible. 14.
The criterion of previous employment in a Company or enterprise, as such, 
is not biassed in principle. In each case, however, a concrete definition of 
the criteria is required. The Federal Labour Court have justified their 
decisions mainly with the argument that when an employer took over another 
enterprise he would not have had any scope of discretion regarding these 
employees and he takes over the existing employments without any restrictions. 
Hence, he is’ under the obligation to these employees to protect and maintain 
their present possessions. Following the practice at the Federal Labour 
Court, the fact that the employer is under an obligation to his employees, 
does not create a valid claim on the part of the other employees to enjoy the 
same privileges. 15. The situation under discussion was different because the 
Company was not legally obligated to pay the allowances in question but had 
used its descretion to favour the former employees of the partner enterprises.
Although the employer has freedom of contract he must not use that 
freedom to create such financial differences between employees that may create 
an illegal situation - in this case, possible discrimination.
(101)
The distinctive criterion must also be compatible with the concrete 
organization of the Company or enterprise. This means that in a small family 
enterprise, for instance, it is possible to apply distinctive systems other 
than those applicable in a large establishment. In the latter case, coarse 
features will be permitted in differentiation whereas in a small craft shop 
more individual criteria relating to the specific persons may be put into 
operation when unequal treatment is concerned. In the present case, the 
general distinction by previous employment appears to be compatible with the 
actual organization of the Company. The fact that the Company has been 
incorporated by the three parent companies for the specific purpose to realize 
a defined project plays a specifically decisive role. The criterion of 
employment in one of the parent companies is, hence, directly linked up with 
the organization and business purpose of the enterprise.
There must also be a special connection between the distinctive criterion 
within the scope of the actual legal relation, on the one hand, and an 
isolated case. Particular consideration must be given to the purpose of 
voluntary allowance and bonuses. 16
The question of whether an unbiassed distinction is made, needs judgment 
by objective criteria in its turn, independently of the employer’s subjective 
aims and statements. There must be an adequate correlation between the 
grounds and the consequences of the distinction. 17
The Company advanced two specific purposes or grounds of differentiation
when it addressed the April 1980 general assembly: —
1. the necessity to have employees acquainted with both the engineering
know-how and the management of the partner enterprises;
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2. a compensation for the disadvantages involved in a change from one
country and Company to another, to the favour of employees coming from 
abroad who continue their career in Germany naturally only for an interim 
period in their lives.
Both are certainly factual criteria which, on principle, justify a 
differentiation. The Company also stated at the same general assembly that 
only a Labour Court instruction would change their views on this matter.
Regarding the first ground it must be stated that this distinction was 
certainly justified in the stage of Company incorporation. The general 
preferential treatment of these employees by allowances was based on an 
objectively substantiated purpose of recruitment. Over a ten year period this 
aspect had been pushed far into the background. The work at the Company was 
now being carried out predominately by employees engaged from the free labour 
market. Moreover, even with regard to concrete jobs carried out by the 
employees - e.g. when they are entrusted with duties abroad - obviously a 
distinction is no longer made by their origin, i.e. whether they come from the 
partner enterprises or from the free labour market. As a result of the period 
for which the Company has existed, a standardization of qualification had been 
brought about, which no longer justified a specific purpose of recruitment. 
From paragraph two of the Company's Articles of Incorporation, the partner 
enterprise companies held the same opinion when it was agreed that all 
employees should be given equal treatment six years after Company 
incorporation. Even though this agreement does not have an immediate effect 
on an employee's title to equal treatment, it explains, as stated before, the 
objective justification of the unequal treatment. A differentiation, however, 
does not become non-objective merely because it turns out to be inexpedient
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and unsuitable in the course of advancing development; it is accepted that 
those facts and conditions should be considered which prevailed at the time 
when such a differentiation was applied. 18 In the present situation, the 
fact remains that ten years after incorporation, a corresponding distinction 
was still made.
Moreover, decisions taken by the Federal Labour Court in 1976 which 
denied an offence against the principle of equal treatment, may be interpreted 
inter alia, that after six years of employment employees should be given equal 
treatment so that equalizing adjustments by the employer would not be 
necessary. 19 This means that the initially unequal conditions would be more 
and more equalized especially by the lapse of time. 20 That case, however, 
was based on the fact that an ever-increasing number of employees favoured by the 
retirement pension scheme, retired from the Company for reasons of their age.
In the present situation such a settlement by the lapse of time does not 
exist. The unequal treatment is continuously re-established whenever a new 
employees is engaged, whether he comes from a partner enterprise or has been 
recruited from the free labour market. The second specific purpose rather 
binds the Company to grant reasonable expense allowances to all employees 
equally interrupting a professional career abroad in order to work for the 
Company for a limited period of time. The Company, however, only grants the 
allowances to former partner enterprise employees. This statement applies 
especially to all current payments made during the employment, i.e. lodging; 
allowances, travelling expense allowance as well as education and training 
subsidies.
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The question depends on the actual conditions applying to each employee. 
The argumentation given by the Company appears to be generally doubtful 
insofar as it is a matter of fact, even for applicants from the labour market, 
that the project is limited in view of time. In this respect too, there is 
rather a presumption to the effect that such foreign employees want to work in 
Germany for a period limited in view of time, and that they have not finally 
interrupted their careers in their home countries.
The following aspects must also be taken into account
a) The scope of discretion applying to the granting of recurring payments on 
conclusion of the contract is generally wider than the scope applying to 
the current allowances and bonuses granted during the employment. The 
consideration of the former employment with relation to the Christmas 
bonus can be justified only with the criterion of interrupted 
professional career and the particular interest the partner enterprises 
have in the employees.
b) It may be relevant whether there are contractual and financial links 
between the Company and the partner enterprises. The letter of 
confirmation by the partner enterprises, on the one hand, and the wording 
used in the first item of the separate agreements give a certain 
indication. Financial and tax criteria, for instance, have been accepted 
in legal practice to be unobjective grounds of differential. 21
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Reasonableness of a unilateral arrangement by the employer can be 
examined only within the framework of such an isolated arrangement. In 
contrast to the principle of equal treatment which can be applied particularly 
to attack the absence of such an arrangement, here only the alleged purpose 
can be examined. Therefore, an examination on reasonableness is possible with 
relation to the arrangements concerning the retirement pension provisions.
Within his scope of discretion, the employer is fundamentally free to 
determine the beneficiaries including the regulations about the waiting 
period. When the entilement to pension claims is made contingent on ten years 
of service, such regulation is principally not inequitable because all 
employees have the chance to qualify for expectancy under the retirement 
pension scheme as a reward for his loyalty to the Company. In the present 
situation, certain doubts arise insofar as the Company’s enterprise is 
project-bound and limited in view of time. Non-partner enterprise employees 
should have been advised in their employment contracts that they were 
precluded from joining the retirement scheme until ten years continous service 
had been completed. The ten years service did, however, count in benefit 
calculations. As far as these employees with pre- 1974 contracts are 
concerned, to merely discover they were precluded from the pension scheme is 
arguably unreasonable. An offence against the principle of equal treatment 
could reside in this fact. Similarly, non-partner enterprise employees 
engaged at a later date (post-1974) are treated differently compared to those 
engaged earlier in that ten years service would not count in benefits. It 
should be noted that a discrimination of employees being newcomers to a 
Company against employees having been in the Company’s services for a longer 
period of time is generally permitted. Such distinction should however, be 
disclosed and published so that the newcomers know from the very beginning 
whether or not they will come under the retirement pension scheme.
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Possibilities and chances of success
The offence against the principle of equal treatment and against the 
unreasonableness of a contractual arrangement may be advanced by each employee 
affected when he has his case decided upon trial at the Labour Court, claiming
the payments to which he is entitled. It is emphasized, in this respect, that
an offence against the principle of equal treatment is assumed to exist. 22 
More recent precedents can also be understood to imply the fact that the 
courts, too, apply a more differentiating and fact-related approach in 
decisions about whether, in a specific case, the distinctive criterion is
objective and unbiassed. 23 This may be interpreted that the Courts will
examine in detail the criteria used by a Company to differentiate between 
employees rather than accept the Company's assertion that custom and practice 
demands such differentiation.
In opposition to the claims held by a single employee under his 
individual contract, the Works Council has the general duty to look after 
compliance not only with the principle of equal treatment, but also right and 
justice in Company-internal employment agreements. 24 What is of similar 
interest is the extent to which the Works Council creates opportunities of 
arrangement beyond the general possiblity of co-operation and discussion with 
the Company. For example, agreements between a Company and a Works Council 
can be made which go beyond the minimum requirements of the legislation. 25
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Right of co-determination
The question whether a general fund has been created or whether the 
retirement pension provisions have been made through general direct pledges or 
promises may be left undecided according to recent court practice at the 
Federal Labour Court. 26 All of these, as far as they have been generally adopted 
in the Company, are subject to the right of co-determination. 27 Any 
retirement pension scheme is subject to co-determination when theoretically 
formed groups of employees are given separate contracts to the same effect. 28
In this situation, merely the right of co-determination is of interest.
The sphere free of co-determination is as follows:-
The employer is free in four respects:- i.e.
whether he wants to provide the financial means for the Company-internal 
retirement pension scheme; to what extent he wants to do so; which type 
of provisions he wants to make; and which employees of groups of 
employees he wants to provide for.
The definition of the beneficiaries includes also the question of the 
specific waiting period following which there is a fundamental eligibility for 
pension payments, in other words: the question of loyalty to which payment is 
to be linked. 29.
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Consequently, the Works Council is primarily entitled to co-determination 
only as far as arrangement problems are involved. There could not be any 
influence by the right of co-determination, particularly on the problems of 
waiting time. 30 Later opinion, however, suggests that the Works Council 
would not be restricted to participation in questions relating to arrangement 
but would also be entitled to examine any pension scheme. 31 The Works 
Council could therefore have the possibilty and the duty to demand remedial 
action. In this respect, the employer’s decisions about the establishment of 
such a scheme and particularly about the definition of the future 
beneficiaries and the corresponding funding framework could be subject to 
change by the Works Council.
These possibilities, however, must not be interpreted as an extenion of 
the rights of co-determination. The Federal Labour Court leaves this question 
undecided but it is unlikely that the comprehensive definition within the 
legislation could be extended. 32
Such voluntary wage supplements as lodging allowance, education, 
subsidies are subject to co-determination. In this respect, the term ’wages’ 
is meant to denote any remuneration in consideration of services rendered,
i.e. any payments made by the employer for the purpose of consideration, 
irrespective of their specific designation. 33 Bonuses have the nature of a 
remuneration in consideration of services rendered. The voluntary factor 
involved in these payments is relevant as the employer cannot be forced to 
make such payments. Even though in the case of voluntary payments the 
co-determination right is not excluded it is restricted as to quantity, which 
means that extension of the payments to other, or all, employees cannot be 
enforced by exercise of the right to co-determination.
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As far as non-recurring moving allowance is concerned there is doubt 
whether it is covered by co-determination. The nature of a pure expense 
allowance prior to the employee’s entrance upon his duties appears to be quite 
normal. Even if the nature of such an allowance could be construed as 
remuneration, it is extremely doubtful that the Works Council could demand a 
right of co-determination.
When the employer grants a loan out of his current means, the loan is not 
defined as a wage payment. Such a payment is not, therefore, subject to Works 
Council co-determination.
The Christmas bonus is subject to co-determination. There is only one 
variation to the effect that the method of calculation of the Christmas bonus 
is controversial. Even though the general arrangements concerning Christmas 
bonus calculation come under the co-determination, it must be noted that the 
payment framework determined by the employer is not subject to
co-determination. Hence, a general increase of the Christmas bonus for one
group of employees cannot be achieved through co-determination. 34
The question of whether an offence against the principle of equal 
treatment is involved or whether a specific agreement by contract has been 
made by unilateral action in an unfair way, is a legal problem not coming 
under the jurisdiction of a mediation (or conciliation) board; unfortunately, 
if the Company will not negotiate, the employee has no option but to take his
complaint to the Labour Court. The same option is also open to a Works
Council.
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Whilst the option available to the Works Council appears clear, it does 
in fact create another problem. To take a problem to the Labour Court, a 
specific infringement of the legislation should have occurred. From the 
foregoing, it can be seen that whereas the problem orginated from the 
discrimination possiblities, the problem overlaps into areas of 
co-determination (Articles 75 and 87 respectively). Indeed, only a gross 
violation of the principle of equal treatment would entitle the Works Council 
to seek a Labour Court decision. 35 It is also feasible that the Labour Court 
may not be willing to clarify one article against accepted interpretations of 
another.
Opinion suggests however, that there could be a right of petition on the 
part of the Works Council in cases where an arrangement, regulation or 
agreement that would otherwise be subject to co-determination, is attacked on 
the grounds of discrimination or unequal treatment. 36 Clearly, in the 
present situation, there is good reason to assume that internal Company 
regulations are involved —  even if they have been stipulated in individual 
contracts of employment - which do not comply with equity, justice and which 
constitute a possible infringement of the principle of equal treatment.
There were three other areas of concern to the Works Council. Two of 
them were possible options open to the Company and the third an individual 
concern regarding the basis of information and data to be provided in the 
event of legal proceedings:-
a) With reference to the principle of equal treatment it is not possible, 
the Works Council concluded, to amend the employment contracts to the 
detriment of the employees so far favoured.
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b) Unilateral amendment of the contracts with the former employees of the 
partner enterprises to remove their allowances could be achieved by the 
Company through termination. Such action would need to have the 
collusion of these employees and we considered this was unlikely. Thus, 
we felt we could protect the interests of the former partner enterprise 
employees whilst attempting to harmonize the remaining majority of 
employee contracts.
c) Disclosure of an employment contract by an employee in proceedings before 
the Labour Court does not constitute a breach of the employment contract.
Events leading to a decision
The legal advice sought by the Works Council in November 1980 was 
presented to the Company in February 1981. The Works Council had still not 
decided to seek a Labour Court decision on the matter and were hoping the 
Company might vary its attitude in the light of the legal advice. The Company 
requested time to consider its reaction but indicated their reluctance to 
comment until the April 1981 Works Council election had taken place. The 
election saw no change of Works Council policy, after considerable debate, 
which was communicated to the Company. The Company’s policy also saw no 
change.
Shortly afterwards the Company refused to pay the invoice presented to
them for the legal services used by the Works Council. Tactically, this was 
an attempt by the Company to persuade the legal service not to take any 
further part in the problem but resulted in further litigation by the Works
Council against the Company on the responsibility for costs. 37*
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The Works Council debated whether to seek a Labour Court decision and 
informal discussion with other experts led to general agreement with the 
concept of the Labour Courts’s involvement however, rather than the Works 
Council taking the problem to court, an individual approach was considered but 
rejected. 38 It was agreed that rather than expose any employee to the 
probable recrimination of such action, the Works Council would take collective 
responsiblity; additionally, it was probable that the Court’s decision on the 
problem might well pave the way for individual cases. No meetings were 
arranged between the Company and the Works Council whilst litigation was under 
way concerning the cost of legal advice; after August 1981 when this 
litigation had been resolved in favour of the Works Council, the Company 
refused to discuss the matter of alleged discrimination until October 1981.
As that meeting the Company reiterated its view that there was no case to 
answer. The Works Council at a meeting on 29th October 1981 decided by a 
majority vote (of 6 to 1) that it had no alternative but to pursue the matter 
in the Labour Court on behalf of the electorate.
The result of the appearance in court was the Judge's opinion that since
the additional financial benefits payable to former partner enterprise
employees were part of the overall employment contract, payable by the Company
and, as such, subject to fiscal taxations, then those benefits were subject to
co-determination with the Works Council-. 39 The Judge considered that it was
unthinkable that foreigners in particular from the same country, whether they
be former partner enterprise employees or not, should be treated differently,
This, perhaps, indicated that he considered German nationals to be not
entitled to the financial benefits. The Judge ordered the Company to allow 
the Works Council co-determination rights and negotiate the additional financial
benefits payable to employees.
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The Judge reached his decision after hearing the Company argue that even 
if their policy was wrong, it was causing individual strife rather than the 
total disruption of peace in the Works, that the Works Council had implied. 
Heavy emphasis was placed upon the essential role of former partner enterprise 
employees in the successful operation of the Company, the special knowledge 
and experience such employees had and without which the Company was 
doomed to failure. Clearly, the Company argued, such employees needed 
additional financial benefits to attract and keep then with the Company. 
Finally, the Company argued that the Works Council legislation was not in 
force when it was decided to pay the additional financial benefits, adding 
that, the Works Council had, to-date, ignored its rights and had thus 
forfeited co-determination as specified. 40
The Works Council discussed what further action could be taken whilst 
negotiation ordered by the Judge was commencing, such aS, should all former 
partner enterprise hirings be vetoed, or a veto on all non-German hirings on 
the basis that they would be seriously disadvantaged by their salary 
classification. The Works Council concluded that such actions would leave the 
Works Council open to accusations of disruption and being impossible to work 
with. Hence, the Company might be able to seek the Works Council's removal 
from office, which, in turn, would almost certainly damage negotiations. 41
To some extent, the Works Council was hopelessly trapped by its own good 
intentions and social conscience.
A viable, if not totally satisfactory, solution was to seek an agreement 
with the Company that any hiring approved by the Works Council was to be 
without prejudice to the outcome of the final negotiations. The Company 
agreed. To ensure the Company could not argue at a later date that the Works 
Council was again condoning Company policy or ignoring its co-determination 
rights, every hiring approval would be annotated accordingly. Notwithstanding 
this arrangement the Company chose to appeal against the JudgeTs decision on 
the basis that it was not clear whether the Works Council’s co-determination 
rights applied to former partner enterprise employees or all employees. The 
appeal was heard at the Regional Labour Court in Munich. The Judge ruled in 
October 1984 that the co-determination rights applied to former partner 
enterprise employees only. The Company decided that such rights could not be 
retrospective and lodged another appeal. By end August 1985 the appeal had 
still not been heard and the issue remains outstanding. Consequently, 
negotiation of additional financial benefits payable to employees have not 
taken place between the Works Council and the Company.
Summary
Within individual undertakings the urge to find a working solution to a 
problem is strong. Such urges, however, require a receptive attitude by both 
the employer and Works Council. To those who would prefer a working solution, 
the idea of perennial conflict is less appealing because they perceive 
conflict as something limited to certain organisational areas within a 
structural and functional context to be respected. There can be no doubt that 
some provisions of the legislation reflect such an attitude towards the 
problems of Works Council and employer co-operation. However, as long as 
little initiative is shown by the employer as regards taking an active part in 
the discussion, there will be little co-operation as this Chapter has 
demonstrated.
The state of employee participation is due to a long historical 
development culminating in the adoption of legislation such as the LMRA. The 
underlying purpose was to avoid conflict between employer and employee through 
the introduction of legalised institutions, for example, Works Councils, 
thereby enabling the employees to have a certain influence on decision making. 
The basis, therefore, of employee participation, as this Chapter demonstrates, 
is legal provisions and not negotiations.
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Another important feature is that employee participation takes place 
indirectly, though the elected representatives of the employees. The 
individual employee usually feels unaffected, although he is able to put 
forward complaints and suggestions; some information of vital concern is given 
to him but in reality he has little chance of shaping relations between his 
Works Council and employer. It should be stressed however that the Works 
Council ensures the protection of the vital and fundamental interests of 
employees whatever conflict may develop between itself and the employer. This 
Chapter clearly demonstrates that unless an issue is clearly legislated upon, 
the employer may be able to use the Courts for a solution rather than 
negotiate with the Works Council. Equally even if the Labour Court decision 
does not favour the employer, the employer may still use the process of law to 
defer implementation of that decision as long as possible. Thus there are 
distinct limitations on the effectiveness of co-determination, which evidently 
rests upon law and perhaps derives some of its weakness from that fact.
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Chapter 5
Job Evaluation and Performance Appraisal
The purpose of this Chapter is to demonstrate the role of the Phase 2 
Works Council in taking initiatives and pursuing them to the implementation 
phase. The title of this Chapter covers one such initiative; how and why it 
arose, the relevant legislation, difficulties encountered and the system 
finally produced.
At the first meeting in December 1979 of the Phase 2 Works Council, the 
members discussed what they saw as problem areas and issued affecting employee 
morale. The first problem of alleged discrimination has been covered in 
Chapter 4; the second problem on the list was one of employees motivation 
combined with a lack of a career structure. Added to this combination was a 
salary structure throughout the Company which did not appear logical. The 
December 1979 Works Council meeting agreed to examine the salary differentials 
throughout the Directorate and consider how it could persuade the Company to 
rectify the situation. The task was delegated to me.
The relevant Sections of the legislation governing this activity by the 
Works Council are Articles 87 and 94 respectively. The former is detailed 
below.
Article 87 (Co-determination)
1) The Works Council have a right of co-determination in the following
matters:-
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matters relating to the order and the conduct of employees in the 
Company;
the commencement and termination of the daily working hours, including 
breaks and the distribution of working hours among the days of the week;
any temporary reduction or extension of the hours normally worked in the 
Company;
the time and place for and the form of payment of remuneration;
the establishment of general principles for leave arrangements and the 
preparation of the leave schedule as well as fixing the time at which the 
leave is to be taken- by individual employees, if no agreement is reached 
between the employer and the employees concerned;
the introduction and use of technical devices designed to monitor the
behaviour or performance of the employees;
arrangements for the prevention of employment accidents and occupational
diseases and for the protection of health on the basis of legislation or
safety regulations;
the form, structuring and administration of social services where scope 
is limited to the Company;
the assignment of and notice to vacate accommodation that is rented to 
employees in view of their employment relationship as well as the general 
fixing of the conditions for the use of such accommodation;
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10. questions related to remuneration arrangements in the Company including
in particular the establishment of principles of remuneration and the 
introduction and application of new remuneration methods or modification 
of existing methods;
11. the fixing of job and bonus rates and comparable performance-related
remuneration including cash coefficients (i.e. prices per time unit);
12. principles for suggestion schemes in the establishment.
2) If no agreement can be reached on a matter covered by the preceding
sub-section, a conciliation committee makes a decision. The award of the 
conciliation committee takes the place of an agreement between the 
employer and the Works Council.
1. Article 87 gives the Works Council an absolute right of co-determination 
with respect to all matters listed in Subs. (1). Co-determination means 
that as to those matters which are specifically listed, the employer must 
not act without the specific consent of the Works Council. It also means 
that in the event an agreement cannot be reached between the employer and 
the Works Council, either side has the right to call upon the 
conciliation board, the decision of which will substitute for the 
agreement between the employer and the Works Council and which will have 
the force of works agreement. Co-determination for purposes of Article 
87 will exist with respect to only those issues covered thereunder which 
are of general application to the works, i.e. which apply to the entire 
works, to certain branches, to a group or groups of employees, or to
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certain positions in the works, and does not apply with respect to 
measures which are intended to apply only to individual employees.
Hence, the employer continues to be free to enter into individual 
contracts with certain employees regulating certain terms of employment 
which, if they had general application, would be subject to 
co-determination. Co-determination cannot, however, be circumvented 
merely by the employer’s negotiation and execution of a multitude of 
individual employment contracts with individual employees since such 
contracts, taken as a whole, set a pattern of general application of 
employment conditions. Co-determination exists regardless of the size of 
the works so long as a Works Council of a least one member (works 
steward) exists and applies to both permanent and temporary measures 
which generally fall within one of the twelve categories set forth in 
Subs. (1). In those works without a Works Council the employer can make 
decisions without regard to participation by employees. Since 
co-determination will exist, regardless of the size of the works or the 
Works Council, with respect to all matters described in Subs. (1) and 
which are of general application, it is advisable, particularly in larger 
works, to enter into general works agreements with the Works Council 
setting forth general guidelines and an institutionalized pattern of 
co-determination so as to avoid discussion and resolution as to each 
decision which may involve co-determination. This is particularly 
important in light of the fact that in the absence of an organized system 
of discussing and deciding upon matters subject to co-determination, 
urgent matters may be stalled and important decisions may be postponed. 
Article 87 does not provide the employer the right to take temporary 
action or measures in those cases in which urgent action is required or 
is in the best interest of the works.
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2. While Article 87 provides a general and absolute right of
co-determination with respect to matters listed therein, two important 
exceptions are provided in Subs. (1). The first exception relates to 
laws and regulations which prescribe certain minimum standards which may 
not be varied unilaterally or even by agreement (e.g. the law regarding 
employment safety which impose^upon the employer the sole obligation to 
assure to all employees a safe place of employment). The second and more 
important exception indicates that a collective labour agreement may 
restrict and have priority over the co-determination rights of the Works 
Council. Subs. (1), sentence 1, read in connection with Article 77 (3), 
indicates that general terms and conditions of employment are to be 
primarily agreed to by collective labour agreement. Hence, no 
co-determination right will exist as to those matters which, though 
covered under Subs. (1), are specifically regulated by an effective 
collective labour agreement. Unless specifically authorized by 
collective labour agreement, the employer and the Works Council may not, 
by: means of works agreement or, failing such agreement, by calling upon 
the conciliation board, force more or less favourable employment terms 
than those agreed upon in the collective labour agreement. Hence, 
co-determination will exist only to the extent had no collective labour 
agreement been negotiated. Co-determination is not, however, precluded 
once a collective labour agreement expires or as to those matters which 
are not specifically regulated in the agreement or as to which the 
agreement is ambiguous.
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3. The list of matters contained in Subs (1) as to which an absolute right 
of co-determination exists is exhaustive. Subs. (1), No. 1, provides a 
right of co-determination with respect to all matters which are designed 
to achieve or maintain the external order of the Works Council or to 
control the conduct of employees in the works. Such matters include the 
introduction of time clocks (which also would be subject to 
co-determination pursuant to Subs (1). No. 6), restrictions regarding 
canvassing, newspaper or other sales or distribution of propaganda 
materials on works property, body searches of employees when entering or 
leaving the works, the parking or storage of vehicles, the use of 
telephones for private purposes, general rules of conduct applicable to 
the relationship of employees inter se, dress codes, restrictions on or 
prohibition of smoking in the works, restriction of moonlighting, 
restrictions on the use of alcohol in the works. Further, any 
disciplinary proceedings contemplated or initiated against employees 
violating works rules designed to achieve order in the works are subject 
to co-determination. Co-determination extends not only to the 
establishment of the general guidelines applicable to disciplinary 
proceedings, but also to specific disciplinary proceedings involving 
individual employees. In light of the right of the Works Council to 
participate in all disciplinary matters, it is advisable, particularly so 
in larger works, to establish a disciplinary committee composed of an 
equal number of representatives of the employer and the Works Council.
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4. Subs. (1), No. 2, provides a right of co-determination with respect to 
any measurers fixing the beginning and end of the daily work day 
(including any temporary changes therein which are of general rather than 
just individual application) and allocating weekly working hours to the
days of the week. Hence, the Works Council has a right of
co-determination with respect to any temporary changes of regular working 
hours, such as the initiation of overtime programmes, using of different 
work shifts, and experimental initiation of flexible starting or quitting 
time programmes. This right to co-determination comes into play no 
matter how temporary the change may be, including in cases in which only 
a single shift may be cancelled or extra working hours may be scheduled 
during peak work periods. Closely related to No. 2 is No. 3 which 
provides a right of co-determination with respect to any temporary 
shortening or extension of regular working hours. This provision is 
primarily designed to cover overtime or short hours work scheduled on a 
very temporary basis.
5. Subs. (1), No. 5, gives the Works Council a general right of
co-determination in matters relating to the establishment of the general
vacation schedule and of the general principles regarding vacation 
policies. This right of co-determination extends to the specific 
scheduling of vacations for the individual employees, and the Works 
Council and, if necessary, the conciliation board, may become involved in 
disputes between the employer and individual employees regarding the 
scheduling of their vacation. Finally, co-determination exists with 
regard to establishing the general policies for granting special 
vacations such as vacations for rest and recreation, and vacations for 
continued education.
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6 . Subs. (1), No. 6, provides an absolute right of co-determination in all
matters involving the introduction of technical equipment which is 
designed or may be utilized to control or supervise the behaviour, 
productivity, efficiency and general output of employees in the works 
(e.g. remote control cameras, productivity meters, quality control 
systems, etc). No co-determination exists, on the other hand, if such 
supervision or control is exercised by supervisory personnel such as a 
foreman, quality control supervisors, etc.
7 Subs. (1), No. 7, gives the Works Council the very important right of
co-determination with respect to all matters of employment safety and 
protection of health. This provision has gained in importance since 
passage of the Regulations Governing Places of Employment 
(Arbeitsstattenverordnung) which was enacted in late 1975 and which 
established a comprehensive regulatory framework applicable generally to 
all places of employment maintained by industrial or commercial 
enterprises to assure a safe as well as humane working environment. The 
regulations establish at times detailed safety standards applcable to 
"places of employment", defined to include not only the facilities in 
which the work process is directly carried on, but also all secondary 
facilities which may be used by employees in connection with their work, 
including medical and sanitary facilities, training and storage 
facilities, temporary work rooms, construction sites and other open-air 
areas. Specifically, the regulations prescribe minimum air quality 
standards for all work areas, and the installation of air conditioning,
air filtration or ventilation systems to achieve such standards, the
taking of specified precautions to avoid common safety hazards and to 
minimize the risk of injury caused by falling objects, fires, dangerous
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and toxic gases, fumes, dust, smoke, electric shock, mechanical 
vibrations and unusual or intense heat, maximum permissible noise levels 
in places of employment, minimum requirements regarding the size (in) 
terms of area, height of ceilings, availability of air, etc and physical 
layout of work rooms, extensive provisions relating to facilities for 
rest and recreation, sleeping rooms for expecting or nursing mothers, and 
sanitary facilities, and prescribe specified medical and first-aid 
facilities in those works with more than 1.000 employees. Of similar 
importance is the Law Regarding Medical Personnel of the Works, Safety 
Engineers and Other Experts for Employment Safety which requires all 
employers to investigate whether the employment or use of medical 
personnel or other experts in employment safety are necessary in the 
works. In determining whether employment of such personnel is necessary, 
the employer must consider the risks of accident and injury which may 
exist in the works and the extent to which such risks may be minimized by 
employment of appropriate experts. The Works Council has an absolute 
right of co-determination in the selection and employment of medical 
personnel or other safety experts, which right also extends to the 
dismissal of such personnel.
8. Co-determination pursuant to Subs. (1), Nos, 8 and 9, exists only to the 
extent the employer has provided certain social and housing facilities 
for the benefit of his employees. Neither the establishment nor the 
closing of such facilities is subject to co-determination. Hence, 
co-determination exists only with respect to the administration and 
management of facilities which were established by the employer. "Social 
facilities" for purposes of Subs. (1), No. 8, are those facilities which 
are established and provided by the employer for the sole benefit of his
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employees (but not including managerial employees) and which take the 
form of a fringe benefit. Such facilities must be made available to 
employees without charge and must be of a permanent rather than temporary 
nature. Neither No. 8 nor No. 9 were intended to give the Works Council 
any voice in determining the amount of employer contributions to 
establish, maintain or operate such facilities, such decisions resting 
within the sole discretion of the employer. Subs. (1), No. 9, relates 
specifically to housing furnished by the employer for the benefit of his 
employees. A co-determination right exists only with respect to those 
housing facilities which are in fact made available to employees and does 
not, for example, extend to the management and administration of 
apartment buildings owned by the employer which are not generally leased 
to employees. Once such housing is leased to employees, however, the 
Works Council has a right of co-determination with respect to the general 
leasing policies and terms and conditions, and has a right to participate 
in the decision as to which leases are granted or cancelled.
9. Subs. (1) Nos. 10 and 11 provide for co-determination by the Works 
Council in questions of general compensation policies which are 
applicable in the Works. Pursuant to No. 10, the Works Council may 
participate in the structuring of general compensation guidelines which 
are applicable throughout the works, to certain branches of the works, or 
to certain groups of employees. This would include some voice of the 
Works Council in profit-sharing or certain premium compensation, 
incentive, piece work or performance oriented compensation schemes. 
Co-determination becomes particularly important in the determination of 
the amount of compensation to be paid for above average performance 
quotas (i.e. work premiums).- 1
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Equal worker co-determination at all levels of the economy has been 
described as "the crucial question of our democracy" by the President of the 
German Trade Union Federation (DGB), Heinz Oskar Vetter in 1976.
It is Article, 87, sub-section 1, paragraph 10, that permits the Works 
Council to take an initiative such as job evaluation. The Works Council 
however only has the right of co-determination if the Company is prepared to 
accept the need for implementing an initiative. x
At the 1st February 1980 Works Council meeting, I presented to my 
colleagues a general outline of the paper I intended to formulate and at a 
meeting with the Company on 8th February 1980, the Managing Director stated 
that he would consider a job evaluation paper sympathetically. On 17th March 
1980 the Works Council agreed to submit my paper entitled "The Way Ahead" to 
the Company; the paper detailed the reasons that the Works Council considered 
a job evaluation scheme necessary and made specific proposals which are 
detailed below:-
Staff Grading Scheme ("The Way Ahead")
Part I
With reference to the Works Council/Company discussion in February 1980, 
we propose a Staff Grading Scheme which we consider would be in the best 
interests of the Company and its employees. In a paper of this nature it is 
necessary to provide background , alternatives and to comment on participation 
in the non-legal sense of the word. This is a complex area but we highlight 
three areas where improvement in "participation" practices seem to be needed.
(132)
Participation as a way of life
Firstly, managers must be prepared to develop a regular system of 
participation which is well understood and respected by employees and their 
representatives. It is only in this way that there will develop an atmosphere 
ot trust and respect which will enable the most difficult and contentious 
problems to be dealt with jointly. It is no use a manager showing an interest 
in participation only when he has an awkward problem on which he wants his 
employees’s help and co-operation. In those circumstances, participation will 
be seen simply as a management device for selling unpopular decisions to the 
workforce and, as such, will be totally counter-productive.
All-embracing participation
Secondly, participation must be real. It must go beyond trivial issues 
to matters of direct concern to the workforce, like changes in working 
methods, expansion of the Company or introduction of new technology, e.g. EDP! 
Furthermore, consultations must take place at an early enough state to enable 
them to affect decisions. There is nothing more likely to create distrust 
than to establish participation systems to act as a rubber stamp for decisions 
already taken elsewhere.
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Participating in "Performance Data"
Thirdly, management must be ready within the limits of confidentiality to 
make information about the Company available to the employees and their 
representatives. If employees representatives are to be expected to take a 
realistic view of the Company’s prospects, then they must be given access to 
as much information as possible about the Company so that they can reach a 
considered and informed view.
Comment:- It is clear from Part I that the Works Council wished to create an 
atmosphere that would allow it to work with the Company without continually 
resorting to legislation (see Chapter 4 for instance)
Part II
A reasonable analysis of the 1979 Work Council election is that there was 
(is) substantial support for the "platform" of some form of career structure 
and grading of personnel. It is clear, therefore, that some formal career 
structure is necessary, if a satisfactory morale/operational situation is to 
be assured.
Formal career structures are likely to have some of the following 
effects, each of which might substantially aid Company efficiency:
1. Relate effort and reward. A career structure, if related to a job
evaluation scheme will tend to relate effort to reward.
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2. Relate internal and external salaries. It is likely that a career 
structure will help to relate salaries paid internally with those paid 
externally,
3. People will know where they stand. Company morale should be improved by a 
knowledge of current and future job responsiblities and salary prospects 
which a career structure should give.
4. Reduce the turnover of staff which the Works Council calculated for 1979 
to be 6%. This is an obvious cost-related benefit in terms of 
recruitment, training and then replacement.
We will not explore in general terms the concept of Staff Salary Grading 
Schemes, and in Part IV of this Paper provide a brief practical example.
The fixing of individual levels of pay suggests a systematic approach 
through job evaluation, ignoring the titles given to jobs but assessing the 
value and nature of the work itself. This may mean a general or specific 
re-classification of jobs. Where a staff salary grading scheme results, it is 
usual to fix a minimum and a maximum for each job classified ladder (probably 
covering a range of comparable jobs) related to age or other criterion which 
can easily be understood and accepted by all concered.
Once an employee is allocated to a grade, he could normally expect to 
enjoy automatic progression up the ladder, subject to satisfactory routine 
personnel reports, marking time eventually on reaching the top. Such an 
arrangement may mean staying for the rest of his service with the Company at 
the maximum salary for that grade, and raises an incentive problem with regard
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to the long service employee, continually doing his best, but having limited 
ability. This suggests a special case to be decided individually on its 
merits. A more talented employee could expect to receive promotion, at some 
stage or another, as a result of which he would be able to climb on to the 
rungs of a higher ladder (grade) well before reaching the top of the present 
shorter ladder. Eventually, he could be promoted right outside the scheme and 
become classified as "ungraded staff".
Age haa.Jbeen mentioned by the Company at recent hiring sessions to the 
Works Council in connection with salary, but a strong case can be made out for 
pay at any level being related to the job in hand, irrespective of age. In 
practice, particularly where grading schemes are in force, it often happens 
that a younger man replacing an older and more experienced colleague,.now 
possibly past his best and thinking of retirement, will start in the same job 
but at a lower salary than that currently being paid. Grading scheme apart, 
however, it could be felt that a top quality young management recruit would 
merit at least comparable pay! Against that argument it may be considered 
inadvisable to give the new-comer too much too soon; by starting at a lower 
level than that enjoyed by his predecessor, there should be room to move to 
enable more substantial increments to be granted later. It is, however, 
dangerous to generalize and, in any case, the final answer may depend on such 
external factors as labour supply and demand, at any given time, and whether 
there is any bias towards full employment or recession.
Grading schemes must be rationalized with inflationary trends, the scales 
being realistically brought up to date, at appropriate intervals. Adjustments 
to changes in the cost of living may result from automatic "voluntary" 
management review (periodically or according to an agreed rise in the cost of 
living) or read across from trade union collective bargaining. Whether the
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outcome is a flat rate percentage increase throughout the organization, or a 
more sophisticated graduated adjustment to take account of income tax etc., at 
various levels of pay, it is primarily a matter of circumstance.
The Company should also give automatic consideration to scheduled 
progression within a salary, perhaps annually, subject to satisfactory work, 
and to promotion from one grage to another as and when they arise.
In most German companies, a wage and salary policy is laid down as a 
matter of course but the routine responsiblity and authority should be 
delegated to the Personnel Department, the appropriate Functional Director and 
the Works Council, for carrying grading implications into practicl effect.
The Managing Director would consider top level salaries for ungraded staff and 
deal with any exceptional circumstances.
Cost of living increases, however, are not the only adjustments that must 
be made, for in Europe, it is still necessary to relate salary scales to 
geographical locations, i.e. Bavaria is an expensive area in many respects! 
With this in mind, there may be a "Bavarian allowance" paid to all employees, 
additionally to scale salaries.
Whatever the pattern of remuneration, there must be room for flexibility. 
Although the agreed pattern of salary scales concerned must be kept within 
reasonable bounds, it must be remembered that this is an excercise involving 
the well-being of the Company.
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Comment:- the Works Council’s objective was to have a career and salary 
structure by agreement with the Company; the objective was not to enter 
collective bargaining on pay and clearly the Works Councils function was not 
to become involved in what was a trade union negotiating matter on a national 
basis.
Having explored the general concept of grading schemes, we now provide 
some detail of how it may be achieved.
Definition
Job grading is a means of assessing the value of a job by taking into 
consideration:
(a) experience required;
(b) initiative required;
(c) skill required;
(d) measure of responsibility entailed;
(e) supervision and/or direction needed.
Classification of Jobs
The following are the six grades into which all office jobs can be 
classified:
Grade A - simple tasks requiring no previous experience and 
performed under close supervision, e.g. sorting.
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Grade B
Grade C
Grade D
Grade E
- tasks which, because of their simplicity, are carried out in 
accordance with a limited number of well defined rules after a 
comparatively short period of training. These tasks are 
closely directed and checked, and are carried out in a daily 
routine covered by a timetable and subject to short period 
control, e.g. simple copying work or straig’nforward adding 
operations using an adding machine.
- task which are of a routine character and follow well defined 
rules but requiring either a reasonable degree of experience or 
a special aptitude for the task, and which are carried out 
according to a daily routine covered by a timetable and subject 
to short period control, e.g. simple ledger machine operation 
or the checking of Grade B work.
- task which require considerable experience, but only a very 
limited degree of initiative and which are carried out 
according to a pre-determined procedure and precise rules; the 
tasks are carried out according to a daily routine which 
varies, but not sufficiently to necessitate any considerable 
direction, e.g. shorthand/typing of a simple straight-forward 
nature.
- tasks which require a significant but not extensive measure of 
discretion and initiative, or which require a specialised 
knowledge and individual responsibility for the work, e.*g. 
dealing with queries of a non-routine character or group 
supervision of routine work.
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Grade F - tasks which necessitate exercising an extensive measure of 
responsibility and judgement or the application of a 
professional technique (legal, accounting, statistical, 
engineering) e.g. acting in close liaison with the management 
or section/departmental supervision.
Procedure
Although there are several job grading systems, the same broad principles 
apply to all of them. The usual procedure is as follows:
(a) examine the job very thoroughly;
(b) prepare a job description and analyse the requirements of the 
job;
(c) compare the job under investigation with others;
(d) arrange the jobs in their correct sequence;
(e) relate the jobs in the sequence to a monetary scale.
Systems
Job grading systems are four in number:
(a) Ranking
i
Simple placing or ranking of each job in the organization according
to its relative importance to other jobs.
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(b) Classification
Although the procedure is similar to the ranking system procedure, 
it is carried out in a different order. In this case, the first 
step is the determination of grades and wage/salary levels
(c) Points Rating
After a detailed examination of the jobs under investigation, each 
job is given a points value based upon the mental and physical 
effort, experience, training and other requirements of the job; it 
is therefore a prerequisite of the system that each of these factors 
is given a points of value, which is determined by its relative 
importance, e.g. experience may be given a maximum of 20 points, 
mental effort a maximum of 10 points and so on. Having arrived at 
the total points value for the job, it is then translated into terms 
of money, using a suitable formula.
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(d) Factor Comparison
Each job is analysed into factors (usually five) common to all types 
of job, e.g. skill, mental effort, physical effort, responsibility, 
working conditions. A number of key jobs are selected as 
representative of the various levels within the overall wage 
structure and in each case a calculation is made to determine the 
proportion of the total wage paid for each factor. If, for example, 
a job merits a total monthly salary of DM 1,000.— , the factor 
comparison may be rated as, say, DM 400.—  for skill, DM 300.—  for 
mental effort, DM 100.—  for physical effort, DM 150.—  for 
responsibility and DM 50.—  for difficult working conditions.
Remarks
Of the four grading systems explained, the following should be 
considered:
Ranking is a simple system and is therefore easily understood and 
administered; it has its disadvantages and is regarded as inadequate, because 
insufficient detail is taken into account. Moreover, the placing of jobs in 
their order of importance is not sufficient to indicate the degree of 
difference between the jobs in the grade.
Points rating has the advantage of simplicity and can be easily explained
to the employee. It may, of course, be criticised on the grounds that the
awarding of points to the respective requirements of the job is too arbitrary 
/
by nature for the purpose of arriving at a value, which is so crucial in
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calculating the extent of an employee’s earnings. Factor comparison resembles 
the points rating system in principle but is more complex and therefore more 
difficult for employees to understand. It has this merit however; once the 
money value of the chosen key jobs has been established, the money value of 
any job at an intermediate level can be read-off quite simply by reference to 
its position on the scale.
Conspicuous by its absence so far in these remarks is that of 
Classification! Based on the age of the Company and its apparent lack of 
long-term prospects, one would normally associate with a Company, then 
Classification appears to the Works Council to be the most appropriate, most 
simple and reasonable basis for a grading system within the Company. Using 
the classification of all office jobs explained at the beginning of this, Part 
III, Paper, i.e. Grades A to F inclusive, Part IV provides a simple example of 
how classification could be applied.
Comment:- "Classification appears" is significant in that the Works Council 
were not professionals in job evaluation techniques. The Works Council 
considered the paper to be of a preliminary nature and in the event of a 
positive response from the Company, intended to carry our further research 
(see later in this chapter).
Taking Grade F as an example, the Works Council used a salary "print-out" 
and removed Section Leaders, Department Leaders, Secretarial, Typist and 
Clerical salaries to establish an average salary for "an engineer".
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The approximate average was calculated to be DM 4,304.—  per month which, 
for the purpose of this Paper, should be considered as 1979 economic 
condition.
Assuming engineer’s job contents, regardless of function, are broadly 
similar, DM 4,304.—  should be the normal rate on commencing employment. This
clearly is not the case as is demonstrated by the differentials in various
Departments. A condiderable number of employees have already complained 
orally to the Works Council about such salary differentials.
Taking an example of one group of engineers, there is a spread of DM
3,500.—  to DM 6,400.— ; the average being DM 4,509.-- which is similar to the
aforementioned overall engineer's average of DM 4,304.— .
The Works Council has assumed that the top salary is the most experience 
body and therefore use such a figure as the top end rate in a scale:-
Start DM 4,300.—
Year 1 4,515.—
Year 2 4,740
Year 3 4,977.—
Year 4 5,226.—
Year 5 5,488.-
Year 6 5,762.—
Year 7 6,050.—
Year 8 6,353.—
Year 9 6,680.—
and so on
(144)
Notes
(a) this would mean immediate uplift for some to close apparent unnecessary 
differentials;
(b) the steps are approximately 5%, which is in-line with the Managing 
Directors 1979 directive for rewarding effort in June of each year.
(c) steps would be automatic subject to satisfactory performance analysis;
(d) steps also provide flexibility to reward additional permanent work/effort 
between annual increase subject to (c) above;
(e) stepts payable June each year and would replace current directive at (b) 
aforementioned.
(f) cost of living increase percentage automatically increases step, i.e. if 
increase is 8% then each step increases by 8%.
(g) cost of living percentage, approximately January each year paid on, 
existing step levels!
(h) those already paid over the average DM 4,304.—  place into relevant year 
step, i.e. those paid already DM 5,226.—  enter grading as F Year 4; 
alternative is, for example, they are already overpaid and must wait 
until grade year catches up with them, although the way the grade is 
structured, there should not be many such cases. Such cases would 
receive cost of living rises however!
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(i) Section Leaders and Departmental Leaders should maintain a 5% and 10% 
respective differential or call them ungraded staff and the Managing 
Director sets their salaries;
(j) such a grade structure would eliminate existing unnecessary salary 
spreads;
(k) the grade structure should be circulated to all employees.
Grades below engineer
The start salary on each grade would be progressively lower but the Year
pattern and 5% steps would be the same.
It may be possible to have some overlap between the lower grades, to
reward, say, a lower grade person who is efficient, loyal but limited to that
grade because of ability.
Similarly, differentials for Section Leaders and Department Leaders 
should be maintained on the lines of those of Grade F explained previously.
Clearly, notes (a) to (k) inclusive, also apply to the lower grades, 
namely secretarial, clerical and typist functions.
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Fart V
The main responsibility for improving the situation must rest with both 
the Works Council and the Company itself; the Company, in particular, must act 
with responsibility and respect towards the Works Council/employees. In the 
long-term, this is the only way to bring about a real improvement in the 
overall situation.
The Works Council believe that the proposal will provide a fair and 
balanced framework within which both the Works Council and Company can set 
about providing balance and fairness.
The Works Council requested a written response and offered to discuss the 
matter with the Company.
The Company response in April 1980 was almost negative; they considered 
the suggestion constructive but felt that the numbers of employees and the 
range of tasks did not appear well-suited to, or require, the restrictions of 
formal grading schemes. The door was not entirely closed as the Works Council 
were invited to pursue the matter by further discussion and to consider 
performance appraisal as an alternative.
The Company agreed to a Working Party on Performance Appraisal in May 1980. 
The Works Council still considered at its meeting later that month that job 
evaluation was necessary in the Company and was a prerequisite of a 
performance appraisal scheme; the- logic being that employees and appraisers 
needed to know exactly the role of an employee prior to any system of 
appraisal. The Works Council also agreed to a survey being carried out by 
myself (concerning job evaluation and performance appraisal), to determine
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union and employer attitudes within the E.E.C., from which the Works Council 
considered they would either be in a better position to pursue job evaluation 
or in the worst case withdraw from the Working Party. The results of the 
survey are tabulated in Figure 1. The conclusion was drawn by the Works 
Council that job evaluation combined with some automatic movement through 
grades established by job evaluation, was the best solution; the DAG response 
(shown in Figure 1) that job evaluation ensured maximum objectivity in salary 
structures was particularly persuasive in reaching such a conclusion; 
performance appraisal at worst could be the tool to be used for more 
substantial movement. My task was, therefore, to convince the Working Party 
that the end result should arrive at such a conclusion.
The Works Council considered that the Working Party should operate within 
an agreed framework and formal terms of reference. This was particularly 
useful owing to the Working Party membership which consisted of a Deputy 
Director, two Department Leaders, a Personnel Department representative and 
one Works Councilor, i.e. myself; in terms nationalities, three Germans and 
two Britons; in terms of partner enterprise, three and non-partner enterprise 
employees, two; four males and one female. The Works Council considered that 
none of the members were particulary pro-Works Council and this might create a 
problem when voting. The Works Council met with the Company in June 1980 and 
requested terms of reference for the Working Party; no objection was raised to 
the Working Party membership arrangements by the Works Council at the meeing 
because it was the Managing Director who specified the arrangements and the 
Works Council had no desire to delay the Working Party being constituted. The 
Company declined to set terms of reference arguing that it did not wish to 
restrict the investigation. The Works Council accepted the argument.
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In July 1980, the Works Council at a meeting, arranged to discuss the 
Working Party, re-affirmed the Hay 1980 decision to pursue job evaluation.
The fallback strategy was acceptance of a Performance Appraisal system 
that contained neutral elements in its operation, the Works Council’, and the 
•results of which were freely accessible to the employees.
The Working Party agreed to operate without an appointed Chairman at the 
October 1980 meeting but was otherwise reasonably democratic; four 
participants supported the Works Council’s position of the need for job 
evaluation and/or performance appraisal; only the Personnel representative was 
vehemently opposed it for no apparently constructive reason. Whilst a vote 
was taken on points of disagreement, all participants were well aware of two 
ultimate rejection possibilities, i.e. the Works Council veto power (Article 
94) and the Company’s refusal to implement the recommendations of the Working 
Party. The underlying trend of opinion was movement towards a straight 
performance appraisal system and away from job evaluation. The motive 
expressed centred on the minimal chance of persuading the management to agree 
to the necessity of job evaluation, particularly considering the salary 
disparities known to exist, whereas performance appraisal might be acceptable 
as a resonably scientific attempt at placating unrest amongst employees 
concerning promotion criteria. I reminded the Working Party of the real issue 
at stake, i.e. the need for career structure, but there remained an 
unwillingness to take on the management - perhaps understandable from those 
who were not Works Council members and those not wishing to be seen to be too 
closely associated with such a body. The Working Party met twice in December 
1980, once in January 1981, once in March 1981 and twice in April 1981.
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At the May 1981 meeting the Working Party were made aware, by a 
dissatisfied member of a Department, that his Department was already operating 
a form of appraisal limited to the mid-year salary adjustment with a format 
that was open to abuse. The Works Council agreed to make a formal objection 
to the Company in June 1981. The Department concerned refused to discuss the 
matter with the Works Council on an informal basis earlier that month; the 
Works Council objection was based on the system not being offered to the Works 
Council for approval or comment in accordance with what the Works Council 
understood Article 94 to mean. The Personnel Manager apologised to the Works 
Council in September 1981, for the existence of the illegal appraisal - 
system. Under normal circumstances, the Works Council may have been worried 
about driving a wedge between themselves and one group of employees. There 
comes a time, however, when a minority has to be reminded that the interests 
of all are paramount.
Article 94 (Questionnaire and Employment Criteria)
(1) Staff questionnaires require the approval of the Works Council. If no 
agreement between Company and Works Council is reached on their content, 
the matter is decided by a conciliation committee. The award of the 
conciliation committee takes the place of an agreement between the 
employer and the Works Council.
(2) Sub-section (1) applies mutatis mutandis, to any personal data contained 
in written employment contracts that are generally used in the 
establishment and to the formulation of general employment criteria.
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At the May 1981 Working Party meeting it was agreed that the 
investigation of performance appraisal would be helped by a comparison of 
other Companies systems in Germany. Previous meetings whilst useful for 
exploring each individual Working Party member's views and ideas, were not 
making identifiable progress. The Companies chosen were Phillip Morris GmbH 
(tobacco industry), Hoechst GmbH (chemicals), IBM GmbH (computers), Deutsche 
Airbus GmbH (aircraft) and Airbus Industrie (aircraft). The choice allowed a 
view of comparable product Companies, comparable Company Organisations, 
Companies in Bavaria and Companies with high and low trade union membership.
Each Working Party member spent the next four months reviewing the chosen 
Companies*systems from documentation obtained from the respective Company’s 
Works Council.
The Working Party met in November 1981 and January 1982 to produce a 
system. After a great deal of discussion within the Working Party an 
agreement was reached,} Covering principles- and recommended practice; the 
agreement is summarised in the following eleven paragraphs.
Principles of Appraisal
a) the appraisal takes the form of a discussion between employee and 
superior,
b) the appraisal is documented on an agreed format,
c) an action plan for the future is mutually agreed.
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The specific aims were agreed:- 
Performance Improvement
to assess/improve the individual’s effectiveness in task areas;
- to provide a record of any special circumstances that affect an
individual’s work;
to compare the individual with others doing similar work, or to compare 
the performance of different departments;
- to provide a way (e.g. interview and record) for arriving at a
commitment for action on either side to improve an individual’s 
performance.
Manpower and Career Planning
- to provide information about possible transfers;
to provide information about possible promotions;
- to provide information on the whereabouts of particular talents;
to provide information about individual career aspirations.
Training
to provide an action document for current training needs; 
to provide an action document for development training; 
to provide a vehicle for planning coaching and counselling activities. 
Promoting Good Human Relations
- to provide a feedback of the Company’s view of an individual’s 
performance;
to provide a feedback of the individual’s view of the requirements;
to provide a vehicle for discussing an individual’s future;
to encourage two-way discussions between manager and sub-ordinate on 
whatever subject either wishes to discuss;
to show that the Company is concerned about people.
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Personnel Administration
- to assist in the processes involved in salary and bonus decision;
to provide a check and feedback on selection and training procedures;
to provide ideas for improving the Company's organisation.
The Working Party agreed that role of the appraisal interview was of 
paramount importance as the main purpose of appraisal is to improve an 
individual's performance in the present job. The appriaisal interview is the 
key to the success of the scheme.
Improved performance is going to come primarily from changes the employee 
makes in :his or her own behaviour, and such changes are only likely if and 
when the employee has been convinced that they are desirable. Discussion of 
performance, therefore, must take place in a face-to-face situation between 
manager and sub-ordinate. The appraisal form acts as a checklist for the 
exchange. Both parties will have the opportunity to speak freely, in order to 
examine the past and to plan for the future. The appraiser must conduct the 
interview in a way that is seen to be fair, and use his or her skills to 
influence the employee to want to improve.
The aim of the appraisal is not to present a criticism on the grounds of
a.discovered weakness. It is rather to encourage discussion by the employee 
on any weakness. Appraisers should:
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- ensure that no employee feels that an admission of a weakness will be 
held against him or her;
- ensure that the links between job performance and reward, if any, are
clearly understood.
The Working Party agreed that criticism improves performance only when:
- it is given with genuine liking for the other person;
- it is related to specific instances;
- the appraisee trusts and respects the appraiser.
The Working Party agreed that improved performances result when: 
goal setting, rather than active criticism is used; 
the goals are specific, jointly set, and resonable;
the manager is regarded as helpful, facilitating, receptive to ideas and 
able to plan;
the evaluation of performance is initiated by the employee, and as a 
prelude to further goal-setting rather than active criticism.
The Working Party agreed that the contents of the system should be 
communicated to all employees.
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The agreements have been summarised to demonstrate the considerable 
progress made by the Working Party, although from a personal viewpoint the 
task had taken twenty-five months (December 1979 to January 1982 inclusive) 
and twenty meetings to achieve a compromise. My specific aim had clearly not 
been achieved as I was unable to persuade the Working Party to agree to the 
original job evaluation scheme. In reality, what had been achieved was only a 
formal but standardised method of ensuring employees had a visible means of 
recording what the legislation already allowed employees to demand (Article 82 
provides the employees with the right to an evaluation of their professional 
development by the Company - the method is not defined in the Article).
I was unable to secure Working Party agreement to a neutral element in an 
appeals procedure should the employee disagree with his appraisal results; 
similarly, no agreements could be reached on the principle of an appeals 
procedure on the need for revised job descriptions before the appraisal system 
was introduced. The content of the appraisal form caused considerable 
argument at the January 1982 Working Party meeting. I was alone in requesting 
the facility of employee signature but chose not to use the Work Council power 
of veto (Article 94) because I considered that the overall appraisal system 
was the best compromise the Works Council was likely to achieve; the 
compromise was a format shown at Figure 2. The appraisal system was 
circulated to the Works Council and the Managing Director early January 1982. 
My Works Council colleagues agreed that the system was the best compromise but 
the Works Council at a late January 1982 meeting considered their involvement 
in the appraisal was necessary to ensure fairness and respectability.
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The Working Party Personnel representative considered they (Personnel) 
were the neutral element and Works Council should only become involved in the 
course of events if an irreconcilable dispute arose between an employee and 
his superior. The Works Council considered Works Council involvement was 
necessary to prevent such disputes but would only participate in the appraisal 
if the employee wanted Works Council presence from the beginning. The debate 
on the neutral element became the excuse needed by the new Managing Director 
appointed September 81 (the Working Party was authorised by his predecessor) 
to stall on the introduction of the system. The Managing Director was not as 
open to suggestion as his predecessor. Bearing in mind the Works Council 
could not force introduction and had co-determination rights only when the 
Company wished to introduce a system, the Works Council could do nothing to 
expedite the situation. At Works Council meetings in March and April 1982 
with the Company, the Company advised that the proposal was still under 
consideration. I persuaded the Works Council at a May 1982 Works Council 
meeting that the neutral element demand should be reconsidered. In addition, 
the Working Party had carried out its task in a timescale parallel to the 
events identified in Chapter 4, i.e. alleged discrimination. I felt that the 
relationship between the Company and Works Council which had deteriorated 
because of the discrimination issue and with the arrival of a new Managing 
Director, was incapable of producing an agreement on the neutral element of 
the appraisal system. I argued therefore that employees who were unhappy with 
results of appraisal were protected by legislation covering grievances (see 
Chapter 6) and could always seek Works Council assistance in disagreements 
with the Company; similarly all Works Council/Company agreements could be 
cancelled by three months notice (Article 77) and if the Works Council were 
not satisfied with the manner in which appraisal was being operated, the Works 
Council using Article 77 could withdraw consent. The Works Council voted on 
the issue; my argument was narrowly accepted (seven member Works Council
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voting 4 to 3 in favour of accepting the system as formulated by the Working 
Party). The Company were advised by the Works Council in May 1982 that the 
Works Council were satisfied with the proposed appraisal system and the 
Company agreed to implementation for the next financial year.
The Chapter demonstrates that the phase 2 Works Council were prepared to 
take constructive iniatiatives on behalf of the employees and, indeed, that it 
considered would be in the best interests of the Company. Whilst such 
iniatiatives are permitted by legislation, it is clear that the Works Council 
were prevented by the legislation from imposing its views on the Company ie. 
Article 87 sub-section 1 paragraph 10 gives the Works Council the right of 
co-determination only if the Company is prepared to accept the need for 
implementing an iniatiative. Given that the iniatiative had taken over two 
years to achieve the status of an agreement, the Chapter also demonstrates the 
Works Councils perseverence with a Company who appeared to be very reluctant 
to accept a Works Council that was prepared to take iniatiatives. The 1972 
legislation which introduced co-determination (1952 legislation did not cover 
it) and the 1976 legislation which extended the rights of co-determination, 
have not basically changed Company’s attitudes towards employee initatiatives 
through co-determination (17). Company strategy remain one of opposing 
co-determination on the basis of it being a basic handicap for entrepreneurial 
policy (18).
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Figure 2
Evaluation of Employee Work Performance
Name Christian name Employer Born
Payroll no Dept Classification
Periodic evaluation 0 Other reasons 0 Transfer 0 Reason 0
Scale to be used for evaluation:
Does not fulil expectations 1. Fulfils expectation only partially 2.
Fulfils expectations 3. Exceeds expectations 4. Far exceed expectations 5.
Evaluation Criteris 1 2  3 4 5
A. On the Job
Qualitative work performance.
Quantitative work performance.
Work planning capability.
Behaviour under stress.
Reliability.
B. Qualifications 
Practical knowledge.
Theoretical Knowledge.
Ability to analyse/evaluate problems.
Adaptability.
Prepared to take initiative.
Prepared to take responsiblity.
C. General Behaviour 
Discipline.
Relations with colleagues.
Relations with superiors.
Relations with third party.
Ability to integrate in a team.
D. Management Performance (only for Management personnel)
Planning and organisation.
Prepared to make decision and take responsiblity.
Capability to motivate and lead personnel.
Prepared to delegate tasks and responsibilities.
Prepared to co-operate with other Departments.
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NOTES:
1. Peltzer/Boer, op.cit., pp 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187 and 188.
2. W.H.Taylor Social Affairs Directorate CBI 4th March 1981.
3. A.Jago Courses Department IPM 16th December 1980
4. P.Jackson C.M.T.C. 3rd December 1980
5. M.Walsh International Department TUC 19th February 1981
6. Dr.Linder/Burmeister Geschaftsfuhrung B.D.A. 24th February 1981
7. Liesegang D.A.G. Landesverband Bayern 20th February 1981
8. R.Dombre Tarif Policy Department D.G.B. 15th May 1981
9. E.Handley Industrial Relations Department F.U.E. 10th April 1981
10. T.Wall Advisory Service I.C.T.U. 2nd April 1981
11. J.W.A.Coelewij V.N.O. 13th March 1981
12. J.Varkevisser F.N.V. 29th April 1981
13. J.Castegnaro President C.G.T. and O.G.B.L. 9th March 1981
(163)
14. K.Holm/O.Simonsen D.E.C. 22nd April 1981
15. P.Carlsen International Department L.O.I.D. 20th February 1981
16. D.Mirone Industrial Relations Director C.G.I.T. 19th March 1981
17. Furstenberg F. op. cit., pp 30
18. ibid pp 31
;
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Chapter 6
The Works Councils Role in Dealing with Grievances.
Over fifty percent of Works Council time was spent on nine separate areas 
of the legislation.
The 1972 LMRA contains 132 Articles of which 24 are not relevant to this 
study, e.g. maritime regulations. Of the 108 relevant Articles only 48 were 
discussed during the Phase 2 Works Councils: this resulted in 924 Works 
Council discussions at 176 meetings over the 30 month period of the study.
Nine of the Articles represented 52.4% of all Works Council discussions
Article Description
87
75
99
77
85
28
94
40
74
Co-determination
Discrimination
Hirings
Company/Works Council
Agreements
Grievances
Committees
Job Evaluation/
Performance Appraisal
Works Council Costs
Meetings with the
Company
Percentage 
of all 
Discussions 
8.8 
8.1 
6.8 
6.2
5.5
4.5 
4.3
4.2
4.0
No. of 
Discussions
82
75
63
58
51
42
40
39
37
QO /.
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Two of the areas, namely alleged discrimination and job 
evaluation/performance appraisal have been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. A third is employee grievances.
The relevant Articles of the legislation are:-
84.
Right to make complaints
1) Every employee is entitled to make a complaint to the competent
authorities in the establishment if he feels that he has been 
discriminated against or treated unfairly or otherwise put at a 
disadvantage by the employer or by other employees of the establishment. 
He may call on a member of the Works Council for assistance or mediation.
2) The employer shall inform the employee on how his complaint will be dealt
with and, if he considers the complaint justified, remedy his grievance.
3) The employee shall not suffer any prejudice as a result of having made a
complaint.
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85.
Works Council’s role in dealing with grievances
1) The Works Council shall hear employees’ grievances and, if they appear 
justified, induce the employer to remedy them.
2) . If there are any differences of opinion between the Works Council and the
employer as to whether the complaint is well-founded, the Works Council 
may appeal to a conciliation committee. The award of a conciliation 
committee shall take the place of an agreement between the employer and 
the Works Council.
3) The employer shall inform the Works Council how the grievance is to be 
resolved. The foregoing shall be without prejudice to Article 84 (2).
The data of this Chapter was taken from my personal diary of events and 
it should be noted that all grievances were raised orally by employees to the 
Works Council.
Employee grievances were categorized into four distinct areas: salary, 
expense claims, personality clashes and miscellaneous; the area of 
discrimination by virtue of origin has been dealt with separately under 
Article 75 (Chapter 4). Whilst many of the grievances impinged on other 
provisions of the legislation, they were raised as items to be considered by 
the Works Council under this specific Article. The following case studies 
serve to demonstrate the employees' problems, the Works Council’s role in 
assisting to resolve such problems, and the Works Council’s role as a Welfare 
Agency. The .case studies were to some extent trivial in content but
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nevertheless were typical of the problems brought to the attention of the 
Works Council. The Works Council continued its practise highlighted in 
previous Chapters, of seeking advice from other Works Councils in the region 
where it felt more experience of the grievance legislation may have been 
gained.
The cases demonstrate a variety of problems brought to the attention of 
the Works Council. The role of the Works Council, in my view, was not only to 
adhere to the legislation but to seek solutions as quickly as possible. As 
this Chapter indicates, the Works Council took its role very seriously and 
sought solutions whenever possible within two weeks of a complaint being made 
- earlier if feasible. Some solutions were taken out of the Works Council’s 
hands by the Company who were clearly capable of resolving employee complaints 
without Works Council assistance, e.g. the de facto trainer and early 
retirement employee (Category 1 - Case C, and Category 3 - Case B, 
respectively).
I considered, however, that in many cases the Works Council were used as 
a Welfare Agency and employees did not do enough to help themselves; equally, 
some of the cases should have been handled by a sympathetic Personnel 
Department. This was not a view shared by my Works Council colleagues, 
notably the Germans, as they considered employee welfare to be a major Works 
Council reponsibility. I did not dispute this but I warned them on several 
occasions, in 1980 and 1981, that Works Councils were in danger of being 
neutralised by the Company, who were obviously content to see us handling 
these cases thus keeping Works Council attention away from potentially more 
serious matters, for example, alleged discrimination (Chapter 4). As 
indicated in previous Chapters from time to time, the Works Council sought 
advice from other Works Councils in the region. This Chapter was no exception
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see for instance Category 3 - Case B, and whenever other Works Councils were 
consulted, they generally agreed with the methods employed in seeking 
solutions to grievances but considered with their number of employees (in some 
cases up to 8,000) they would not have been as willing to become involved. 
Their Company's often had substantial trade union membership and had formal 
grievance procedures to be used prior to Works Council involvement.
As no stage was there any trade union involvement in grievances handled 
by the Works Councils of which I was a member. This was possibly due to a low 
trade union membership (see Chapter 3) and I cannot recall any agrieved 
employee requesting trade union representation or advice. Given the Company's 
employee size (Chapter 3) the Phase 2 Works Council considered a formal 
grievance procedure was unnecessary when the matter was discussed at the 
inaugeral December 1979 meeting.
Category 1 - Salary
Case A (August 1980)
An employee received zero increase in salary at mid-year review. His 
Supervisor allegedly stated this was solely because the Personnel Manager 
would not allow it.
There were two elements here; firstly, the need to educate the employee 
that mid-year salary reviews are based on performance and, as such, are not an 
automatic right; secondly, the alleged statement by the Supervisor. The Works 
Council discussed the situation immediately with the employee during which the 
first element was introduced and understood. Next an informal approach one 
week later to the Supervisor, who initially denied the alleged statement.
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The Works Council then arranged for employee, Supervisor and Works Council 
representative to meet three days later. At the meeting the Supervisor 
retracted his denial but insisted that if the matter was taken formally to the 
Personnel Manager, the denial would be reinstated. The Supervisor further 
stated that the employee's performance had been satisfactory (note, not above 
average warranting financial recognition). The Works Council discussed the 
grievance with the Personnel Manager on a one-on-one basis the following day 
and he confirmed that he did monitor the Supervisor's evaluation and had 
concluded from regular dealings with the employee concerned that his (the 
employee's) professional performance was not above average; the Personnel 
Manager had then approached the Supervisor concerned who had agreed and 
withdrawn the recommendation for salary increase. The Supervisor confirmed 
the Personnel Manager's story to the Works Council and said it had a strong 
element of truth, but emphasized that he felt he had been intimidated into 
agreement. The series of events was related to the employee the next day and 
he was requested to consider whether he wanted to take the matter further, for 
example, a meeting between all concerned. The employee withdrew his complaint 
at that stage on the basis that he did not wish to prolong the agony, neither 
did he wish to be seen as a rebel in the eyes of the Personnel Manager.
Advice from other Works Councils in the region revealed that they would have 
dropped the grievance after the Personnel Manager confirmed he had agreed with 
the Supervisor, not to give the employee a salary increase on the basis that, 
the Personnel Manager was technically correct otherwise he would not have even 
discussed the matter with the Works Council.
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Case B (July 1980)
An employee was promoted with zero salary increase with a verbal promise 
of a salary review after six months; after nine months no salary increase had 
been forthcoming.
The elements herewere the verbal promise and proof thereof, the 
employee’s performance during the six month period, and the general morality 
of the situation. Firstly, the employee could not prove the promise was made 
and revealed that it was a conversation between himself and his Supervisor 
prior to his formal promotion offer. Secondly, the employee had not sought, 
or been subject to, formal reviews of his progress during the period since 
promotion; he had assumed no news was good news. The Works Council decided 
the immediate approach should be directly to the Personnel Manager who, in 
turn, agreed to investigate. He reported two days later to the Works Council 
that having investigated the matter the employee had not been promised 
anything in writing, or to his knowledge, therefore the promise did not exist. 
In terms of the employee’s performance, Personnel considered that he had met 
the standards required - just, and the reason for zero salary increase at 
promotion was that he was overpaid in his previous position within the 
Company. There was a general recognition by Personnel of mistakes made in the 
past, particularly not having appraised the employee’s performance on a 
regular basis (see also chapter 5). The Works Council pointed out that 
whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, an individual employee would 
now doubtless be bearing a grudge and when the story emerged on the 
"grapevine" at it inevitably would, general morale would dip and mistrust 
develop. The Personnel Manager further agreed to include in discussion the 
dangers of such situations whenever he had contact with Supervision in hiring 
and/or promotion. The employee was informed one day later by the Works
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Council and decided to take no further action. Advice from other Works
Councils in the region was to have advised the employee not to have pursued
the matter as soon as it became apparent that the employee could not prove any 
promises had been made. As a general policy, the Works Council took upon 
itself to reinforce to employees the statement, most notably at General
Assemblies, that if it is not in writing it does not exist when it comes to
personal employment contracts.
Case C (May 1980)
An employee took on the de facto role of trainer of new employees on a 
section and complained to the Works Council that there was no financial reward 
for the training role but felt unable to refuse to carry out the task.
The Works Council sought an immediate informal discussion with the 
employee and his Supervisor at which the employee’s problem was examined. The 
Supervisor took a sympathetic view and wished to take up the question of 
financial reward with the Personnel Manager, and requested Works Council 
support should it become nessary. The Works Council mentioned the case during 
an ad hoc meeting with the Company two days later, and the Personnel Manager 
agreed to investigate. Within one week the employee advised the Works Council 
that a substantial cash payment had been offered as a one-off arrangement and 
was happy to accept. The Works Council pointed out that if the training role 
was to continue, perhaps a salary increase would have been more appropriate. 
The employee refused to consider further action(s) and insisted that the Works 
Council ceased activity on the case. Informal discussion with the employee 
four weeks later at a social occasion revealed that part of the agreement with 
the Company, in return for the one-off payment, was to ensure Works Council 
took no further action; the employee also stated if that part of the
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arrangement became public, the revelation would be denied. No further action 
obviously possible.
Case D (May 1981)
A Group of employees approached the Works Council and insisted that their 
salaries were low in comparison to other comparable empolyees within the 
Company; they requested the Works Council to confirm that the salaries were 
low and assist in rectifying the situation.
A delicate problem for the Works Council was that it was feasible to 
compare salaries (available from a salary list issued quarterly to it by the 
Company) but they were unable to provide detailed information concerning a 
more representative salary to an employee without disclosing confidential 
information concerning salaries. Equally, on reviewing individual 
qualifications, experience and type of task being performed, it was easy to 
see why there was a disparity between the employees who raised the grievance. 
The Works Council recommended to these employees that they took their 
grievance initially to their Supervision and, in the event that they did not 
achieve satisfaction, request Works Council presence at a meeting with the 
Personnel Manager. The employees accepted our recommendation made within two 
days of the complaint. In parallel, as the employees worked in an area of the 
Company with a high staff turnover (25% compared to the Company average of 
4%), the Works Council mentioned the possiblity of low morale and general 
dissatisfaction in the area to the Personnel Manager at an ad hoc meeting 
called that week by the Works Council on another subject.
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The group of employees were interviewed over a three day period 
individually and separately by both their Supervision and the Personnel 
Manager; this resulted in all but one employee dropping their claims and 
immediately withdrawing their requests for Works Council involvement - no 
reason being given. The remaining employee, insisted on another meeting with 
the Personnel Manager with Works Council presence. Whilst arrangement were 
being made for such a meeting, the employee withdrew the request and would not 
give a reason. Clearly, the Works Council could take no further action(s) 
other than continue monitoring salaries; remarkably, the group of employees 
all received token salary increases at the next mid-year review and one of 
them (the last to withdraw the claim) was promoted some time later.
Category 2 - Expenses
Case A (February 1980)
An Employee on Company business was delayed at an International airport 
by runway closure, due to an aircraft accident, and claimed expenses based on 
a 15 hour day rather then the 12 hour day scheduled. The expense claim was 
refused in total.
The difficulty lay in the regulations governing any Company's ability to 
have travel expenses set against tax. The Company could have paid the 
employee's claim in full but the tax authorities would only allow, in this 
case, the 12 hour claim against tax; many Company contracts did have some 
clauses imposed in them by Customers, insisting that claims for travel and 
subsistence levied against the contract would not exceed the maximum permitted 
tax deductible amounts; another definition is that claims over and above such 
amounts were to be paid out of the Company's operating budget or profit.
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The Company therefore was somewhat sensitive to expense claims above the norm. 
The circumstances of the claim, however, were different and the Works Council 
considered that the Company should have been more sympathetic.
The Works Council approached the Accounts Department to verify that the 
reasons for the rejection of the claim was solely based on regulations rather 
than personalities. It was confirmed that regulations were the issue. The 
Personnel Manager was remarkably understanding when the Works Council raised 
the matter with him a day later and, subject to proof of delayed flights, 
agreed to intervene on the employee's behalf without prejudice to any future 
situation. The proof was forthcoming as was settlement of the expense claim. 
The employee in this case demonstrated a somewhat typical attitude of seeking 
Works Council assistance without exhausting available avenues.
Case B (June 1980)
An employee from a partner enterprise Company returned to his former 
place of residence, at Company expense, as agreed in his Contract of 
Employment on an annual basis; the expense claim submitted was rejected 
because of the route used.
The Works Council established with the employee at the time the complaint 
was raised that the total expense claim met the guideline of not exceeding the 
cost of airfares when travelling by private car. The employee insisted that 
the route was known in advance to his Supervisor and had in fact, reduced the 
mileage travelled by virtue of the car ferry route, which had eliminated the 
necessity for an overnight stop en route and was approximately equal to 
previous year's claims. The employees was, however, unable to obtain his 
Supervision's support in arguing his case and on that basis had sought Works 
Council assistance.
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The calculations geographically proved the employee’s case, although a 
glance at the physical map of Europe without knowledge of motoways, ferry 
routes etc., would have supported an initial rejection of the claim. The 
Personnel Manager was immediately approached by the Works Council. His 
attitude centred on approval in advance of the route used and rapidly became a 
matter of principle with him. It took four more meetings over two weeks 
between the Personnel Manager and the Works Council before he agreed that the 
issue at stake was financial and not a matter of principle. Finally, he 
accepted the calculations showing comparative routes and circumstances, 
versus the overall cost had the claim been based on airfares. Initially, I 
had considered the situation to be another case of an employee not exhausting 
available avenues prior to Works Council involvement. On reflection, the 
employee would not have succeeded had he not sought the assistance of the 
Works Council.
Case C (September 1980)
An employee claimed expenses for a business trip which were rejected on 
the basis that the trip was an errand. Problem was when was a business trip 
an errand and vice-versa?
Essentially, an errand was defined as a visit to an establishement within 
the area covered by the city telephone directory; outside that area of 30 
kilometres it was a business trip and, therefore, subject to daily subsistence 
rates. The errand in this case was a visit that lasted a full working day 
and, as such, the employee incurred expenses such as lunch for which he was 
not entitled to reimbursement under the Company’s area definition. The 
definition was in the Company’s favour but the Works Council approached them 
on a common sense basis, two days after the complaint had been made by the
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employee but without success. No further progress was made in this matter 
despite various Works Council protests and procrastinations at three meetings 
held in the following month; the case was cited at the General Assembly held 
during November 1980, as a warning to all employees. The warning was 
apparently successful in that no further incidents occurred. The Works 
Council did, one month after the General Assembly, attempt to re-define the 
area regulation, for an errand, to a radius of 10 kilometres from the 
Company’s location in a memorandum to the Company. The Company formally 
refused the Works Council request within a week without giving a satisfactory 
explanation.
Category 3 - Personality Clashes
Case A (February 1980)
An older employee allegedly made statements verging on the libel against 
a much younger employee who sought Works Council assistance and advice.
The two employees worked in the same department and had contact only in 
that the mail distribution point was located in the older employee’s office. 
The statements began essentially on the topic of personal relationships 
outside office hours and the general differences in views of life that exist 
between two generations. The situation had deteriorated into verbal abuse by 
both sides culminating in the older employee seeking legal advice and the 
younger employee’s complaint to the Works Council. It was immediately 
established by the Works Council that employee’s Supervision were aware of the 
clashes but had not sought to relieve the tensions by, at the very least, 
discussing the situation with both employees. The Works Council pursued such 
an approach but Supervision and Personnel showed a great reluctance to become
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involved. Peace in the Works (Article 2) did not seem to matter. A week 
later, the Personnel Manager made it very clear at a meeting with the Works 
Council that he felt it was a Supervision task to solve the problem and 
certainly not his or the Works Council’s. On four separate occasions in the 
next two weeks, the Works Council tried to arrange a meeting with all relevant 
parties, without success. As a last resort, the Works Council pursuaded the 
Supervision in the third week to change the mail location point and collection 
arrangement which resulted in zero contact betwen the two employees. This 
considerably reduced the tensions and litigation threats subsided some eight 
weeks later; eventually, the younger employee left the Company in May 1980.
The reason for leaving was given as career advancement rather than the 
personality problem. This was a pity because it was generally considered by 
the Works Council that the employee was a above-average performer and had made 
a good contribution to the efficiency of the Company.
Case B (May 1980)
An older employee made a request to the Works Council to hold a 
referendum on the removal of the Personnel Manager from the Company.
This verbal request followed the hiring of another employee, 
subsequently made responsible to the older employee who consequently 
discovered the new employee was earning approximately twenty percent more in 
salary. It was well known that the older employee and the Personnel Manager 
did not like each other and that several stong verbal exchanges had occurred 
between them over the previous year on various matters.
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Having calmed the irate older employee, the Works Council investigated 
his claim that his subordinate’s salary exceeded his own. His claim proved to 
be well-founded, although the salary was commensurate with the new employee's 
experience and qualifications; the older employee had little or no academic 
qualifications but considerable relevant experience and, indeed, was rapidly 
approaching retirement age.
The Works Council sought advice from other Works Councils in the region 
about the requested referendum. Their advice was that such a referendum had 
no legal basis and if it were to be held the Company would be able to seek the 
Labour Court removal of the Works Council on the bais of being unable to work 
further with those elected (Article 2); they also pointed out that this could 
be exactly what the Company was seeking in view of the Article 75 situation 
(alleged discrimination covered in Chapter 4). Further discussion took place 
between the older employee and the Works Council one week later, at which the 
Works Council advised that it was possible the Company had taken on the new 
employee with a view to replacing the older employee when he retired; the 
older employee recognized the possiblity and was so incensed at the possible 
repercussions of a referendum explained to him by the Works Council, that he 
withdrew his request on the basis of not wishing to be associated with such 
repercussions. At a June 1980 ad hoc meeting between the Works Council and 
the Personnel Manager, the retirement situation was discussed. The Personnel 
Mamager followed up the discussion a day later with the older employee and, 
although tensions eased a little, the situation was a long way short of being 
acceptable; shortly afterwards (August 1980) the older employee was offered 
and accepted, without seeking Works Council advice, early retirement 
arrangements.
(179)
Case C (June 1980)
An employee left the Company. His de facto deputy appeared to be the 
natural successor. The Company appointed a replacement from the external 
labour market at a higher salary than the leaver. The passed-over employee 
complained to the Works Council about the situation and said the Personnel 
Manager had stopped him getting the job.
The Company’s selection procedure (Article 99 covers actual hiring) was 
not part of the co-determination rights of the Works Council (Article 87) but 
the Works Council could, and did, insist that internal applications received 
full and fair consideration for any vacant post (Article 93). At the time of 
the hiring, in May 1980, the Works Council had strongly opposed the outside 
applicant when there seemed to be a better choice available internally. The 
information provided to the Works Council at that time demonstrated,that the 
internal applicant could not match the Company’s choice in experience and/or 
qualification (although he clearly had the edge in knowledge of the Company 
and the system), and that the internal applicant had received serious 
consideration including a formal interview. The Works Council had confirmed 
with the internal applicant that he had, indeed, received an interview and was 
satisfied with the way matters were proceeding. Clearly, the situation had 
turned sour when he was informed that his application was unsuccessful.
The employee was advised by the Works Council two days after his 
complaint that in their view he had received fair consideration and, without 
revealing details, explained that there were significant differences between 
himself and the appointee, favouring the appointee. He agreed he had not been 
led to believe he would be successful in his application but considered the
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Works Council had let him down badly. No amount of discussion could shake him 
from such an illogical view. It was also apparent from the discussion that he 
had no foundation for his allegation concerning the Personnel Manager. The 
Works Council offered to attend a meeting between employee and Personnel 
Manager to clarify their respective attitudes but the employee refused, 
accusing the Works Council of being pro-management. Clearly one voter lost 
forever.
Case D (June 1981)
A non-white employee alleged that colleagues of the Department concerned 
showed discrimination in attitude. There were only two non-white employees in 
the Company.
.Investigation by the Works Council informally revealed that there was 
indeed a problem but centred around two employees. The non-white’s work 
output and general performance met the required standard. The colleague 
concerned could best be described as a domineering workaholic who consistently 
produced an extremely high work rate. The colleague was irritated by the 
non-white’s inability and perhaps unwillingness to match her high work rate; 
this irritation was shown predominantly in a lack of patience with the 
non-white's difficulty in speaking German fluently particularly in social 
conversations. Our workaholic colleague was known to have particular respect 
for one Works Councillor, professionally and socially, so his influence was 
used in a one-on-one informal discussion a week later to defuse the situation. 
The two colleagues were then brought together by the Works Council. The 
invitation was extended to the employee's Supervisor but he declined to 
attend. The problem was solved with both parties agreeing to show a little 
more tolerance of each other. Supervision’s lack of interest in the case was
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essentially due to the autocratic nature of the Supervisor and clear dislike 
of Works Council involvement in his area. Having advised the Personnel 
Manager the day after the meeting, as a matter of courtesy, the opportunity 
was taken by the Works Council to urge some form of management training for 
the Supervisor in people management. The Personnel Manager agreed to discuss 
the matter with the Supervisor. No further action necessary on the part of 
the Works Council.
Case E (November 1981)
A Supervisor was made responsible to another Supervisor of the same rank 
on the basis that he had not shown the managerial qualities required and his 
professional knowledge left a great deal to be desired. The Supervisor 
alleged that he had been denied training opportunities by the Head of 
Department with whom there existed a clash of personalities.
The Works Council immediately sought the Personnel Manager’s views on 
the situation and his view was generally supportive of the Supervisor’s 
effective demotion based on the Departmental Head’s assessment; he was, 
however, suprised to learn that the Supervisor had been seeking training 
opportunities and agreed to investigate. A week later, the Personnel Manager 
confirmed to the Works Council that there had not been any training requests. 
The Works Council immediately established with the Supervisor that such 
requests had only been made orally but had been specific and detailed. His 
Head of Department had turned down the requests initially on the basis that 
the courses were not relevant. From this situation had developed a clash of 
personalities which had stretched over a period of two years with somewhat 
disastrous results. All parties were brough together by the Works Council in 
December 1981 for a full and frank discussion, and there were lessons to be
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learned by both Supervisor and Departmental Head. The Supervisor remained 
sceptical about the Departmental Head's motives but accepted that he had not 
helped himself in the problem. From the Works Council’s point of view, it was 
another case of if it was not in writing, it did not exist. The workplace 
solution acceptable to all, was for the Supervisor to operate as a one man 
team, using the opportunity to attend relevant technical and managerial 
training courses, and review his progress over the following year at regular 
intervals. The Works Council and Personnel continued to monitor the situation 
at monthly intervals ensuring that the Supervisor remained happy with his 
progress. No further problem occured.
Category 4 - Miscellaneous
Case A (October 1980)
Vandalism in the car park resulted in damage to several employees’ 
vehicles and they requested Works Council assistance to obtain compensation 
from the Company.
The car park was owned by a local Company who administeredthe industrial 
estate on which our Company was located. Our Company negotiated terms 
annually for the employees and contributed fifty percent of the monthly rental
cost; the rental agreements were, however, between the individual and the
industrial estate administration. Any complaints therefore must be taken up 
by the individual and not against our Company. The Works Council did, 
however, obtain agreement with Personnel within one week to formally protest 
about car park security arrangements. The small print in the rental contracts 
contained a disclaimer clause, and the employees thus withdrew their request
for Works Council intervention in November 1980.
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Case B (February 1980)
Two employees from the UK requested Works Council assistance to establish 
with the Company why arrangements for evacuation were not available in the 
event of a Soviet invasion of West Germany.
Clearly, one of the more usual requests. The Company’s view was that 
whilst they were obligated to be socially responsible towards their employees, 
evacuation in the case of any invasion was beyond any bounds of 
reasonableness. The Works Council recognized this prior to requesting the 
Company to comment but it was considered worthy of at least asking the 
question. Concerned employees were advised by the Works Council to contact 
the British Consulate.
Case C (March 1980)
An employee sought Works Council assistance because he was not sure of 
individual job duties and alleged he could not clarify them with his 
Supervision.
This was a common problem (some 30% of all grievances) and it soon became 
apparent to the Works Council that many of such complaints were either 
unfounded or simply a case of re-writing a job description with the 
Supervisor’s assistance (and Personnel agreement). No serious confrontation 
occurred between the Works Council and the Company when dealing with this type 
of complaint which was usually resolved within a week, by the Works Council 
approaching the relevant Supervisor.
Case D (April 1980)
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An employee received written demand from Personnel for the return of 
interest accumulated on interest free loans.
This situation arose in terms of the Company, on request, would provide 
an interest free loan to new employees for the purpose of paying a deposit on 
rented accommodation (see also Chapter 4). The deposit was usually three 
months rent, held in a bonded account and returnable to the tenant at the end 
of tenancy assuming no damage had been done to the accommodation.
The Company argued in the written demand that interest accumulated on the 
account and should be repaid to them, i.e. the loan was interest free to the 
employee, not the landlord. Morally, a reasonable case if the interest could 
be extracted from the landlord. Very few people escaped losing some of the 
deposit and the Company insisted on full repayment of the loan.
The Works Council considered that the loan was payable to the employee; 
what the employee did with it was his business, especially if the Company 
would not become involved in disputes with landlords. Similarly, the loan was 
interest free. Such advice was given by the Works Council to any employees 
who found themselves in that situation. The Company mishandled this problem 
very badly indeed and caused considerable irritation amongst employees. Some 
employees caved in under the moral pressure and repaid interest they may have 
never received. Others successfully held out. The Works Council orally 
suggested to Personnel in May 1980 that if the matter was so important, they 
should request future new employees to sign an agreement that interest 
accumulated and received by the employee, would be repaid to the Company.
This suggestion was put into immediated effect but it did not prevent the
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Company from the occasional attempt with longer serving employees whose 
tenancy had ended or were moving to another area.
Summary
The forgoing cases demonstrated a variety of problems brought to the 
attention of the Works Council. A detailed analysis of all individual 
grievances encountered during the thirty month period of study was:-
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 total no of percentage of
(6 months) grievances all grievances
salary 12 9 6 27 25.3
expenses 7 7 4 18 16.8
personality 10 7 7 24 22.4
clashes
job duties 13 12 7 32 29.9
other _1 _3 2 6 5.6
total 43 38 26 107 100
There is no other study available enabling an analysis of this empirical 
evidence in order to judge whether it is typical of otherwise of grievances 
within comparable companies. Informal discussion with members of other Works 
Councillors in the region revealed that they did not compile statistical data 
of this nature. I was advised however that from their practical experience 
over the same period, clarification of job duties was of a similar magnitude; 
the major grievance in their Companies was that of salary (some sixty percent 
of all grievances). Clear limitations to my stastical data are that 
personality clashes may well have been due to the mix of nationalities within
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the Company (see chapter 3) and a comparison of trade union involvement in 
grievances was meaningless because Chapter 3 also demonstrated the Works 
Council and the trade unionist are one person in 80% of all Company Works 
Councils excluding the Company in this study.
A meaningful analysis was however that using the manpower figures stated 
in Chapter 3, only 14% of the Company’s employees brought their grievance to 
the Works Council annually; in Thimm’s "The False Promise of Codetermination" 
pp 163 to 169, an empirical study of the Works Council in Siemens showed that 
74% of the employees do not take their grievance to the Works Council (54% of 
the 74% went to Supervision and the remainder went to colleagues). Thimm also 
identified in the study what Siemens employees expected of the Works Council 
ie 43% counsel and information, 36% solving general problems and 10% 
assistance in dealing with top management. According to Thimm his study 
showed "the Works Council serves both as a social welfare agency and a tool of 
worker participation". This Chapter supports Thimm’s analysis of the Works 
Council being a social welfare agency within a Company containing a low 
percentage of trade union members (over 60% of Siemens employees in Thimm’s 
study did not belong to a trade union).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Works Councils in West Germany are supposed to function as a connecting 
link between employees and management thereby serving as a kind of buffer 
between potentially conflicting spheres of interest. Within the cross-fire, 
based essentially on legal provisions and not on mutual agreement, the first 
aim of the Works Council should be to neutralise tensions in order to fulfil 
its legally prescribed functions. The Works Council must also ensure that it 
is not distanced from employees by either its own actions or by those of the 
management. The efficiency of the Works Council is decisively determined by 
whether it is successful in working within the more or less neutralised 
marginal spheres of labour-management relations. In attempting to achieve 
this it is handicapped by several difficulties which take the form of problems 
of representation, of social integration and solidarity with the interests of 
all employees. Sometimes employees feel that the Works Council belongs to the 
management 1. This is particularly underlined by the fact that a Works 
Council functioning in an orderly way depends to a large extent upon the means 
of communication provided by the management.
The Works Council, like management, faces the problem of overcoming the 
social distance between itself and employees (see for example Chapter 3). The 
only opportunity for contact with large numbers of the employees is during 
elections and at general assemblies which take place during working hours; 
since employees are not interested in detailed successes and plans or 
political problems, the Works Council needs to create two way communication 
at general assemblies in order to prevent boredom and/or apathy by employees 
(Chapter 3).
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If a Works Council takes the initiative it faces determined resistance 
from the management (Chapter 5). Management still insists on making main 
decisions. The Works Council is however unable to enforce basic decisions, 
since its power is merely constituted by law; the basic organisational 
structure is missing and the Works Council, though it has the power of 
negotiation, has not the power to enforce its position through the exercise of 
sanctions. (Chapter 4). It can be said that from an organisational point of 
view the Works Council is an appendage of the Company structure and its 
functioning is dependent upon a successfully functioning management. On the 
other hand its very existence may foster the peaceful development of 
industrial relations and this may help the Company become more effective both 
technically and economically.
If a Works Council wishes to operate successfully with management its 
relations have to be close; a certain degree of integretation of the Works 
Council into the Company structure represented by the management appears to be 
unavoidable. Management attitudes however towards the Works Council differ 
widely according to personal and background factors. After having overcome 
its initial reserve and uncertainty towards newly elected members of the Works 
Council, mamagement usually attempts to utilise their functions for its own 
purposes and to integrate (or coerce) them into the existing social system of 
the Company. Management can benefit from the existence of a Works Council if 
this body helps the personnel department in fulfilling part of its tasks 
(Chapter 6). In some cases the Works Council activities are even welcomed by 
management because they save time and money eg. the de facto welfare service 
often provided by the Works Council. Besides being useful such activity takes 
up a substantial amount of the Works Council members’ time and energy and may 
hinder them from being active in more crucial areas.
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Co-operation becomes more difficult where joint decisions on Company 
rules and systems have to be made. For example Chapter 5 demonstrates it took 
more than 22 months of negotiation on a performance appraisal system. This 
example also demonstrates the bureaucratisation of labour-management 
relations, which is due to the fact that the negotiations are mostly carried 
out in a judicial manner (Chapter 4). As management often has a legal advisor 
quickly available, legalistic interpretations are often taken of Works Council 
initiatives to make an obstinate Works Council ineffective.
There are areas in which the Works Council can be used as an executive 
organ of management policy. In order to obtain this type of co-operation, 
management has to give in to some of the demands which the Works Council may 
make on behalf of the workforce; some give - and - take was missing from the 
Works Council - Company relationship in this study. It may be said that the 
more successfully Works Council co-operate with management, the more they 
become incorporated into the Company and consequently their policy is 
influenced by the policy of the Company or even neutralised by the Company.
Certainly there exists in other Works Councils a problem of solidarity 
between the Works Council and the general policy of the trade union movement
2. Formally a Works Council should be independent of both management and the 
trade unions. The 1972 LMRA provides that the trade unions have no direct 
influence on the constitution of the Works Council but in reality trade union 
membership on Works Councils is high (Chapter 3) although not in this study; 
trade unions do provide a positive opportunity for the training of Works 
Council members and are able to provide free legal advice when conflict 
situations arise between Works Councils and management. Actually, the trade 
unions are the only organisations which can strengthen the Works Council 
particularly Works Council negotiating weakness but as in this study, Works 
Councils are able to operate without the support of the trade unions.
(190)
Though Works Councils in West Germany are an effective means of ensuring 
Workers’ participation in management, their scope is definitely limited by the 
legislation. Similarly, the Works Council is a marginal institution at the 
crossing point of two interest groups - namely management and employees. Only 
in a few areas is it possible for these groups to use the Works Council 
totally for its own purposes. In this study, the Works Council tried to make 
its own policy according to its real situation and this, means that it is more 
likely to make opportunist policy.
There are only limited opportunities for a Works Council to give 
employees the feeling of real participation in management; the most promising 
outlet for Works Council activity lies in influencing the execution of 
decisions. The lack of opportunity to create Company policy and a lack of 
comprehensive information from management, may lead to inner conflict within 
the Works Council as well as with management. In periods of social unrest 
(perceived or thought to be perceived), the Works Council is less a promoter 
than a barometer of the stability of the social system of the Company. 
Nevertheless, Works Councils are able to neutralise not only themselves but 
general conflict situations. Thimm (1980) argues that the high level of 
social co-operation between employees, Works Councils and management that 
prevails in the model co-determination companies, eg. Volkswagen and Siemens, 
is not typical of Works Council determination throughout West Germany 3.
Thimm also concludes that Works Councils representing five hundred employees 
or less play a negligible role and strong management is able to reduce 
co-determination to a one way flow of information.
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In my view, the Works Council is not in business to protect employees 
from themselves; if it adopts such a policy it will, regardless of size, 
become a Thimm statistic. I realise that the welfare role of the Works Council 
is important but feel that the Company used that role to neutralise the Works 
Council as much as possible (see Chapter 6). In this study the Works Council 
was fundamentally a lost cause without strong trade union support - the events 
of Chapter 4 may well have been different for instance.
Perhaps the success of a Works Council like that of the individual 
depends, ultimately, on choice. It is not natural in the sense in which 
legislation is often natural and intended to be progressive.
It is clear however that without the untiring and devoted efforts of West 
German trade unionists, able to hold their own in debate with politicians and 
academics of renown, Works Councils never would been brought about. It has to 
be recognised that there are many difficulties that stand in the way of 
developing and expanding Works Councils. Simmilar difficulties could be 
encountered if the concept of the Works Counil were to be attempted in the UK 
- if nothing else because the concepts were, in the last resort, despite all 
the theorising, worked out on West German shop floors and board rooms and are 
backed by years of experience (see also Chapter 2). Works Councils have 
replaced some of the tension by co-operation and understanding which could 
help the UK situation. Unfortunately, the significance of the German 
achievement in the modern industrial age is in my view totally overestimated; 
the danger for Britain is that if the political parties agree that in many 
ways the West German past economic prosperity and industrial peace is a 
demonstration of the theory’s success, theory might be transplanted without 
any real regard for the reality of Britain’s industrial relations. Whilst the 
feasibility of such a transplant would be difficult, it should be stressed
(192)
that the system of Works Councils in West Germany is one part of the 
interdependant institutional framework ie. industrial and rather bureaucratic 
trade unions involved in fairly centralised pay negotiations, national and 
regional, and regulated by an elaborate system of labour law in particular; 
the relationship between Works Councils and Board level representation 
especially in larger companies is crucial. Thus West German Works Councils 
should not be seen in isolation either from the other major institutional 
forms or from the economic context which in turn, has supported an ideological 
framework that is quite different from that in the UK. Obstacles to 
transplanting the West German Works Council legislation into Britain would be 
trade union opposition to judiciary involvement in industrial relations, 
opposition to anything resembling the Bullock Report or reductions of trade 
union power such as the so-called "Prior” and "Tebbit" legislation, management 
beliefs and practices. Works Councils could move away from the collective, 
single channel of representation used.in the UK to a flexible conception of 
representation. This would be an attraction for certain political parties 
especially those interested in ending the closed shop and insisting upon 
ballots; the attraction would be disliked by active trade unionists and would 
be a most important part of their objection to Works Councils rather than any 
principled objection to the legislation. Some employers would probably prefer 
a legally regulated system of Works Councils to current workplace bargaining 
particularly where unions are strongly organised; many, where unions are weak 
or non-existent would resist Works Councils as an infringement of their 
de facto perogative; presumably the longer an economic recession lasts, the 
second group would become larger.
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For Works Councils to succeed in UK, the legislation must include full 
and real co-determination rights regardless of Company size or strategic 
importance of the economy; perhaps this is advocating worker control of plants 
but not as a substitute for democracy.
It is clear that any Works Council in West Germany is faced with the 
increasing difficulty of distinguishing negotiation from consultation; indeed 
a special creature is required which does more than consult but less than 
bargain. In my view, the result is a tension and a paradox. On the one hand, 
relative inefficiency, stagnation and prolonged alienation are the inevitable 
accompaniments of the systemised elitism and repression that are necessary to 
carry out the first order of business; the preservation of power. On the 
other hand, the system is well designed to be impervious to the consequence of 
the failures and social demoralization that are built into it.
Based upon my unique experience of Works Councils, I therefore consider 
that as a system of management accountability they are successful in West 
Germany; as a basis for employee involvement and participation, they are not 
totally successful; as a major influence on co-operation and a cause of low 
levels of conflict, perhaps successful but as economic conditions deteriorate 
and unemployment rises then it is probable that employees may realise that 
Works Councils are not the panacea they first thought. To transplant the 
Works Council system (not Worker Directors etc) into UK might be the labour 
movement’s road to real participation of the 1980s, assuming that the movement 
faces the reality of their currently weak position in society.
(194)
NOTES
1. A view also expressed by Mausolff.A. in "Gewerkschaft und Betriebsrat in
Urteil der Arbitnehmer.11 Darmstadt. 1952.
2. See for instance Furstenberg.F. "Workers Paricipation in Management in
the Federal Republic of Germany" I.I.L.S. Geneva. 1978.
3. Thimm A.L. "The False Promise of Co-determination." Lexington. Toronto. 
1980.
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